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ABSTRACT 
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OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY 
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HISTORY M.A. THESIS, JULY 2019 
 
Thesis Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
 
 
Keywords: Ottomans in North Africa, Tripoli, Karamanlı Dynasty, Ottoman 
Intervention, Ottoman Imperialism 
 
 
This thesis is a study of the relationship between the Ottoman central administration and 
North African periphery, and more specifically, Tripoli in the first half of the 19th 
century. The region was ruled by a local dynasty of Anatolian origin, Karamanlıs, 
virtually independent from the Sublime Porte for more than a century. After the outbreak 
of the unremedied internal upheavals in the 1830s, Ottoman center took the initiative to 
eliminate the ruling dynasty, thus stabilizing the region in 1835. The stability of the region 
was a top priority because of the Ottomans’ increased suspicion of further European 
encroachment after the French aggression in Algeria. Nonetheless, there were also other 
competitors preying on the Tripolitan territory, thus Ottoman action could be best 
understood as active participation in an inter-imperial competition. The process, however, 
shows us that the establishment of the central authority was the last resort. Before coming 
to that point, Ottomans worked hard to ensure a noise-free continuation of the Karamanlı 
Dynasty. The last part of the study attempts to make sense of Ottoman presence in the 
Tripoli after the intervention. It demonstrates that some elements of the so-called Ottoman 
orientalist attitude that came about in the late 19th century were taking root earlier. 
Nonetheless, it finds the use the terms such as colonialism and even orientalism 
problematic because the Ottoman imperial presence in Tripoli had never been officially 
defined as colonialism. Alternatively, the term “imperial repertoires of power” is utilized 
in accounting for the center-periphery relations in the period in question.    
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ÖZET 
 
 
 
TRABLUSGARP’A OSMANLI MÜDAHELESİ VE 19. YY’DA OSMANLI 
EMPERYALİZMİ TARTIŞMASI 
 
 
 
İBRAHİM KILIÇASLAN 
 
TARİH, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, TEMMUZ 2019 
 
Tez Danışmanı:  Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Kuzey Afrikada Osmanlılar, Trablusgarp, Karamanlı Hanedanı, 
Osmanlı Müdahelesi, Osmanlı Emperyalizmi 
 
Bu çalışma 19. Yüzyıl’ın ilk yarısında Osmanlı merkezi yönetimi ile Garp Ocakları 
arasında cari olan merkez-çevre ilişkisini daha ziyade Trablusgarp Ocağı çerçevesinde 
ele almaktadır. Trablusgarp Ocağı her ne kadar Osmanlı toprağı gibi gözükse de 18. 
Yüzyıl boyunca yerel bir hanedan olan Karamanlı ailesi tarafından merkezden neredeyse 
tamamen bağımsız bir şekilde yönetilmiştir. Ancak 1830’lu yılların başında bu hanedan 
bir yönetim krizinin içinde boğulmaya başlamış ve bölge şiddeti gittikçe artan bir iç 
karışıklık dönemine girmiştir. Osmanlı merkezi yönetimi öncelikle Karamanlı 
hanedanının devamını sağlayarak bölgeyi stabilize etmeye çalışmış, bunda başarısız 
olunca ise hanedanı 1835’in mayıs ayında yönetimden indirip merkezden vali göndererek 
bölgeyi olası bir dış işgale karşı güvence altına almıştır. Gerçekten de devletlerarası 
güvenlik endişeleri özellikle Cezayir’in işgali sonrasında artan Fransız etkinliği sebebiyle 
oldukça artmıştı. Diğer taraftan Fransızlar Kuzey Afrika’da genişleme arzusunda olan tek 
güç de değildi. Dolayısıyla 1830 ile 1835 yılları arasında Osmanlı bürokratları ve 
donanma ehlinin bölgedeki aktiviteleri devletlerarası bir güç mücadelesinde aktör olma 
çabası olarak okunmalıdır ki Trablusgarp özelinde bu mücadeleden galip çıkılmıştır. 
Çalışmanın son kısmında ise Osmanlı müdahalesinden sonra Trablusgarp’taki Osmanlı 
varlığı sorgulanmıştır. Literatürde 19. Yüzyılın sonlarında ortaya çıktığı savunulan 
Osmanlı oryantalist tavrının daha erken dönemde de emarelerinin var olduğu ortaya 
konulsa da bu tavrın kavramsallaştırılmasında oryantalizm ve kolonyalizm gibi 
kavramların kullanılması sorunlu görülmüştür. Çünkü Osmanlı Merkezi çeperlerindeki 
varlığını resmi olarak hiçbir zaman bu şekilde tanımlamamıştır. Bunun yerine daha esnek 
bir kavram olan “güç repertuvarı” kavramı önerilmiştir.  
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1.INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Historiography of the 18th Century Ottoman Empire works with the conception that the 
period in question was distinctly marked by a gradually developing localization of 
political power and its subsequent hereditation in some of the localities across the 
Empire.1 Accordingly, this trend had reached its epitome at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, a tide only to be reversed by the centralizing policies of Ottoman center starting 
from the reign of Mahmud II (Zürcher 2004, 21). It must be stated that these observations 
are very well-grounded in the historical realities of the period. However, this 
generalization should not lead us to overlook the regional varieties in the alignments of 
power because a quick survey of the imperial domains demonstrates that power relations 
within the Ottoman Empire of the 18th Century were far more complicated, each region 
having a special arrangement in terms of political authority, be that realized through 
intentional policy-making or have risen circumstantially. Such awareness is crucial 
because it is against the background of these regional differences that a historian of the 
19th Century Ottoman Empire could understand the process of centralization with its 
failures and successes. 
Starting from an extremely weak position, Mahmud II and the central government in 
Istanbul started to regain control of the imperial domains after the war with the Russian 
Empire was concluded in 1812. It took nearly a decade to subdue the local notables across 
Anatolia and Rumelia except for the Kurdish Emirates in Eastern Anatolia. A variety of 
methods was used during the process. At times Mahmud II was granting titles to win over 
loyalty or giving large sums of money out of his benevolence, at others he played upon 
the rivalries between the notables (Zürcher 2004, 29-30). Thus far, the process was 
 
1 For a classic example of this approach see (McGowan 1994); For a more recent critical perspective, see: Hathaway, 
2004); Ali Yaycıoğlu has recently offered a revisionist reading of the late 18th and early 19th century in the context of 
the Age of Revolutions, see: (Yaycıoğlu 2016). For a shorter version of his interpretation, see: (Yaycıoğlu 2011) 
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relatively peaceful. Yet, exactly at this moment, regional differences in the alignments of 
power played into the unfolding of events. In places where centrifugal forces did not feel 
an obligation to put up with the demands of Istanbul, the central government was 
compelled to resort to the use of coercive power and violence to redefine center-periphery 
relations. For example, in Bosnia, the dissidents found a champion in the person of 
Hüseyin Kapudan, who acted as de facto ruler of the province for a year before Ottomans 
finally suppressed his rebellion in 1832 and put him under house arrest in Istanbul. 
However, he continued to communicate with Bosnian notables to play his part in stirring 
rebellion until he died in 1834. (Turhan 2014, 461, 467, 469-470). Even though Reşid 
Mehmed Pasha’s extraordinary measures has broken the power of local families in 
Balkans Albania continued to be a center of opposition and 1840s witnessed the outbreak 
of several rebellions (Atabaş 2017, 3). At the other end of the Empire, Mamluks of 
Baghdad and Jalili family of Mosul remained resilient up until the 1831 and 1834, 
respectively.[2  Tuzcuoğulları also resisted in three phases before eventually being put 
down in 1834 (Aktepe 1953). At all these instances Ottomans used coercive methods and 
succeeded in crushing the local power base. However, it was not all that smooth in other 
regions. When Ali of Tepelene’s rebellion was subdued, the power vacuum was filled by 
the Greeks seeking independence from the Sublime Porte.3 Similarly, Mehmet Ali of 
Egypt and his successors had practically managed to carve a state of their own in the 
prosperous province of Egypt.4 
In the case of Ottoman provinces in North Africa and especially in Tripoli, it is rather 
imperative to ask how far was the political power centralized in the hands of the 
bureaucrats in Istanbul even before the process of decentralization had concurrently taken 
roots across the imperial domains in the 18th Century? Probably, not too far. Did 
Ottomans ever establish direct control over these territories and its inhabitants? The 
answer is a strict no. Even in the 16th century when Ottoman Empire was at the zenith of 
its power and prestige, the north African provinces and their infamous sailor/pirates were 
 
2 Jalili family’s gradual rise to political prominence and their eventual defeat to Ottoman centralization policy is best 
studied in (Khoury, 1997). For the downfall of Mamluks of Baghdad and subsequent integration of the province into 
central government’s hold, see: (Ceylan 2011) 
 
3 Ali Pasha’s rule in Balkans has been a relatively popular subject but most recently Katherine Flemming revisited the 
subject, see: (Flemming. 2014). In the Turkish language, there are also valuable studies focusing on his clash with 
centralization policies of Mahmud II, see for example: (Feyzioğlu 2017). 
 
4 For Egypt’s rise to international prominence under Mehmet Ali Pasha, see: (Fahmy 1997). For one of the best analysis 
of his bitter rivalry with Mahmud II in 1831-1841, see: (Kutluoğlu 1998). 
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cooperating with the Ottoman center, without being formally incorporated by it.5 Yet 
again, 17th and 18th centuries meant a radical change for these regions as well. In Tunisia, 
Muradi dynasty accumulated a vast amount of power, consequently securing a hereditary 
governorship after 1631. After a brief attempt to formally integrate the Tunisian Province 
into the Istanbul’s hold on the part of Ahmed III, Huseynid family had settled as 
hereditary governors of Tunisia replacing Muradis (Abun-Nasr 1987, 172-173). 
Similarly, in 1711, Karamanlı Ahmed Bey, a member of the Kuloğlu class, 6 established 
his family as hereditary governors.7  Each of these provinces had virtually become 
independent from Istanbul not only in terms of their domestic policy but also in dictating 
their own foreign policy priorities vis-à-vis European states and the United States of 
America. The localization and hereditation of political power went hand in hand in these 
regions before nearly anywhere else in the vast territories Ottoman rule extended. To look 
at the following anecdote would enlighten the extent of the disparity between the Ottoman 
capital and the provinces in North Africa. 
In the 1860s, Mustafa Aşir Efendi was appointed as the judge of Tripoli by Ottoman 
authorities in Istanbul. It was a fortunate moment, indeed, because nobody involved 
would have guessed that it would lead to the chain of events which ended up with his son 
Mehmed Nehicüddin Efendi having translated and expanded upon a crucial book on the 
history of the province of Tripoli; “Tarih-i Ibn Galbun Der Beyan-ı Trablusgarb.” He 
managed to complete his work by 1864 and it was published by the print house Ceride-i 
Havadis later in the 1867 (Nehicüddin Efendi and Hasan Sâfî 2013, vi). Approximately 
thirty years after Ottoman armed intervention in 1835 and establishment of the agents of 
the central government in the Tripoli, Nehicüddin Efendi, the writer of a first-ever 
dedicated history book on its subject, remarks that “the true particulars of Tripoli are 
unknown to us. Even though it is possible to gather bits and pieces of information from 
 
5 Unfortunately, the Ottoman Empire’s flexible rule in North Africa is not always thoroughly appreciated. There is an 
inclination especially in Turkish academia to see the nature of Ottoman rule as effectively centralized even in these 
regions. In fact, the Ottoman Empire was operating in different levels of integration and forms of sovereignty in 
different regions. See for an excellent discussion on limits of Ottoman power in frontier regions: (Agoston 2003). In 
the case of Ottoman North Africa, Emrah Safa Gürkan developed the most advanced analysis concerning center-
periphery relations, see: (Gürkan 2018). 
 
6 Kuloğlu is the name of the tax-exempt political elite in the North African provinces. They are a mixture of Janissaries 
coming from imperial heartlands with local women. At first, Kuloğlu class was not allowed to participate in politics of 
the region and was only expected to offer military service to the provincial administrator. However, as of the 18th 
century, their desire to take part in government bore fruit and they seized power concurrently all over the Maghreb. 
 
7 Karamanlı Ahmed’s rise to political power and the subsequent power struggle in Tripoli leading to the recognition he 
got from Ahmed III in 1722 can be easily followed in (Dearden 1976, 27-41). 
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various histories, all historians sufficed with passing on ancient wisdom …… such weak 
and little information can’t be helpful in forming a definitive opinion.”8 These are telling, 
indeed, in terms of understanding the Ottoman central government’s political 
involvement with the region. What is more striking would arrive a couple of pages after 
these opening remarks when Nehicüddin Efendi criticizes the writer of the original text 
of being irrational in accounting for the initial Ottoman conquest of Tripoli in 1551. 
Followingly, he states that “as these events pertain to the history of Istanbul, it seems 
convenient to summarize the truth of the matter from our histories.”9 Surprisingly, here 
we see a 19th century Ottoman ulema who clearly makes an us/them distinction between 
Tripolitania and Istanbul.    
In accordance with his observation, during my research for the writing of this thesis, it 
came to my attention that almost none of the official court historians of the period in 
question gives detailed accounts of what was happening in the North African provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire except for the invasion of Algeria by the French.10 Of course, it 
doesn’t mean that the Ottoman central government was completely indifferent to these 
regions. Official communication was continuing between Istanbul and the pashas of 
Tripoli and there is a considerable amount of information in the Mühimme registers that 
would help us understand the relations between Tripoli and Ottoman Capital.11However, 
tracing intimately the local history of the region from these records is rather problematic. 
Consequently, even a basic search in the Ottoman archives reveals that the documents 
produced after the 1830s outnumber nearly all the preceding centuries and this is not 
without a reason: the establishment of Ottoman central control over the province in 1835. 
A letter of reigning Yusuf Pasha arrived at the Sublime Porte in January 1833 (Taş 2016, 
388).12 It was containing some troubling news, especially in the light of recent French 
 
8 Translation is mine. For the original Turkish see: (Nehicüddin Efendi & Hasan Safi, 5). “… Trablusgarp’ın tefasil-i 
hakikiyyesi bizce meçhul olup filvaki bazı tarihlerden malumat-ı cüziyye alınmakta ise de …. öyle ahbar-ı zaife ve 
kalileden kanaat-i kafiye hasıl olamayacağından ….” 
 
9 Translation is mine. For original Turkish see: (Nehicüddin Efendi & Hasan Safi, 19). “Mamafih şu keyfiyet İstanbul 
vekayii olduğundan bizim tarihlerden hakikat-i halin ihtisaren beyanı münasip görülmüştür.” 
 
10 Even in this occasion, Ottoman court historians focus on how the Ottoman center diplomatically reacted to the French 
invasion of Algeria and they do not dwell much on socio-economic or political issues of the Algerian province itself. 
An obvious example is Ahmet Lütfi Efendi. See especially (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, 519-526, 899-908). 
 
11 Abdullah Erdem Taş uses Mühimme registers dating back to the 18th century to understand the dynamics of Ottoman 
Center-Tripolitan periphery, see: (Taş 2016). 
12 For the original of the letter see Cumhurbaşkanlığı Osmanlı Arşivi (Hereafter COA), HAT.366.20242-D. 1248/1832-
1833. 
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aggression on Ottoman soil in North Africa. Yusuf Pasha was reporting the recent 
developments in the Tripoli. His country was in serious disarray due to the actions of the 
rebellious alliance gathered around his grandson Mehmed. He included in his letter that 
he abdicated from his position in favor of his son, Ali, and requested from the Sublime 
Porte to recognize him as his successor. Mahmud II’s immediate circle at the time decided 
to take their time before granting what Yusuf Pasha had wanted and sent Mehmed Şakir 
Efendi to Tripoli to investigate the situation. Eventually, in May 1835, Ottoman central 
government dispatched a naval force composed of twenty-two ships manned by seven 
thousand trained soldiers under the command of Mustafa Necip Pasha. They had easily 
succeeded in removing the Karamanlı dynasty from power and deported most of the 
family members to Istanbul. Necip Pasha and his successors were now tasked with 
building up a formal centralized Ottoman province (Ibrahim, 1982, 1). Accordingly, 
soldiers and bureaucrats needed to run this distant province were those who responsible 
for the piles of documents produced after 1835 and stored in the Ottoman Archives and 
Dar al-Mahfuzat al-Tarihiyye in today’s Libya. 
This thesis sets out to understand and problematize the dynamics of the Ottoman 
Intervention in Tripoli in 1835. Who were the actors behind this intervention? What kind 
of decision-making processes were carried out? What were Ottomans’ principal 
motivations in intervening such a distant province with which only seaborne 
communication and travel were possible at the time? Were they just following an abstract 
notion of state-centralization or in pursuit of solving more practical concerns? Similarly, 
what kind of significance does this development bear in the context of world politics? I 
believe not only in the fact that the pursuit of these questions allows us to nuance our 
understanding of the 19th century Ottoman policy-making but it also gives us an 
opportunity to integrate the Ottoman Empire to the study of 19th century empires, a field 
in which Ottoman Empire was intentionally excluded for a long time as the ‘Sick Man of 
Europe.’13 In this respect, it also becomes crucial to question the validity of the arguments 
of some European observers of the time and subsequent scholars who have addressed the 
 
13 The sick man of Europe is first termed by Tsar Nicholas in a conversation with the British ambassador to St. 
Petersburg Sir G.H. Seymour in 1853 to describe the alleged weakness of the Ottoman Empire. His description proved 
to be quite popular such that the subsequent scholarship largely adopted this as an analytical tool when trying to account 
for the Eastern Question. For Nicholas’s conversation with the ambassador and a wonderful examination of the term’s 
journey in Russian political culture see: (Taki, 2016, 129-167). For a critique of its historiographical burden see: 
(Khoury and Kennedy 2007, 233) 
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Ottoman intervention as an act of establishing an overseas colony.14 Is such a claim 
sustainable in light of historical evidence or not?  
These are the questions that I seek to address in this thesis. It goes without saying that 
some of them had already been asked and answered by previous scholars. For the 
moment, therefore, let me embark upon a review of the historiography of the region to 
demonstrate how far the lack of information Nehicüddin Efendi complains about had 
gradually been tackled within the following centuries by the international scholarly 
community and how does this thesis fit into the picture. In my analysis of the relevant 
literature, I will focus on the following: (1) the intellectual and socio-political context of 
the study itself (2) the kind of source material the study under scrutiny utilizes and its 
implications for its overall arguments; (3) and last but not least its examination and 
interpretation of the Ottoman intervention in 1835. Following the critical survey of the 
literature, I will provide an outline of the chapters where the contentions and arguments 
of the present thesis will be discussed. 
The scholarly interest in Africa has not been well-developed in 19th Century Ottoman 
literati and 20th-century Turkish academia (Kavas 2013, 17-34, 28-29). Even though 
North Africa has been a subject of relatively wider interest, in the case of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the interest was far more limited. Unfortunately, Tripoli occupies much little 
space in this literature. Academic production of knowledge was, and to a large extent still 
is, at best sporadic. One may corroborate this just by looking at the number of manuscripts 
and published works written the 19th and early 20th century on the Tripoli at the catalogs 
of Turkish libraries.15 After Nehicüddin Efendi published his expanded translation of Ibn 
Galbun’s history in 1867, the interest in North Africa has faded away until the outbreak 
of Turco-Italian war in 1911 with the notable exceptions of Sadık Muayyed Azmzade’s 
and Cami Baykurt’s travel accounts.16 Following Italian aggression, Mehmed Naci’s 
 
14 For the remarks of English Consul George Hanmer Warrington, see the quote Atabaş gives in (Atabaş 2017, 57) and 
for a French perspective in early 20th century see: (Marchand, 1908: 245-252). 
 
15 It doesn’t exceed a dozen. See for a complete list: (Ahmet Kavas ed, 2013, 293-294). 
 
16 Cami Baykurt was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress when he was in imperial military school. 
Thanks to his oppositional views, his first official post was Fezzan, a place that is known for being an exile destination. 
Nevertheless, he developed a fondness for the region and became the MP of Fezzan in the Second Constitutional Period. 
He published his memoirs and travel accounts in 1908 (Cami Bey 1908). This Arabic script edition is later transcribed 
and republished. See: (Baykurt 2009). For detailed knowledge see: (Yılmaz 2018). Sadık Müeyyed’s accounts of his 
official duties in Sahara were published in 1897 by Alem Matbaası (El-Müeyyed 1897). This travel account is also re-
published in Latin transcription see: (Bostan 2010). 
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Trablusgarp Tarihi appeared in the bookshelves in Cağaloğlu. Additionally, Avanzâde 
Mehmed Süleyman also started to publish his Trablusgarb ve Devlet-i Aliyye-İtalya 
Vekâyiʻ-i Harbiyesi as the Ottoman-Italian war was going on.17 One may state that the 
Young Turks’ era showed a more genuine interest in Ottoman Africa than the previous 
century.18 However, as Italians successfully penetrated through the Ottoman defensive 
and turned the region into an Italian colony after the defeat of Ottoman-Sanusiya alliance, 
the charm surrounding the region slowly disappeared from the public sphere. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman state remained officially interested in the region and tried to help 
Sanusiya organize a front against the Italians during the Great War (Simon 1987, 229-
232). 
The foundation of the Turkish Republic in a drastically different ideological framework 
from that of the Ottoman Empire had some serious repercussions for the historiography 
of the 20th century. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, institutionally incorporated Turkish 
intellectuals and Turkish historians busied themselves with providing the new regime 
with an official vision of the Turkish national history. In an environment where the denial 
of Ottoman past was required to lay the ground for the new regime’s legitimacy discourse, 
the former territories of the Empire were mostly left out from the scholarly attention of 
historians. Accordingly, the first attempt at accounting for the Ottoman rule in North 
Africa came outside of academia when Aziz Samih İlter published his important two 
volumes book respectively in 1936 and 1937.19 It attempts to cover entire North Africa 
from sixteenth to twentieth centuries and in its vast coverage, the Tripoli was squeezed 
into the last seventy pages where İlter leans his back to Ibn Galbun, Hasan Safi and 
Mühimme registers (İlter 1937, 185-256).20 He sticks to a descriptive approach in his 
chapter about the political history of Tripoli. Analytical reasoning and historical 
contextualization are rather weak. For example, it is hard to follow the dynamics of 
Ottoman decision-making and international situation of the time. Nonetheless, it must be 
stated that İlter’s works have become a foundational reference work for future scholars. I 
 
17 For information on the text and its publishing history see: (Küçükefe 2015). 
 
18 Apart from these book size publications related to the province of Tripoli, numerous articles and small pamphlets 
were published during the Ottoman-Italian war in Tripoli. For a survey analysis of these publications see: (İlkbahar, 
2009). 
 
19 The first volume was published one year before the second one by the same publishing house. See: (İlter 1936) 
 
20 See notes 1 and 2 in (İlter 1937, 219). 
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believe its value lies in the fact that he attempts to write a local history which does not 
only talk about the relations between the Ottoman center and Tripolitan periphery. 
After İlter’s work, the front has been silent for about three decades until Akdes Nimet 
Kurat wrote an article on American-North African Relations (Kurat 1964). Later, 
Ercüment Kuran and Abdurrahman Çaycı also approached North Africa from the 
perspective of diplomatic history, both using effectively Ottoman and French Archives. 
Kuran’s work analyzed the Ottoman diplomatic reactions to the invasion of the province 
of Algeria in the context of the development of a modern ministry of foreign affairs. 
Therefore, it may as well be understood as a history of Ottoman modernization in the 19th 
century (Kuran 1957). For the purposes of this thesis, Çaycı’s work on the Turkish-French 
competition in the Libyan Sahara occupies a special place. (Çaycı, 1995). He was 
probably the first historian who makes an attempt to situate the Ottoman Empire and its 
agents in the famous Scramble for Africa. He gives a special meaning to the Ottoman 
intervention in the Tripoli as it gave the Ottoman government in Istanbul a chance to 
declare the Libyan hinterland as its sphere of influence. He emphasizes that by making 
the Tripoli a formal part of the Empire, Ottomans have found an opportunity to safeguard 
the Muslims of Tripoli and Lake Chad basin from aggressive French and British colonial 
expansion. Of course, Çaycı’s argument is only one side of the coin, but a shiny one 
indeed. In this context, one must note that Ottoman policy after the 1880s itself had some 
colonial aspects.  In 2016, Çaycı’s thread was followed by Mustafa Minawi in a book 
provokingly entitled as Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the 
Sahara and Hijaz. In his thought-provoking conclusion, he urges historians of the 
nineteenth-century empires not to be blinded by the teleology of failure in recognizing 
the Ottoman Empire as an agent in the inter-imperial competition of the nineteenth 
century whose strategies of rule worth a comparative analysis (Minawi 2016, 142-143). 
If there has been any surge in the field of African Studies in Turkey, it is after 2005. This 
was the date when the first congress on African Studies is organized. I take this as a 
turning point because the number of academics and academic publications related to 
Africa has significantly increased ever since this congress, not necessarily because of it. 
On the other hand, the very organizing of the Congress has a lot to do with the new 
political engagement the Republic of Turkey has gotten into with the African States who 
has a seat in the United Nations. Subsequently, the year 2005 was proclaimed as the 
African Year and ever since a lot of events were held in Turkey to promote African-
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Turkish friendship. Nonetheless, it would be doing injustice to already existing academic 
circles interested in Ottoman presence in Africa if we solely give the credit for the stirred 
interest in African studies to the newly aroused political climate. One must cite the leading 
figures of these circles such as Ahmet Kavas and Zekeriya Kurşun. The number of 
publications has risen significantly thanks to scholarly associations established with the 
prerogatives of these scholars such as ORDAF and AFAM.21 Even though these 
institutions are not directly funded by the Turkish government, it is still noteworthy that 
they appeared in a period when Turkey’s foreign policy priorities have shifted towards 
an approach geared to strengthen the Turkish soft power across the Middle East, Africa, 
and Central Asia. Quite naturally perhaps, most of these studies are emphasizing the 
friendship and cooperation between the locals and Ottoman authorities along with 
Ottomans’ role in postponing the intrusion of European imperialism into North and sub-
Saharan Africa.22 Themselves being prolific historians on the subject, their efforts also 
paved the way of a new generation of historians who work on Ottoman Africa. Among 
them are Abdullah Erdem Taş and Muhammed Tandoğan.23 Independently, Cemal 
Atabaş also produced an important Ph.D. thesis on the process of centralization in the 
province of Tripoli at Istanbul University (Atabaş 2017). They have one thing in common, 
a good command of Arabic and impeccable archival research, a combination that would 
result in a balanced understanding of center-periphery relations in the context of North 
African provinces. 
The studies of Taş and Atabaş are of particular importance for our purposes here because 
each one of these authors has dealt with the history of Tripoli using primarily Ottoman 
documentation. Erdem Taş completed his study of Karamanlı Period in Tripoli in 2016. 
However, his title seems to humble the vast coverage of the thesis because the study 
includes a lengthy discussion of the political history of the Tripoli until the rise of 
Karamanlı dynasty and a very well researched discussion of the Ottoman intervention in 
1835. When he contemplates on the challenges of writing a thesis on such a long time and 
the relative academic neglect, he rightly states that “the lack of general and descriptive 
studies makes it hard to carry out more analytical works.” However, he hopes that his 
 
21 Ortadoğu ve Afrika Araştırmacıları Derneği (ORDAF) and Afrika Araştırmaları Merkezi (AFAM). 
 
22 For example, (Kavas, 2006) See for a similar stance: (Akyıldız and Kurşun 2015). 
 
23 Tandoğan published a book on the Tuareg tribes living in the Sahara and their relations with Sublime Porte. See: 
(Tandoğan, 2018). 
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study would serve as a starting point for future researchers who would take up the 
challenge and approach the history of the region from an analytical point of view. He also 
suggests the process of centralization following the Ottoman intervention as a possible 
venue of research for future scholars (Taş 2016, 434). His advice seems to be taken by 
Cemal Atabaş who has completed his Ph.D. thesis on this very subject. He is more 
analytical than Erdem Taş with regards to the larger meaning of Ottoman intervention in 
Tripoli which he examines as a spin-off from the centralizing policies of Sublime Porte 
(Atabaş 2017, 1-21). Even though both studies are really good examples in terms of the 
historians’ attention to minute details and strict adherence to the primary sources, these 
are not in conversation with highly debated historiographical currents in the international 
scholarly community such as the comparative study of empires and post-colonial debates. 
For example, Erdem Taş detects that in the decision-making process, several reports from 
the Ottoman inspector in Tripoli, Mehmet Şakir Efendi, and a treaty written by Hassuna 
D’Ghies were taken into consideration. The latter included in the treaty a highly 
controversial word in its European rendering: the “civilization.”24  I believe that even the 
existence of a word with such baggage must be alarming because Hassune Efendi openly 
refers to the word’s meaning in the European context. It brings us to the question of how 
far, Ottoman decision-makers appropriated a so-called ‘civilizing mission’ when they 
intervened in Tripoli? Unfortunately, no discussion ensues Taş’s important finding. When 
Atabaş unveiled the correspondence of English Consul Hanmer George Warrington and 
see a clear reference to Ottoman intervention as an act of colonization that is doomed to 
fail because of the lack of resources, he also misses an opportunity to problematize the 
subject comparatively (Atabaş, 2017, 57). It may be the case that Warrington is an 
outsider to Ottoman mentality and decision-making and was importing concepts from his 
own political vocabulary, however, an elaboration of different strategies of power 
projection might be quite useful to think about empires comparatively, especially given 
the fact that a colonial discourse and self-presentation was eventually developed by 
Ottoman ruling elite in the late 19th century.25  
 
24 It is extremely noteworthy that Hassune Efendi does not refer to what he means as “medeniyet” but specifically 
resorts to its European rendering as “sivilizasyon.” For a discussion of the journey of “medeniyet” as a concept see: 
(Schäbler, 2004). 
25 The literature on Ottoman imperialism and Ottoman orientalism are constantly growing. Some examples are Selim 
(Deringil 2003); (Makdisi 2002); (Herzog and Motika, 2000); (Kühn 2007); For a critical survey of this literature see: 
(Türesay 2013) It is also available in English translation. 
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However, it must also be said that these two studies enrich our understanding of center-
periphery relations as well as the process leading to Ottoman intervention with their 
reliance on Ottoman documentation while even the most advanced studies published in 
English did not have concrete answers for the Ottoman motivations to integrate this region 
formally into state-apparatus. While Seton Dearden, in his popular history of Karamanlı 
Dynasty, refers to the “Turks’ fear from growing French influence in North Africa” as 
the primary reason, it was only a fraction of the whole picture (Dearden 1976, 311). 
Dearden’s work anticipated another important book on the history of Tripoli during the 
reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, that of Kola Folayan (Fọlayan, 1979).  
This study is by far the best analysis available pertaining to the last quarter of Karamanlı 
rule in Tripoli. It examines the Yusuf Pasha’s efforts to make Tripoli a formidable power 
in the Barbary coast and the reasons behind the failure of this project. He argues that 
Yusuf Pasha intentionally raised his naval power to raise funds to finance the 
centralization policy he would embark upon after 1806. This project includes the 
subjugation of tribal contingents residing in Cyrenaica, Ghadames, and Fezzan. He was 
remarkably successful realizing his ambition to pacify these regions. However, Yusuf’s 
political ambitions did not stop at the traditional borders of his province and subsequently, 
he tried to form an empire that would include Bornu and Kanem to the south of Fezzan. 
However, such a venture was beyond the financial capabilities of his dynasty in the face 
of growing international pressure on piracy and gradually diminishing customs revenues 
due to the diversion of the trade routes traditionally flowing from sub-Saharan Africa, 
through Fezzan into the port of Tripoli (Fọlayan 1979, xii).  
Folayan does not use Ottoman documentation, therefore, his explanation for the 
motivations behind Ottoman intervention relies on educated speculation of what Mehmed 
Şakir Efendi could have reported when he went back to Istanbul after his mission to 
inspect what was going on in Tripoli. Even though Folayan relies only on a short summary 
of Şakir Efendi’s report, he speculated surprisingly well. For him, the inability of both 
parties in the civil war to overcome the other was the primary reason behind Ottoman 
action because Şakir Efendi must have reported the rumors that the Bey of Tunis or 
Mehmed Ali of Egypt would take advantage of the situation if the matter is not resolved 
soon enough. He adds that a possible French aggression was also rumored due to 
suspicious contours a French naval officer along the shores of the province. (Fọlayan 
1979, 161-163). A similar line of argument has also been offered by Ali İbrahim Abdullah 
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in his Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Utah in 1982.26 Efforts of Warrington 
in persuading his government to intervene militarily in the civil war are further scrutinized 
by Jamil M. Abun-Nasr in his monumental work on the history of Maghrib in the Islamic 
period. (Abun-Nasr 1987, 204-205). He further argues that after 1835 Libya became an 
outpost from where Ottomans tried to salvage what they can from their diminishing 
influence in North African shores even though these prospects were seriously restrained 
by the opposition of tribal leaders such as Abdülcelil Seyfünnasr, Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i 
Garbi and the influence which European consuls had obtained before the Ottomans 
arrived Tripoli (Abun-Nasr 1987, 314). 
Another attempt to account for the Ottoman presence in Tripoli and its hinterland was 
made by Ali Abdullatif Ahmida in a rather theoretical way. He opposes the arguments of 
the segmentary model developed by social anthropologists such as E. Evans Pritchard, 
and Ernest Gellner.27 He argues that “segmentary model assumes the existence of a tribal 
society comprised of homogeneous tribal segments. In the absence of state control, the 
order was kept through mutually deterring tribal segments in any clan that threatened to 
disrupt the balance of power” whereas the social organization in North Africa was not 
only “an agglomeration of tribes or tribal states basically isolated from the larger social 
and economic structures of the region.” (Ahmida 1994, 3). He is also highly critical of 
Modernization theorists like Daniel Lerner who holds the idea that the modern Maghrib 
and the rest of the third world are composed of traditional societies whose modernization 
began under the European colonialism. (Ahmida 1994. 3-4). Accordingly, he goes on to 
propound that North African history has a dynamism of itself before the coming of 
Europeans because “powerful tribal and peasant alliances ruled Libya before the 
Ottomans and the construction of a modern urban-centered state began in alliance with 
the Ottomans.” That is, before European colonial rule. (Ahmida 1994, 5).  
His approach to the Libyan social history is heavily informed by New British Marxism, 
exemplified most notably by Edward P. Thompson in his famous “The Making of the 
 
26 It is important to remark that especially after the 1980s, American Universities has become important centers for 
intellectual production about Libyan History. Apart from the work of historians of Libyan origin coming to these 
universities as graduate students, others such as Michel Le Gall also participated in this new historiography rising in 
the United States. I couldn’t help but notice a correlation between the forming of OPEC and the oil crises of the 1970s 
and a rise of interest in an oil-producing country’s history. For notable examples, see: (Ahmida, 1990); (Barbar, 1980); 
(Elbhloul 1986); (Le Gall 1986). 
 
27 In this book, Pritchard has made the first attempt to understand the Sanusiyya movement (Evans-Pritchard 1954). 
For Ernest Gellner’s views see: (Gellner and Micaud 1972) 
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English Working Class” where he emphasizes the agency of workers themselves rather 
than an automatic relation between the rise of the factories and formation of the working 
class. (Ahmida 1994, 3-9). Like Thompson, Ahmida also does not comply with rigid 
explanations of class formation argued by traditional Marxism of the 19th century. For 
Ahmida, this was especially fruitful because of the fluidity of tribal contingents in the 
19th and 20th century Libya. Their coming together as a clearly discernible class was 
made possible by a constant and deliberate struggle against the Italian colonial policy 
even though they were intentionally excluded from capitalist agriculture. In a sense, they 
were engaging with the transformative power of modern capitalism by resisting it. They 
were able to resist both Ottomans and Italian colonialism because of their non-segmentary 
social connections across North Africa and Lake Chad Basin.  
However, the way Ahmida conceptualizes the motivation behind the initial Ottoman 
intervention in Tripoli is rather ambiguous and seems to be far-fetching in terms of the 
development of capitalist relations and mentality in the Ottoman Empire. He puts forward 
that “capitalist transformation within the empire -toward the goal of asserting authority 
over the periphery- culminated in the brutal colonial conquest of Ottoman Libya in 1835.” 
(Ahmida 1994, 24). When a couple of pages later he goes on to explain what he means 
by internal capitalist transformation, his account focuses on the rise of the tax-farming, 
an application in which “the state sold state land to private owners to obtain quick cash 
for the treasury.” This, in turn, led to the emergence of a new tax-farming class. 
Accordingly, “by the end of the 18th century, capitalist tendencies became dominant in 
the ruling class.” (Ahmida 1994, 31). In this scheme, he seems to mistake the 
monetization of economy and taxation with the rise of capitalism per se. In fact, the 
development of capitalism implies much more than a change in the way people carry out 
their transactions and the form in which they pay their taxes. Even in strict Marxist terms, 
it requires a bourgeoise class that owns the means of production and who is willing to set 
the fire of social change. However, in non-Western contexts, it is hard to locate such a 
class that is both willing and able.28 In other words, structurally speaking, he favors a 
causality between the project of centralization and the rise of capitalist mentality. It seems 
 
28  The rise of bourgeoise and its social role in changing the traditional societal norms and political structure is a highly 
debated issue in Ottoman historiography. However, in any case, Ahmida’s approach is too hasty in accepting the idea 
that the Ottoman Empire was transformed into a properly capitalist worldview. See for an overview of this 
historiographical problem; (Göçek 1996, 12-20). 
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to me that in his analysis of the rise of capitalism in the Ottoman Empire and its 
subsequent implications for the Empire’s people, he seems to be a vulgar Marxist rather 
than a new Marxist.29 Why should, for example, the rise of capitalist mentality 
automatically mean an instinctive expansion of the center’s control over the distant 
province of Tripoli? It seems to me that the one hundred fifty thousand kuruş that is 
entrusted to Necip Pasha to overthrow the ruling dynasty in Tripoli could have been 
invested in a much more promising capitalist venture (Taş 2016, 417).30  
As for the material causes of the “brutal colonial conquest of Ottoman Libya in 1835,” 
Ahmida points to the fear of losing Tripoli which serves as a gateway to Muslim Africa 
either to the French or to the British (Ahmida 1994, 31). However, he doesn’t carry out a 
historical analysis related to this material cause; it rather pops up without a proper 
discussion. His wording is referring to Ottoman intervention is also self-contradictory and 
anachronistic not only because he clearly distinguishes the colonial Italian occupation 
from the second period of direct Ottoman rule in his introduction but also because he fails 
to elaborate on what was resembling of colonialism about the Ottoman intervention in 
1835.  
Lisa Anderson has also produced a book in which she discusses the dynamics of state 
formation and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya from a comparative perspective. 
The way she poses the central question of her book is revealing: “How was it that one of 
these neighboring countries seemed to display many of the attributes of Western-inspired 
parliamentary democracy while the regime of the other explicitly and emphatically 
rejected them?” (Anderson 1987, 3). She puts forward the idea that a long tradition of 
local bureaucracy is the key to understand the divergence in the fates of two countries. 
This semi-independent garrison-states at the turn of the nineteenth century have entered 
the path of creating modern mechanisms of rule which meant for both “the replacement 
of kinship ties of tribes with those of wider and more flexible clientele networks of the 
peasantry.” (Anderson 1987, 9). However, she adds that divergent experiences of two 
countries with the European colonialism created the eventual outcome she stated in her 
 
29 Here I am alluding to the sparkling distinction Eric Hobsbawm makes. summarizes what he means by vulgar Marxism 
in seven points. However, his most important point in this context is that this type of Marxist historiography blindly 
adheres to the base and superstructure model which assumes a simple interdependency between economic base and 
political structure. In Ahmida’s case, it is the transformative effect of the rise of capitalism on how Ottomans wanted 
to conceptualize their state. See: (Hobsbawm, 1997). 
 
30 For the final decision as to how much funds should be allocated to Necip Pasha see (COA.HAT.454.22441).  
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question because while “the French under the guise of protectorate retained, strengthened, 
and extended the bureaucratic administration of the local state, the Italians on the other 
hand “destroyed the local administration, to replace it with an exclusively Italian one, in 
which the local population was not permitted to participate.” (Anderson 1987, 9).  In her 
mind, at the time of independence, this left Tunisia with two paths to choose from, 
democracy or dictatorship, whereas such a choice was out of the question in Libya. Even 
though her book has its strength in making sense of the post-independence political orders 
in Libya and Tunisia, she approaches her question from the perspective of a political 
scientist and her analysis leans back to a good understanding of the secondary literature 
of the time. As for why the Ottoman center acted in the way it did in 1835, she simply 
refers to Ottomans’ fear of European encroachment.  
So far, I put an effort into critically approaching the existing literature. What follows is 
my general observation and a key to how I will try to approach the issue. The English 
language publications are not well informed about the trends in Ottoman historiography 
and confine their understanding of the Ottoman intervention only with the international 
pressure of the time and Ottoman’s alleged fear of losing Tripoli to a foreign power. In 
most of the cases, this general deduction is only based on outside sources such as consular 
reports, diplomatic correspondence and alike. It is, of course, a part of the general picture 
but real dynamics of Ottoman decision-making are obscure in these studies. How the real 
actors viewed the issue is not properly addressed. On the other hand, even though recently 
written theses in Turkish universities are extremely sensitive to how Ottomans carried out 
this delicate operation, they do not problematize the attitude of operational Ottoman 
agents. What were their backgrounds? How did they conceptualize what they were doing? 
In what words did they project the Ottoman center’s power in Tripoli? And perhaps most 
importantly, how does it compare to their contemporary rivals in North Africa. I believe 
that it is time to offer a balanced account of the issue which is informed by both internal 
dynamics within the empire and external pressures leading to the Ottoman intervention. 
The present thesis tries to approach the issue more comprehensively, defining the actors, 
their discourse, and larger implications of their actions within domestic and foreign 
policies of the Ottoman Empire. I argue that Ottomans decided to intervene in Tripoli 
because, as it is nicely put by Şükrü Hanioğlu, they see that “a loosely bound association 
of disparate, semi-independently ruled territories could not expect to survive” and “the 
attempt to establish a new balance between the center and the periphery was thus an 
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existential imperative” (Hanioğlu, 2010, 40). In other words, centralization was a form of 
participating in the inter-imperial competition and it was in its essence a survival strategy. 
As I have already touched upon, regional variables are extremely important to understand 
the relative success of the Ottoman center’s expansion into the periphery. This is exactly 
what I seek to achieve in Chapter 1 which discusses the processes leading to the decline 
of Karamanlı power. I believe that the combination of the decline of Karamanlı power 
and timeliness of Ottoman action was the major factor behind eventual success. In 
Chapter 2, the process from the outbreak of dynastic struggle to Ottoman intervention is 
analyzed. Moreover, major contenders to Libyan territory are enumerated and their 
respective policies are examined. These include Mehmet Ali of Egypt, France, Britain, 
and the Ottoman Empire, and for a brief period, Huseynids of Tunisia. Fear plays into the 
picture exactly at this moment. Yet, I also delve into the major characters’ involvement 
in the decision-making process. Serasker Hüsrev Mehmet Pasha, Damat Halil Rıfat 
Pasha, and Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha were the masterminds of this intervention. I 
mentioned some works that conceptualize the Ottoman intervention as an act of colonial 
penetration into Libyan interior. However, my research shows that people directly 
involved with the decision-making process do not attach such meaning to their action. 
Nonetheless, it also does not mean that Ottoman intentions were devoid of imperial 
designs and pursuit of the economic prospects of the region. Accordingly, Chapter 3 
carries out a retrospective discussion of Ottoman political mentality in 19th century with 
regards to what modern literature termed as Ottoman orientalism and colonialism to make 
sense of the Ottoman policies after the city of Tripoli is put under direct control. It is clear 
from the primary documents that Ottomans created a social otherness in viewing the 
unruly tribal chiefs that defied the Ottoman authority and rebelled against officials sent 
from Istanbul. In that sense, the findings of the study show that the emergence of such an 
attitude predates the conventionally known period. Nonetheless, I disagree with the use 
of the terms such as colonialism and orientalism in accounting for this behavior because 
I believe that its use takes it out of its proper historical context. 
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2. THE RISE AND DEMISE OF YUSUF PASHA KARAMANLI (1795-1832) 
 
 
 
2.1 Yusuf Defying the Rules of Succession 
 
The Karamanlı family is a local dynasty with Anatolian origins. Even though some 
sources date their settling in Tripoli back to initial conquest of the region by Turgut Reis 
in 1551, it is more likely that they have come to the region sometime after 1600 (Mantran 
2001). Territorially speaking, Libya, as it is known today, is a by-product of the 
Karamanlı rule which united the hitherto unconnected regions of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, 
and Fezzan. Karamanlı rule has started with the Ahmed Bey who took advantage of 
eventful years of the 1710s to establish himself as the sole power in the region. In the end, 
he was able to get the official recognition of Ottoman Sultan instituting him as the 
governor of the region in 1722. His descendants enjoyed a rule that is virtually 
independent of the imperial center and held on to their title as the governor of the Tripoli 
for four generations until 1835 when Ottomans finally removed the family from power.  
The founder of the dynasty, Karamanlı Ahmed (r.1711-1745) tried to establish 
primogeniture as the principle of succession. After his death, the fresh memory of his 
achievements provided his son Mehmed with a smooth accession to his father’s position. 
The remainder of his reign passed in tranquility concerning power struggles within the 
family. However, the issue of succession appeared as a serious problem after him. When 
Ali Pasha, as the eldest son of Mehmed, claimed his father’s position, his uncle Mustafa 
opposed him, showing apparent disapproval of Ahmed Pasha’s preference for 
primogeniture. His first attempt at overthrowing his nephew was silenced by appointing 
Mustafa as the Bey and giving him the administration of Cyrenaica. It was understood 
soon that this could only be a temporary solution when rumors aroused in the Tripoli that 
other Karamanlı princes were plotting against Ali and intend to call Mustafa to lead 
another coup d’état.   
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Table 1: Karamanlı Succession and family tree 
  
In response, Ali Pasha sent a force of three thousand soldiers to Cyrenaica on the pretext 
of suppressing tribal unrest whereas the covert mission was to arrest and assassinate 
Mustafa and his trusted men. Running from them, Mustafa managed to escape to Tunis, 
from where he continued to pose a serious threat to Ali Pasha’s regime. Mustafa’s 
challenge, being not decisively eliminated, set an example for future princes of Karamanlı 
family who are lusting for power (Fọlayan 1979, 4-5). Yusuf was indeed one of them.  
Yusuf was the third and youngest son of reigning governor of the Tripoli, Ali Pasha 
Karamanlı. Being as such, he was not entitled to ascend to the highest position in the 
province, that of his father’s. However, this only encouraged him to take action as to 
secure what he believed rightfully his. On his way to the throne, there was Hasan Bey, 
the eldest brother, who consolidated his power in the late 1770s taking advantage of their 
father’s incurable absenteeism from state business and his position as the commander-in-
chief of the province’s army. Even though Ahmed, the second brother, hadn’t got as much 
support in the administrative elite of Tripoli as his elder brother, he was still in a better 
position compared to their little brother Yusuf in terms of being the heir apparent. 
Nevertheless, Yusuf did not wait for fortune to come and find him, he had built up his 
own luck. 
Ahmed Karamanlı (r.1711-1745)
Mahmut Mehmed Karamanlı (r.1745-1754)
Ali Karamanlı (r.1754-1793)
Hasan Yusuf Karamanlı (r.1795-1832)
Mehmed
Mehmed
Ahmet Ali Karamanlı (r.1832-1835) Mehmed Mustafa İbrahim Osman
Ahmed
Yusuf
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In 1780s, Ali Pasha’s grip over the regions of Fezzan and Cyrenaica which are formerly 
tied up to Tripoli by Ahmed Karamanli’s successful campaigns was loosening as the 
internal revolts increased in frequency and intensity Hasan Bey was the one who actively 
tried to pacify these revolts, a policy which wins him a considerable popularity in the 
ruling elite. For inordinately ambitious Yusuf, this was unacceptable.  Consequently, in 
1788, Yusuf finally tried his chances twice to eliminate his brother during a campaign 
against the rebellious Evlad-ı Süleyman tribe.  
Even though the attempts were evaded thanks to the vigilance of Hasan Bey’s close men, 
Yusuf was determined to clear his way. In the following year, Yusuf tricked his mother 
to call Hasan Bey unarmed to her presence by claiming that he intends to reach a 
permanent reconciliation. Hopeful of ending the vicious cycle of animosity, Hasan Bey 
appeared unarmed in front of their mother despite his suspicions. A fatal underestimation 
of Yusuf’s lust for power, indeed. On the spot, Yusuf murdered his own brother without 
hesitation. This meant that if Yusuf was ever to get hold of Tripoli’s seat of government, 
he needed to come up with a solution to win over the supports of the general populace 
and government dignitaries. 
Folayan’s estimation is that some measures taken by Yusuf were successful in 
manipulating the populace so much so that about one and a half years’ time, Yusuf 
gathered a force of six hundred armed men around him, especially in the Menşiye region, 
a quarter whose geographical position was overseeing the main supply routes of the 
Tripoli and its control was easing the monitoring of the movements of reinforcements and 
blockading of the supply routes of the city (Fọlayan 1979, 8-9). 
After his hopes to achieve a smoother transition in the Tripolitan throne by orchestrating 
a palace coup came to naught when his brother turned his offer to cooperate, this left over-
ambitious Yusuf with a single choice, that is, paving his way by way of brute force. A 
failed assassination attempt followed at his brother’s life followed this conviction. 
Being aware of the growing tensions between his sons, Ali Pasha ordered the arming of 
city-folk and called for reinforcements from Misurata Arabs. Resonation of this plea with 
the Arabs of Misurata led Yusuf to hasten up his plans to lay a siege to the city. Ultimately, 
Yusuf’s fear of being outnumbered and outplayed against the recently renovated city 
defenses and refreshed manpower evolved into a civil war that will continue for two years, 
1791-1793. 
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For about one and a half year, defensive forces in the city successfully repulsed Yusuf’s 
attacks and briefly succeeded in pushing Yusuf’s forces to the suburbs of the Menşiye. 
However, the initial disadvantageous position of Yusuf revolved into a stalemate. The 
incessant flow of reinforcements thanks to the broad popular support enjoyed by his 
brother and superior firepower of the city defenses was gradually dismantling due to Ali 
Pasha’s vague treatment of his rebel son -he even publicly propagated for not considering 
Yusuf as a rebel- and Yusuf’s ability to paralyze the economic life of the city. 
Furthermore, Yusuf was working hard to broaden his power base by bargaining with 
Berbers and Arabs of Tarhuna, Mesellate and Sahil regions. In the summer of 1793, 
numerical superiority was lying with Yusuf and the desperateness of the city defenses 
grew into fighting with stones. Under such circumstances, Ali Pasha made his move to 
refresh the defensive by calling for the assistance of Huseynids of Tunisia against his 
rebellious son. Refreshed as such, the defensive managed to halt the advancement of 
Yusuf’s forces, creating one more deadlock, only to be crushed by an unexpected external 
party, Ali Bulgur (Fọlayan 1979, 12-15). 
Ali Bulgur was a convert in the service of the Dey of Algiers. He gradually rose to 
prominence in his court and eventually reached the highest position in the navy. After he 
was accused by those who are resented by his arrogant conduct in office, he fled to 
Istanbul where his brother was serving Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. In this capacity, he was 
sent to Tripoli when Ali Pasha’s governorship was symbolically renewed. It was exactly 
at this time that he witnessed the decaying authority of Ali Pasha of Tripoli. Two brothers 
had decided to venture into overthrowing the Karamanlı dynasty from power. To this end, 
they persuaded some Tripolitan merchants to petition the Sultan with regards to their 
discontent with the ruling family. Allegedly, Ali Pasha was empowering Jewish 
merchants and was responsible for the death of his eldest son Hasan Bey. These prominent 
merchants were asking a naval squadron to be dispatched to take full control of the 
province by the Sultan. However, at the time, the Ottoman navy did not have the 
necessary means to carry out operations in Tripoli as well. 
Some historians have argued that Ali Bulgur arrived in Tripoli in an official capacity, 
acting by the orders of Sultan Selim III. However, when presented with the petition of 
Tripolitan merchants and Ali Bulgur’s plan, Selim simply dismissed these by saying “we 
don’t attend to such low business.” It was rather a political adventure of Ali’s own at the 
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beginning as evidenced by the fact that he procured the eight ships and necessary crew to 
operate these ships with his private means. Contemporary witnesses, though, recount that 
upon boarding Tripolitan harbor, an official ferman declaring the dismissal of the Ali 
Pasha Karamanlı and recognition of Ali Bulgur as the Sultan’s deputy was read aloud by 
a çavuş coming from Istanbul. In fact, Ali Bulgur was presenting a mere fabrication read 
by an impostor çavuş. Sublime Porte’s recognition came only after Ali Bulgur seized 
power completely in March 1794. (Taş 2016, 252-256) This has provided Ali Bulgur’s 
regime with a legal basis and the support of some tribes from the interior of the country. 
While Yusuf remained in the Menşiye to sustain the siege, his brother and father took 
refuge in Tunis.  
Now, Yusuf, thus far an infamous rebel and murderer, was presented with a unique 
opportunity to portray himself as the liberator of the Tripoli from the yoke of a political 
adventurer who in part diminished the de facto independence of Tripoli from Istanbul. 
This was, however, no easy task because Ali Bulgur was firmly establishing himself 
within the city by persuading former Karamanlı officials to collaborate. Those who did 
not comply were forced to vacate their positions and were replaced by Ali Bulgur’s 
mercenary.  
Things were further complicated for Yusuf by Ali Bulgur’s effective foreign policy. He 
ingeniously played on the fear of small European states and urged their consuls to 
consider Tripoli with equal international standing with the Algiers. This practically meant 
a wider range of subsidies to be given to Ali Bulgur’s regime if these vulnerable states 
were willing to renew their treaties which would protect their commercial shipping 
operations from the harm that may possibly be done by Tripolitan corsairs. This translated 
into thirty-five barrels of gunpowder, skilled artisans to build up a vessel of sixteen guns 
and two hundred fifty tons of corn, a crucial supply to feed the mercenary garrison. When 
Sultan Selim’s recognition instituting Ali Bulgur as the one who reigns in his name, the 
dispatch also brought a vessel of twenty-two guns as a gift (Taş 2016, 256). Meanwhile, 
he also enjoyed the arrival of a reinforcement of five hundred mercenary soldiers sent by 
his brother. In short, Bulgur’s ranks were toughening.  
In August 1794, now officially recognized Pasha of Tripoli defeated Yusuf’s forces in the 
stationed in the Menşiye, making Yusuf abandon the siege and retreat from the region. 
Ali Bulgur was ever more powerful in the Tripoli thanks to the new political arrangement 
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he made with the Arab chiefs of the interior. Bulgur’s success was mainly thanks to the 
help they provided in the form of warriors and supplies for the city. They probably 
reckoned that Ali Bulgur had come to stay after he got the affirmation of the Ottoman 
Sultan (Fọlayan 1979, 19). 
It may have been the end of Karamanlı dynasty if Ali Bulgur had acted with more caution 
against the Bey of Tunisia. I have already touched upon the fact that Bey of Tunis offered 
asylum to Karamanlı family after Bulgur’s takeover. This time, Yusuf turned to ask 
military help against his now formidable enemy who succeeded in crushing his forces. 
The answer was affirmative. The prime motivation of the bey of Tunis in deciding to help 
Yusuf, however, was Ali Bulgur himself. After he had decisively beaten Yusuf, Ali 
Bulgur launched a campaign against the territorial interest of the Bey of Tunis. He ordered 
his forces to take possession of the island of Cerbe and continued to lay a siege to the city 
of Sfax. Greatly alarmed by such bold moves of the Ali Bulgur, Bey of Tunis took 
immediate action as to remove him. Escorted by the members of Karamanlı family, he 
commanded a combination of naval and land forces nearly amounting to forty thousand 
men to march against the occupational force in Cerbe. After easily securing victory there, 
this huge army sailed towards Tripoli where they retook the Menşiye quarter in a matter 
of hours in 18th January 1795 (Fọlayan 1979, 20).  
Next morning, it appeared that Ali Bulgur had escaped from the Tripoli with two vessels, 
plundering what is left from Karamanlı family in the mansion of Ali Pasha. Tripoli was 
again about to go under the sway of Karamanlis, but city folk refused to open the gates, 
being fearful of a looting activity on the part of Tunisian troops. At this critical juncture, 
Yusuf assumed the leadership to persuade the general populace to raise an extraordinary 
tax to buy off the Tunisian troops and pay for their troubles. After an agreement was 
reached Tunisian troops left the Tripoli and Ahmed and Yusuf triumphantly re-entered 
the city. As their father was seriously ill and his abdication was formally recognized by 
Ottoman Sultan, Ahmed as the heir apparent assumed the throne. Nevertheless, his reign 
proved to be short-lived. Drawing on the popular support he gained during his struggle 
against the occupation of Ali Bulgur and his brother’s feebleness in devising any policy 
that would put a halt to the disastrous situation of the country after four years of political 
instability and warfare, Yusuf had the doors of the city closed when his brother Ahmed 
went outside the city walls. Ahmed was left with no choice other than leaving (Abun-
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Nasr 1987, 196). At last Yusuf’s long-awaited political ambition became the new reality 
of Tripoli as he assumed the Tripoli’s seat of power.     
 
 
2.2 Tripoli under Yusuf Pasha 
 
Yusuf Pasha’s seizure of power after a protracted period of political instability, marked 
by civil war and a struggle to regain power in Tripoli, was followed by a revival of the 
economy and political prowess of the Tripoli in the international arena. Yusuf Pasha’s 
way to achieve this was a distinctly North African phenomenon. Namely, the creation of 
a strong navy that would pose a formidable threat to commercial shipping in the 
Mediterranean.  
To increase the naval strength of Tripoli, the port was secured by the amendment 
fortifications of the city and stationing of canons. Then followed an increased investment 
in shipbuilding. The rapid growth of the navy caught the attention of Istanbul which had 
gifted two strong warships. The already impressive number of eleven ships in 1798 was 
doubled due to the outbreak of the American War in 1801, building the naval inventory 
up to twenty-four ships in 1805. (Fọlayan 1979, 27). 
Before the eighteenth century closed, Tripolitan naval forces successfully targeted the 
commercial shipping of several European states and the U.S.A and forced these countries 
to renew or get into treaty arrangements with Tripoli to secure safe passage in the 
Mediterranean. The policy of extortion was largely successful. While Spain and Venice 
quickly paid their dues, the insubordinations of the Swedes, the Dutch and the Danish 
were returned by attacking their shipping. The imminent danger made the first two have 
a change of heart and they readily abide by what Yusuf Pasha had asked to release their 
ships and prisoners. Denmark ordered his Mediterranean fleet under the command of 
Captain Bille to attack Tripoli to save those who are captured. Significantly, Bille’s 
success in the confrontation fell short of taking back the captives until a new peace 
agreement was negotiated. Even more significant is that the naval victory did not lead to 
a decrease either in the yearly tribute or the lump sum that must be paid right after the 
conclusion of the agreement. Ragusans also fell victim to Yusuf Pasha’s ambition and 
agreed to pay a yearly tribute despite the Sublime Porte’s protection of this Republic and 
its active intervention on their behalf. After the use of naval force as an active tool of 
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diplomatic extortion, a sum of 322.000 Spanish piastres had been poured into Tripolitan 
treasure (Taş 2016, 266-269). This money was about to be used in the pacification of the 
regions of Fezzan and Cyrenaica. 
The historical development of Tripolitan-American relations showed at the beginning an 
almost verisimilitude with those stated above.  In 1796, Yusuf Pasha negotiated with 
American representative and parties signed a treaty of friendship. However, given the fact 
that the terms of the treaty were not favorable in the eyes of Yusuf Pasha, American 
attitude in honoring the mutually agreed terms was even more disappointing. As a result, 
things took an unexpected turn in 1801 when Yusuf Pasha declared a war that would 
continue for four years against the United States. To understand the reasons and outcomes 
of this clash, it is imperative to take a detour and investigate the North African-American 
relations in more detail before we delve into how Yusuf Pasha expanded his rule around 
the nucleus he created in Tripoli with the help of the refilled treasury.  
  
 
2.2.1     North African-American relations and Yusuf Pasha’s disillusionment with 
the Treaty of 1796 
 
The American Revolution had not only provided the American people with their 
independence but also deprived them of the British protection that they were enjoying in 
the Mediterranean waters. After the British recognition of American independence in 
September 1783, the American commercial shipping had inevitably become a legitimate 
target for the North African rulers. British efforts to put a halt to the American inflow into 
the Mediterranean ports and a consequent flourishment of trade between U.S and 
Mediterranean basin did not stop at abolishing their protection of the American shipping 
(Lambert 2005, 15-16). Not only did they allegedly delivered the routes of American 
ships to Algerians throughout the 1780s, but they also extended their diplomatic efforts 
in 1793 to conclude the ongoing war between the Portuguese and Algiers to secure safe 
passage for Algerian corsair navy which would hunt down American merchants even in 
the Atlantic. As naturally infuriating as it was for the American public and the Congress, 
they had not got a navy that would escort their merchant fleet, a fact which encouraged 
British activities (Kurat. 1964, 188-189). 
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The imminent danger of being hunted by corsair fleets turned into a reality in 1784 when 
Moroccans captured an American ship named Betsey. However, it was soon understood 
that this hostile act was to establish proper diplomatic channels. The Moroccan ruler was 
offended by the fact that no diplomatic mission was sent to his realm despite his 
recognition of the United States as an independent country (Allison 1995, 7-8). After John 
Adams had notified the Congress that it would be wise to negotiate with the Barbary 
Powers in 1783, Thomas Jefferson and John Adams had been authorized to carry out the 
negotiations. In the case of Morocco, the misunderstanding had been easily addressed and 
two parties concluded a peace treaty within a month (Lambert 2005, 58-59).  
The ease with which Americans had come to terms with the Moroccans had created an 
illusion in the American diplomatic circles that the same would be possible with other 
powers in the North African coastline. However, the truth of the matter unfolded in a 
starkly contrasting manner. Problems for the Americans multiplied as the promise of the 
French King to act as a mediator between the Barbary Powers and the United States came 
to a naught after the outbreak of the French Revolution. Now, the only solution to reach 
a rapprochement was to establish direct diplomatic contact with each of these powers. In 
the meantime, Tripolitan and Algerian pirates were consistently preying on American 
shipping. 
The American diplomatic mission in Europe had for some time hoped that they would 
not be obliged to pay large sums of money for brokering peace agreements. They were 
soon to understand that their hopes were at best childish. In 1786, the American mission 
represented by John Lamb tried to approach the Dey of Algiers with the expectation to 
reach an agreement with regards to the release of the recently captured American citizens. 
The amount demanded by Dey was fourteenth times higher than Lamb was keen to pay 
on behalf of the United States (Allison 1995, 12). It goes without saying that under the 
circumstances first American attempt proved to be an utter failure. 
Upon the arrival of a letter written by the American captive Richard O’Brien, in which 
he enumerated the conditions of a possible truce between U.S and Algiers, the American 
President George Washington asked the Congress to consider acting in accordance with 
the propositions of O’Brien. The news was also circulating that now the time is ripe to 
renegotiate with the Dey of Algiers. However, both O’Brien and the ultimate ruling of 
Congress was utterly optimistic. It was authorizing the payment of 40.000 dollars for 
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ransoming the prisoners, an additional 25.000 dollars of lumpsum and lastly a yearly 
tribute of equal amount (Kurat 1964, 187). Shortly after American commissioner David 
Humphreys departed from Lisbon, news reached that the peace between the Algerians 
and the Portuguese had been concluded. Given the incentive, the Dey of Algiers 
dispatched his navy which eventually captured eleven American ships in the Atlantic. 
The Dey also sent word that he would accept no American commissioner whatsoever. 
Now, the price of the peace was to be placed much higher, against the optimistic position 
of American Congress. Even though Humphreys continued his efforts to establish a 
connection with the Dey of Algiers, he soon realized that requesting the mediation of 
other parties was in vain. He had returned to Lisbon after the second unfortunate 
diplomatic failure (Kurat 1964, 188).  
The recurring theme of diplomatic failures in the North African coast led to heated 
debates in the Congress. There occurred a strong opinion that the U.S. should build its 
own navy to fight back those who are acting against the interest of the American nation. 
In fact, this was an idea which Thomas Jefferson put forward repeatedly in every chance 
he gets ever since his days as the American representative at Paris. Now, him being the 
Secretary of the State and, given the American diplomacy stuck into, the Congress agreed 
to pay more than a million dollars to start constructing a strong navy (Lambert 2005, 
impasse 79-80). 
In the meantime, Humphreys restarted his efforts to negotiate with the Dey of Algiers 
after he was authorized to spend 800.000 dollars to free American captives in Algeria. 
Upon the request of Humphreys, the Swedish consul in Algiers mediated the delivery of 
the news that Americans want to reach an agreement with Hasan Dey. It turned out shortly 
after that what Hasan Dey was asking 2.435.000 dollars. Even though this was beyond 
the imaginable for the Americans, the matter had to be resolved. Accordingly, Americans 
have demonstrated a strong will to sit on to negotiate. The eventual agreement brokered 
by American representative Joel Barlow included that Americans should pay a lump sum 
of 642.000 dollars and 216.000 dollars yearly tribute or shipbuilding material of the same 
value. It is said that with the added value of other presents to be given to Dey of Algiers, 
the total cost of the long-awaited peace was about one million dollars (Lambert 2005, 82). 
Americans also agreed to build and arm numerous ships in American dockyards to be 
delivered to Algiers. Joel Barlow proved himself to be a good negotiator. He convinced 
Hasan Dey to act as a mediator and guarantor of future agreements to be reached with 
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other Barbary Powers. After Humphreys on whose behalf Barlow was negotiating 
approved the treaty in Lisbon, it was sent to be ratified by the U.S. government, which 
did so on March 2, 1796 (Kurat 1964, 192). 
The promise given by Hasan Dey to act as a mediator and guarantor of future treaties that 
Americans would possibly sign with remaining powers along the North African coast 
turned out to be a defining moment for Tripolitan-American relations which culminated 
into a full-fledged naval confrontation in 1801. On the one hand, it was far easier to 
approach Yusuf Pasha Karamanli who knew that the Hasan Dey’s backing of the United 
States was binding for him. However, it was something he found disgracefully offensive. 
Given that no treaty relationship between the two had yet to be established and Yusuf 
Pasha was rebuilding the Tripolitan navy, it was only a matter of time American shipping 
would be targeted. It was in August 1796 when American ships the Betsey and the Sophia 
were captured that the Americans felt the encroachment of the Tripolitan corsair fleet 
under the command of Scottish renegade Murad Reis, admiral of Yusuf Pasha. The Betsey 
was added to Tripolitan naval inventory as a warship while the latter was released because 
it carries the treaty money intended for Hasan Dey (Fọlayan 1979, 31). 
The natural course of action for the United States was to seek an opportunity to negotiate. 
Former captive of Hasan Dey, Richard O’Brien was tasked with finding common ground 
with Yusuf Pasha. On the first round of talks, O’Brien’s offer was only 40.000 dollars for 
the ransom and peace together. In the eyes of Yusuf Pasha, this was nothing, but an 
outrageous insult compared to 642.000 paid by the U.S. to Algiers. Furthermore, rumors 
of American willingness to pay 180.000 dollars to Tunis were circulating. Thus, he 
refused to come to terms with O’Brien under these accords. Hasan Dey’s influence played 
into the picture in favor of American representative and later in the month Pasha had 
agreed to strike a peace deal in return for a “sum of 40.000 dollars, together with ‘consular 
presents of 12.000 dollars cash and some naval stores – canvas, pitch, boards, etc.” 
(Fọlayan 1979, 31). For the time being, peace was established but things were soon to 
change. 
The last ruler to make peace with was Hammuda Bey of Tunis. He had a direct way of 
engaging with the Americans. The American commissioner in Algiers, Joel Barlow 
received a notification from a French merchant residing in Tunis, Joseph Étienne Famin 
which stated the desire of Hammuda Bey to get into peaceful relations. The letter also 
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asserted Bey’s terms for peace and included that Bey requires an answer within six 
months. It translates as if his demands would not be met in due time, Bey would withdraw 
his orders that banned preying on American shipping, thereby setting free all the wrath of 
his corsair fleet. Americans were tempted by this offer in view of their thirteen years of 
efforts to secure safe passage in the Mediterranean waters. They complied with what 
Hammuda Bey demanded and paid 180.000 dollars in addition to the promise of the 
delivery of an American-built brig in 1797 (Lambert 2005, 92).  
For the maintenance of the peace, Americans had appointed resident consuls in each of 
the North African capitals; Richard O’Brien as consul-general of Algiers with super-
intendant power over the consuls of Tunis and Tripoli, and William Eaton as consul at 
Tunis. However, the appointment of James Leander Cathcart as the consul at Tripoli 
delayed until 1799. It must be said that it only made things worse for because especially 
Cathcart’s was a bitter job given that Yusuf Pasha was obliged by Hasan Dey’s pressure 
to sign a treaty that he did not want to (Kurat. 1964, 199). 
It was upon the terms of this very peace treaty and absence of Cathcart that the tensions 
between the United States and Tripoli had escalated. Articles I and XII stipulated that if 
any disagreement regarding the interpretation of the treaty should arise between the 
signatories, the mutual friend Hasan Dey would be the arbitrator. For Tripolitans, the 
meaning of this was simple enough; arbitration of a mutual friend. On the other hand, the 
American position was markedly different. They interpreted these articles as 
manifestations of Tripoli’s dependence upon the Algiers and Hasan Dey’s position vis-à-
vis Yusuf Pasha as one of a political overlord. In fact, this misconception was further 
attested by the structure of consular representation in Barbary; Richard O’Brien having 
the super-intendant duties. At least it was how he presented it to one of Yusuf Pasha’s 
envoys to Algiers in 1797. For a man of Yusuf’s ambition, this misunderstanding was 
unacceptable. He repeatedly demanded from Americans to treat him as an independent 
ruler and his state as a sovereign one. In return, Americans had failed to honor treaty 
obligations. There was no evidence whatsoever as to when the consular presents would 
arrive. Neither any word was heard from the appointment of a resident consul. Nor the 
promised warship had been delivered. When Yusuf Pasha formally requested a reply from 
O’Brien, his answer worked only to aggravate the situation. While Tunis and Algiers were 
getting the promised items in their treaties, Yusuf’s share was a mere excuse stipulating 
the harsh winter in America as the reason why American promises were not still delivered 
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after almost two years since the treaty had been ratified (Fọlayan 1979, 32-35). Even after 
the American Consul James Catchard’s arrival to Tripoli, the American attitude remained 
mostly unchanged despite their firsthand experience of Yusuf Pasha’s protests.  
Eventually, American attitude forced Yusuf Pasha to change his position. In the 
meantime, the Tripolitan navy organized a capture of an American ship in October 1800. 
Yusuf Pasha ordered its release and reprimanded the responsible parties only to show that 
he is still inclined to honor the agreement of 1796. At the same time, it was to remind 
Americans that Tripoli is a major naval power capable of reprehending the violations of 
the treaties it is a signatory of. After a full year had passed and no answer from the 
President had arrived in his court, Yusuf Pasha was left with one choice; that is to cut off 
diplomatic relations and declare war against the U.S. on May 14, 1801. He also added 
that as of now the terms of the treaty are obsolete and if Americans want to renew it, an 
amount of 250.000 dollars and a yearly tribute of 20.000 dollars were the prices of the 
peace (Kurat 1964, 199). 
After deliberations with his cabinet and assuring the constitutionality of sending a naval 
squadron into the Mediterranean, newly inaugurated president Thomas Jefferson decided 
to retaliate with force. However, the main strategy of Jefferson was to “awe and talk.” 
(Lambert 2005, 124) He thought that an effective naval blockade would teach Tripolitans 
a sound lesson not to mess with U.S. shipping anymore. His hopes however foundered on 
the shores of Tripoli. The American bombardments were highly ineffective, leaving 
minimal damage in the city at best. Likewise, the naval blockade of Tripolitan harbor was 
continuously breached by a Tripolitan fleet commanded by Murad Reis. Repeated 
incursions to capture American ships was crowned by the seizing of American warship 
the Philadelphia in 1803, which increased the number of enslaved Americans up to more 
than three hundred (Dearden 1976, 159). 
The success of the Tripolitan navy and city walls in warding off the American attacks led 
Americans to come up with a brilliant plan. Even though it is not clear who first conceived 
the idea of stirring Ahmed Karamanlı to stage a coup d’état, the plan was perfected and 
executed by William Eaton who was serving as the American consul at Tunis at the time 
(Folayan 1979, 36). It was envisioned that in every possible scenario, Ahmed’s challenge 
to Yusuf’s regime would give a bargaining advantage to the Americans’ interest. Thus, 
after tracking Ahmed into the deeps of Egypt, William Eaton convinced Ahmed 
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Karamanlı to a triumphant march through the Libyan desert in the company of unruly 
tribal warriors.  They eventually managed to take Derna, a coastal town east of Tripoli 
(Dearden 1976, 189). 
Hearing the victory of Ahmed, Yusuf Pasha finally agreed to finalize the armed-conflict 
and negotiate a new treaty of “Peace and Amity”. It anticipated the evacuation of Derna 
and mutual exchange of war-prisoners on the condition that the U.S. would pay a ransom 
of 60.000 dollars. It has been publicized as a U.S. win by Thomas Jefferson and today, it 
is mostly taken as a moment bolstering national pride. Be that as it may, it is safe to argue 
that this was, in fact, a confrontation ending up with a draw because Yusuf Pasha had 
obtained the international recognition he so desperately sought after ever since he 
ascended to the throne. There was no mention of Algerine guarantee whatsoever in the 
treaty. Moreover, any last glimmer of hope on the part of his brother Ahmed to seize the 
Tripolitan seat of power had waned away. Last but not least, a handsome amount of 
ransom was secured for the release of American prisoners (Folayan 1972, 261-70). 
  
 
2.2.2     Expansion of Yusuf’s Patrimonial Rule  
 
The administrative structure was much more elaborate in Yusuf pasha's time in office 
compared to the system which existed under his predecessors even though it was still 
patrimonial in essence. Now, the divan transformed from being a mere military council 
into a more complex political structure which was presided over by Yusuf Pasha himself 
and attended by top-level state officials such as the Treasurer (Hazinedar), Admiral of 
the navy (Reis al-Marine), commander-in-chief of land forces (Agha), Yusuf’s deputy 
(Grand Kahya), and mayor (sheikh) of Tripoli. The title Bey came to signify a generic 
meaning of governor and assumed by appointed officials of Yusuf Pasha in Cyrenaica 
and Fezzan.    
Apart from the revenues, the government of Tripoli gained through piratical activities the 
treasury was also fed by Trans Saharan trade, especially in slaves. His control of the slave 
trade enabled him to strengthen his hold over the rulers of Fezzan by way of exerting 
heavy tributes.  He also established a state monopoly on the exportation of agricultural 
goods and livestock. While personally overseeing the trade of some produce in others he 
granted the privilege to trade that particular product to some merchants in return for a 
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fixed annual payment (Abun-Nasr 1987, 199). Accumulation of financial resources in the 
hands of Yusuf Pasha allowed him to reorganize end expand the military force Tripoli 
can put into use against those who defied pasha’s authority. The veterans of this army 
were already battle-hardened in the American war and served as the nucleus around which 
Yusuf could increase their strength.      
Even before the war with America had come to an end, Yusuf Pasha’s political problems 
started to surface. In the summer of 1803, Berbers of Gharian Mountains rejected to pay 
the annual tribute they customarily owe to Yusuf Pasha responded with a large military 
force, too great for Gharians to put up a fight against. At last, they not only find 
themselves in the position of paying a heavy indemnity but also lost their autonomy as 
Yusuf Pasha obliged them to permanently host a Tripolitan garrison in the region.  
As soon as the peace with America had been concluded, Yusuf Pasha turned his attention 
to Derna. After his brother's departure, he aimed at strengthening his authority by 
reinforcing the military force whose cost of maintaining was burdened on the residents of 
the city short-lived support to Ahmed.  
This was only a preamble to Yusuf Pasha’s plan to systematically pacify the country. The 
first problem on his way was the tribe of Evlad-ı Süleyman who had rebelled against the 
pasha in 1807 due to their growing suspicion of Yusuf Pasha’s centralizing policies. Their 
strategy was to cut off the link of Tripoli with Fezzan, thereby ensuring the obstruction 
of the flow trans-Saharan trade which cripples Yusuf pasha's commercial gains from the 
trade with regions like Sudan. The formidable force sent against them under the command 
of Mehmed Bey, first son of the Pasha, managed to defeat their adversary and fortunately 
for Tripolitan interests the leader of the Evlad-ı Süleyman tribe was killed during one of 
the military confrontations along with many of his man. In the absence of strong 
leadership, the rebellion died out. The remainder of the clan submitted to pasha’s 
authority as their fellow tribesmen were taken as hostages against any future mischief. 
Three years later in 1810, Yusuf started to proactively orchestrate his political program. 
This time he aimed to put the regions bordering Sudan, that are Ghadames and Fezzan, 
under the sway of his rule in hoping to fully exploit the economic prospects. These regions 
were incredibly important trade hubs connecting Tripoli with Timbuktu (today located in 
Mali), Hausaland (today correspond s to the area of northern Nigeria and the Republic of 
Niger), and Bornu (today located in Nigeria) which also housed wealthy financiers of 
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Sudanese trade. The expedition to Ghadames led by Yusuf Pasha’s third son, Ali, did not 
face any resistance by the city folk. Thinking that a protracted defensive war would be 
bad for business, the city surrendered to Ali’s terms. They were to pay an indemnity and 
accept the Pasha’s imposition of a governor who would directly collect the future customs 
duties of the city.  
In the case of Fezzan, Yusuf Pasha adopted a policy of gradual subjugation. Ruled by 
Kanem from 13th to 15th centuries, Fezzan came to be dominated by a Sharifian dynasty 
called Evlad-ı Muhammed in the 16th century. This family ruled over Fezzan 
independently without interruption until the founder of the Karamanlı house had 
succeeded in making Evlad-ı Muhammed a tributary of Tripoli in the first half of the 18th 
century. In the subsequent years when the descendants of the Ahmed Karamanlı grow 
weaker and fed up by indolent lives, Tripoli’s authority over Fezzan attenuated gradually. 
When Yusuf Pasha ascended to the throne, Evlad-ı Muhammad had already fully 
recovered its political power and annual tributes due to Tripoli came to be unregularized. 
At first, Yusuf Pasha made do with the status quo. Yusuf’s growing military strength, 
however, allowed him to exert pressure for the regularization of due tributes. For this 
purpose, he appointed Muhammed al-Mukni as the collector in 1790s. Al-Mukni started 
to build a case against the Evlad-ı Muhammed, trying to prove that Fezzan can pay a 
significantly higher amount of tribute thanks to enormously rich resources of the region. 
He suggested that Yusuf Pasha should establish more direct control over the region by 
eliminating the reigning dynasty and put the region under someone who would act as 
Yusuf’s delegate.  
Al-Mukni’s suggestions resonated well with Yusuf Pasha who himself was actively trying 
to better exploit commercially important parts of his realm. When all these coincided with 
the lately hostile position of the reigning Sultan Muntasir of the Fezzan, Yusuf decided 
that it is time to act. Not only Muntasir attempted to cut the direct trade between Bornu 
and Tripoli in 1807, but he also provided safe haven to rebellious Evlad-ı Süleyman 
tribesmen. Using these as a pretext to a successful military campaign, Yusuf Pasha 
instigated his agent as the new ruler of the Fezzan and allowed him to use the titles 
enjoyed by overthrown dynasty. In return, al-Mukni promised a yearly tribute three times 
more than Evlad-ı Muhammed did. However, Yusuf Pasha’s control over the region was 
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now undisputed as it is evidenced by the fact that he removed al-Mukni from power when 
he deemed it necessary in 1820 (Fọlayan 1979, 51-53). 
In the meantime, trying to take advantage of Yusuf Pasha’s concentration on the southern 
regions, various tribes in Benghazi, Gulf of Sirte and Derna refused to hold up their end 
of the tributary arrangements. Therefore, a strong military contingent was put together 
under the command of Mehmed Bey. This force quickly defeated the oppositional force 
in Derna and executed the leading figures of this insurrection. Then, Bey continued to 
Benghazi, tribes of which quickly fulfilled their obligations to pay tribute and reclaimed 
their loyalty to Yusuf Pasha. The suppression of Evlad-ı Ali Arabs in the Gulf of Sirte, 
however, proved much harder. Yet, Mehmed’s forces outnumbered them and possessed 
superior firepower. When the insurgents were decisively defeated, Muhammed singled 
out the leaders and brutally executed them to make an example out of them by hanging 
their heads over the castle in Tripoli. 
Muhammed taking pride with his decisive victory over the insurgents of eastern 
Cyrenaica grew ever more arrogant and power-hungry. Consequently, to detract his son 
from his proximity, Yusuf granted him the governorship of the Benghazi and Derna. This 
could only be an opportunity for Mehmed who used it wisely by mounting a rebellion 
with the support of Zuaza tribes in 1816. Against this threat, Yusuf Pasha charged his 
second son Ahmed with the task of eliminating his brother’s rebellion. An unexpectedly 
formidable force was gathered with the support of Misurata Arabs and several other 
tribes. It was a triumphal march, indeed, as even before arriving at Derna, it scared off 
most of the Mehmed’s supporters, leading Mehmed himself to retreat to Bombah, a small 
town close to the Egyptian frontier.  
As for the people of Derna who rallied around Mehmed Bey, Ahmed Bey granted a 
tentative amnesty after they renounced Mehmed’s cause. After his victory in Derna, 
Ahmed ordered each town in the Cyrenaica region to send a delegation to a ceremony in 
which Ahmed would celebrate his victory and give Arab leaders red cloaks in recognition 
of their contribution to Ahmed’s victory over his brother. Even though some of the leaders 
grew suspicious of Ahmed’s invitation, most of them welcomed Ahmed’s offer. 
Nonetheless, they insisted that only forty-three of their leaders would be present at the 
celebrations. This, Ahmed agreed. Unalarmed by the fate expecting them in the official 
residence in Benghazi, leaders of Zuaza tribe showed up in the celebrations on September 
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5, 1817. After the welcoming coffee was served, Ahmed’s guards relentlessly massacred 
all the present leaders. Those who could escape the residence were hunted down before 
they could exit the city and the hostages allegedly sent to Tripoli as political leverage was 
returned, only to be added to death toll (Fọlayan, 1979, 53-57).  
After campaign and campaign, the Yusuf’s hold over the entire regions of Fezzan, 
Tripolitania, and Cyrenaica had grown to be firmly established and a proper provincial 
administration was put in place. As long as the Pasha’s financial resources remained intact 
the situation also remained unaltered. However, it was not to survive long. 
  
 
2.2.3     Beginnings of the End  
 
The ongoing Napoleonic wars had a delaying effect on the gradual demise of North 
African maritime power. No nation was singlehandedly able to put up an effective naval 
fight against the rulers of the region, combined with the fact that Tunis, Tripoli, and 
Algiers join forces when they were facing an outside danger, it rendered the European 
efforts to suppress piratical raids in the Mediterranean ineffective. Nevertheless, from 
about 1810, the balance of power was tilted in favor of Europeans.  
In the case of Yusuf Pasha, activities of British consul Warrington had a decisive effect. 
With the encouragement of British government, Warrington forced Yusuf Pasha to 
surrender his trade monopolies on agricultural goods and livestock to be shipped to Malta, 
which had lately become the naval base of British Empire in the Mediterranean to Maltese 
traders. Moreover, the income from piracy was also declining, again due to unsanctioned 
activities of British consuls. The British had traditionally acted as the protector of smaller 
nations in the Mediterranean waters. Taking on this honorable duty on its shoulders, the 
British had always been trying to force the Yusuf Pasha to reach settlements with 
countries under their diplomatic protection. Yet, the British consuls found another 
shortcut solution to both enrich themselves and to expand the safe passage that originally 
British shipping was enjoying. They started to issue British “Mediterranean passes” to 
the ships of other countries, thereby dwindling the chance of pirates to prey on the so-
called legitimate targets (Abun-Nasr 1987, 199).  
For the suppression of piracy, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was another turning point. 
It was in this diplomatic meeting that European powers decided to act together in their 
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efforts to eliminate piracy.31 In 1816, English Admiral Lord Exmouth sailed to the 
Mediterranean to put into effect the implications of the decisions taken in the Vienna, 
thereby obliging the North African rulers to announce proclamations banning piracy from 
their shores. At first, Yusuf Pasha only pretended to honor the promises he had given in 
the agreement signed between Lord Exmouth and himself. However, when a final 
resolution to effectively suppress the Mediterranean piracy was adopted in the Aix-la-
Chapelle in 1818, Yusuf Pasha had no chance against the joint British and French fleet 
but to abide by what Europeans were asking (Panzac, 2005, 289-292).32 Yusuf Pasha had 
taken these threats so seriously that his inability to provide the Ottoman navy with 
properly equipped warships get Sublime Porte infuriated during the Greek rebellion (Taş 
2016, 347-348). 
Having been deprived of his main sources of income, Yusuf Pasha started to think about 
invading the Bornu region. Even though his plan failed at the end, it may also be 
understood as the transformation of centralization policies of Yusuf Pasha into a full-
fledged imperial design. This region was from about 1808 ruled by a charismatic religious 
scholar and military leader, Al-Kanimi who successfully isolated the danger of jihadist 
forces of Uthman dan Fadio in Hausaland. The first diplomatic contact between Tripoli 
and Bornu came about when Al-Kanimi requested military help from Yusuf Pasha against 
the adjacent political rivals threatening the Bornu. Yusuf Pasha replied favorably and sent 
the Bey of Fezzan, al-Mukni to al-Kanimi’s help. When al-Mukni after a successful 
campaign returned to Fezzan with a large booty which enabled him to present to Yusuf 
Pasha with more than a thousand slaves, Yusuf Pasha confirmed that his design would 
bring enormous economic profit to the Tripolitan treasury.  
The problem was that Yusuf Pasha did not have financial means to provide the expedition 
with the necessary arms and the provisions. In 1820, He turned to the British government 
to raise a loan of 50.000 pounds. He suggested to Warrington who was acting as the 
liaison between Yusuf and his government that the expedition is intended to exploit the 
gold mines situated in Bornu. Warrington was aware of the fact that the region was not 
rich in terms of gold mines, and that Pasha was hiding his real ambition to take full control 
 
31 For a decent diplomatic history of the Congress of Vienna see: (Chapman, 1998). A more recent and comprehensive 
book that has been recently published is (Vick 2014). 
 
32 See for the docile answer given by Yusuf Pasha to combined fleets of Admiral Jurien de la Graviere and Admiral 
Freemantle: (Taş 2016, 332). 
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of the slave trade behind this fabricated claim. He consequently ensured Yusuf Pasha 
would not get hold of the money he seeks as he deemed such a monopoly as a serious 
threat to British interest in the region. This only slowed down the imperial ambitions of 
Yusuf Pasha as while maintaining an entente cordiale with al-Kanemi by once again 
helping him win a victory over Baghirmi in 1821, he was still conspiring to raise the 
necessary financial means to occupy the territory under al-Kanemi’s control.  
In the meantime, impressed by the appearance sustained by Yusuf Pasha, Al-Kanemi sent 
three of his sons to reside in Murzuk, the administrative center of Fezzan under the 
auspice of al-Mukni. Yusuf Pasha once again thought that it was time to send another 
expedition when Warrington had asked him to provide safe conduct for a team of British 
explorers meant to discover Bornu. After agreeing to Warrington’s request, Pasha had the 
company delayed about a year in order to assemble the force he needed to occupy Bornu. 
Travelers delay must have raised the suspicions of al-Kanemi as he militarily prepared 
his realm against a foreign invasion and requested his son’s release by Yusuf Pasha. After 
one last attempt to secure the financial resources by applying for a loan from the British 
government to provision his invading army, Yusuf Pasha necessarily abandoned his plan 
to expand southwards due to the ongoing Greek rebellion, to fight against which Yusuf 
Pasha was asked by Sublime Porte to equip two vessels (Fọlayan 1971 463-76). 
Being uncomfortable with the ascendancy of consular nodes of power, Yusuf Pasha tried 
to reassert his power by taking two measures. Firstly, he revitalized his long-neglected 
navy by a round of fresh investment. For a time, smaller European powers restarted to 
pay the price of peace, however, in light of the recent naval growth of the French and the 
British, this venture was doomed to fail. Secondly, he appointed Hassuna D’Ghies33 as 
his foreign minister, specifically giving him the task of curtailing the powers of British 
and French Consuls in Tripoli. D’Ghies’s principal tactic was to balance Warrington with 
 
33 Hassune D’Ghies was a member of an established Tripolitan merchant family. He was an utterly spectacular character 
for any historian. His father and brother also served in Yusuf Pasha’s government. He was well acquainted with the 
European ways of diplomacy. Documents from the Ottoman archives suggests that Ottoman Ambassador at London, 
Nuri Efendi wanted him to be flattered by Sublime Porte so that he can continue benefitting from his precious 
knowledge (COA.HAT.1174.46429, 27 Zilkade 1250/27 March 1835). We also have evidence that he traveled with 
the company of Nuri Efendi’s predecessor Namık Pasha to Manchester. See for reference to Hassune D’Ghies’s 
presence with the Ottoman delegation’s journey to Manchester and Liverpool; (Londra Seyahatnamesi, İÜ NEK-TY, 
fol. 56b). (My special thanks are due to İsa Uğurlu who kindly pointed to this joint journey from London to Manchester 
in one of our private conversations and shared with me the manuscript I cite here) In one of his journeys to England, 
he also came across with the influential philosopher Jeremy Bentham and provided him with the information he 
requested for the preparation of his “Securities against Misrule, adapted to a Mahommedan State and prepared with 
particular reference to Tripoli in Barbary”, for detailed information see: (Hume 1980) 
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the French Consul Charles Rousseau. For some time, his plan proved to be effective. 
Nevertheless, as it is aptly put by Folayan, these were “more like flickers of a dying fire” 
(Fọlayan 1979, 108) rather than policies that can be systematically applied in view of the 
present economic conditions of the Tripoli, given that now, apart from the developments 
I already touched upon, Tripoli was struck by recurring famines throughout the 1820s. It 
was only a matter of time that Warrington would find a scheme to obstruct Yusuf Pasha’s 
renewed bid for power. Using a fabricated story to pressure the Pasha to dismiss the 
Hassuna D’Ghies on the charges of conspiring against Consul’s son-in-law, Warrington 
had Pasha issue a statement which publicly accuses the French consul and his minister 
for getting involved with the murder of Major Laing. Warrington’s victory was two-
folded, having D’Ghies removed while at the same time striking a blow to the growing 
influence of Rousseau (Abun-Nasr 1987, 202). Added up to already existing 
undercurrents of political weakness, Pasha’s statement had given a push to the chain of 
events that would bring his rule to an end. 
  
 
2.2.4     Last Years of Yusuf Pasha 
 
Before going forward to elaborate on the development of this political breakdown, it is 
imperative to discuss the aggravation of the financial problems of the Tripolitan treasury, 
especially after 1829 because it appears as the utmost bone of contention between the 
Consuls of British and French governments and Yusuf Pasha. To supply the drained 
treasury with fresh inflow, Yusuf Pasha came up with the plan to invade Bornu, which, 
unfortunately for Pasha, failed. Moreover, the short-lived revival of piracy proved to be 
a futile effort to refill it. After these developments, Yusuf Pasha resorted to the good old 
method of debasing the Tripolitan currency. However, he took it to the extreme by doing 
these seven times within the scope of three years between 1829-1832. The inevitable 
outcome was an extremely volatile marketplace from which regular attendants started to 
shy away. The problem for the treasury was even more serious because it also deprived 
Yusuf of the exactions he used to take from the merchants. The Tripolitan government 
started to confiscate any property which claimants to it could not document their 
ownership. Yusuf’s legitimacy was taking serious damages from such outrageous 
measures. 
38 
 
In the meantime, he tried to address the shortage of money by dragging himself into over-
indebtedness. He resorted to a surprisingly modern method of raising loans when he 
started to issue promissory papers which resembles today’s state bonds. However, it also 
turned into a vicious cycle of reproducing his debts because every time the deadline of a 
set of papers came close, a new set of promissory papers were issued. The real problem 
arose when merchants of smaller nations such as Sweden or Denmark started to transfer 
their assets to British and French traders, knowing that their own consuls would not be 
able to exert the pressure to liquidate their assets. Consequently, nearly all these papers 
accumulated in the hands of the French and British subjects, allowing their Consuls to 
manipulate Yusuf Pasha as they see in alignment with their interests (Fọlayan 1979, 129-
134). 
As a result, the resentment of French Consul Rousseau was to cost Yusuf Pasha dearly. 
In August 1830, French Admiral Rosamel with the naval squadron under his command 
had come aboard the Tripoli urging Yusuf Pasha to sign a treaty in which he obliged him 
to refrain from meddling with the French interest in occupied Algeria and to limit the size 
of the Tripolitan fleet. It was also added in the treaty that Rousseau had nothing to do 
with the murder of Major Laing. We see here that Yusuf Pasha was sacrificing his power 
by accepting a foreign imposition with regards to the size of his navy. An additional 
request coming from Rosamel was the liquidation of the assets of Pasha’s French 
creditors. In return, Warrington decided to retaliate for the allegedly uneven treatment the 
British creditors had as their share. Coupled with the repudiation of the accusations put 
forth against Rousseau, Yusuf Pasha was about to feel Warrington’s wrath right up to his 
bones (Abun-Nasr 1987, 202).  
The already damaged authority of Yusuf Pasha had continued to decline in the 
countryside. In 1831, Evlad-ı Süleyman, sensing the feebleness of the pasha, put up a 
rebellion against centralized Tripolitan rule once again. Judging from Warrington’s 
conduct some historians rightly speculated that Warrington actively promoted the leader 
of this tribe, Abdulcelil Seyfinnasr34 to lead an armed resistance in order to prepare the 
country for a possible British invasion. Abdulcelil himself requested from Warrington 
that he should lobby in favor of his government’s occupation of the Tripoli (Abun-Nasr 
 
34 For a nearly contemporary account of Abdülcelil political career see: (Subtil 1844) 
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1987, 203).35  In the meantime, Warrington was squeezing the pasha for the settlement of 
the debts of the British creditors because of the recent payments made to the French. After 
he refused Yusuf’s offer to liquidate these accounts with intermittent installments, he 
threatened Pasha to summon the British naval forces. It was soon understood that 
Warrington was keen on living up to his promise when British warships came ashore to 
demand the payment of the debts on July 14, 1832. It was, in fact, the exact moment when 
Yusuf’s political career was permanently sealed. To pay back his enormous debts, he sold 
everything in his possession, only to understand that they would not cover what he owes 
to British creditors. As a last resort, he summoned the notables of the city including those 
who are traditionally exempt from taxation and announced an emergency tax. Pretending 
to be compliant, the Kuloğlu stroke the banner of rebellion when they returned to their 
quarters, announcing Yusuf’s grandson as their Pasha. After they formed an alternative 
government with some former members of Yusuf Pasha’s regime, Warrington also 
permanently settled in Menşiye. His effort made sure that Abdülcelil’s rebellion would be 
combined with that of Mehmed’s.  
Having spent last thirty-seven years of his life in power, Yusuf Pasha presided over one 
last divan meeting, after which it is decided that Yusuf’s only chance was to abdicate in 
favor of his youngest son Ali and inform the Sublime Porte about the situation. The letter 
he sent to Istanbul started the process that ended up with the Ottoman intervention in 
1835.
 
35 For a more substantiated opinion see: (Fọlayan 1979, 120). 
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3. PRELUDE TO OTTOMAN INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
3.1. Milestones of Center-Periphery Relations in the Ottoman North Africa in the 
Early 19th Century. 
 
The relationship between the North African provinces and Ottoman center had 
traditionally been based on a mutual understanding given that it was not imposed by 
territorial conquest in the first place. Even though the Ottomans started to appoint 
governors from the center late sixteenth century onwards, they never ferociously seek 
ultimate integration of these provinces. This was due to a combination of factors. Even if 
we dismiss the problems of logistics created by the harsh winds of the winter and 
operational radius of galleys as structural barriers to an effective policy of centralization, 
the Ottomans would have been in a position to negotiate with different power groups such 
as Janissaries, local ulema and various tribal groups, alienation of which would be 
detrimental to Ottoman operations in the western Mediterranean in the 16th century. In 
the following centuries, though the Habsburg frontier in the Mediterranean ceased to 
exist, the corsairs’ role as the most effective part of the Sultan’s navy, motivated 
Ottomans to continue maintaining the status quo. As long as the treasury kept fed by the 
annual tribute they sent and the North Africans targeted successfully the Mediterranean 
operations of the European powers, thereby blocking the full commercial exposure of the 
Mediterranean to European traders, and occasionally participated in seasonal naval 
patrolling campaigns, Ottomans were satisfied with minimal political involvement with 
the local affairs (Gürkan 2010, 156). 
When the decentralization of political authority became the salient feature of the Ottoman 
dominions in the 18th century, Ottoman center mostly abandoned the administrative 
practices such as acting as the supervisor of the military cooperation between three 
provinces, or assuming the role of a mediator between the three provinces in case of a 
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border dispute, or regularly sending investigative envoys to ensure the maintenance of 
justice (Gürkan 2010, 157-160). Each province produced a ruling elite that would address 
such issues amongst themselves and except for Algeria, governorship became hereditary. 
The most important is that each province started to dictate its own foreign policy priorities 
and struck deals with European powers independently from late 17th century onwards. 
On the other hand, they also continued to seek recognition from the Ottoman Sultan as it 
was probably the most effective tool of legitimacy while also meaning diplomatic 
protection of an Empire that could be accounted as a world power. In every renewal of 
governorship, Ottoman Sultan had sent gifts to these rulers which included most needed 
materials such as arms and ammunition; and occasionally fully-equipped warships. It is 
also important to highlight that the perception of these provinces as semi-independent 
regencies was not confined to Europeans, Ottomans themselves recognized this reality as 
well. 
The turn of the 19th century reinforced the notion of independence from the Sublime 
Porte as a self-perception of North African rulers, especially in the case of Tripoli of 
Yusuf Pasha. He assumed the title of emir’ul-muminin in his official correspondence 
which is normally used by Ottoman Sultan himself as a manifestation of Ottomans’ claim 
to Caliphate (Hanioğlu 2010, 10). Moreover, in every chance he gets, Yusuf Pasha not 
only reiterated that he is an independent ruler but also occasionally acted against the 
overall Ottoman interest. For example, I have already cited the extortions committed 
against Ragusan shipping in Chapter 1. Normally, Ragusan merchants were the subjects 
of the Ottoman Sultan, and their nominal diplomatic status was no different than that of 
Tripolitans. Counting on this, Ragusan merchants appealed to Ottoman Sultan for him to 
stop Yusuf Pasha’s illegal demands of tribute. When presented with the ferman issued by 
Ottoman Sultan, Yusuf Pasha claimed that “you reckon that this ferman matters, but 
anyone who pays forty kuruş can get one of these, in my eyes this is nothing but a piece 
of paper” (Quoted in Taş 2016, 425) More dramatic was Yusuf Pasha’s policy during the 
Napoleon’s Egyptian expedition. Infuriated by a long-standing ally’s infringement of 
Ottoman territorial integrity, Sultan Selim III had sent orders to North African rulers to 
prey on French shipping as well as a ruling to blockade the Toulon port.36 He also 
 
36 The hükm sent to Algiers (COA.C.HR.3.1796, 29 Ramazan 1214/24 February 1800). Sublime Porte requested from 
North African provinces to capture and arrest any personnel serving to the French State. Another request was the 
equipping of strong warships to fight against the infidels (COA.C.HR.54.2655). However, Algerians took it to the 
extreme and continued their hunt of French shipping even after a settlement was reached amongst Ottoman and French 
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requested the participation of Tripolitan naval forces in Ottoman campaign.  Yusuf 
ostensibly abided by the ruling of Sultan, but in effect, he did not see any profit in 
damaging his own relationship with France. Accordingly, he  delayed the departure of the 
Tripolitan navy on purpose as far as he can before permanently calling it off with the 
excuse of his own political problems, started to commercially gain by supplying French 
forces with foodstuff and lastly allowed Tripoli to act as a communicative liaison between 
Napoleon and Paris given that British exterminated the French naval force that would 
normally carry out the official communication of the Egyptian expedition (Taş 2016, 276-
287).   
While the aftermaths of the Congresses of Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle represent 
continuity for the Ottoman position, it signifies a turning point for the North Africans. 
Sublime Porte’s approach can be followed in a hatt-ı hümayun of Mahmud II which 
summarizes a diplomatic exchange of words between Sublime Porte and Austrian 
delegation right after the Congress of Vienna.37 As it is well-known Sublime Porte did 
not send a delegation to Vienna in 1815 even though Prince Metternich made his effort 
convince Sultan Mahmud II to send a representative to discuss the integration of the 
Ottoman Empire into European States System as a barrier against Russian southward 
expansion. Ottoman pretension at the time was the full recognition of the territorial 
designations of Treaty of Bucharest which provisioned the Ottoman-Russian borders to 
return to pre-war conditions in the Caucasia and Balkans (Bitis, 2006, 30-31). On the 
other hand, Russians were deliberately delaying the evacuation of former Ottoman 
territories. Moreover, rumors were circulating that Russia would bring the Serbian 
Question to Congress.  Therefore, Sublime Porte notified Prince Metternich that Ottoman 
Sultan would send a delegation only if Austria was to guarantee act as a mediator in the 
settlement of Russo-Ottoman Caucasian dispute in favor of Sublime Porte. Even though 
Metternich was utterly uncomfortable with the Russian advances at the expense of 
Ottomans, given European powers’ delicate preoccupation with the partition of Poland 
 
States. It seemed that the outbreak of war was imminent as the French navy headed towards the Algiers from Toulon 
Port. Then Sublime Porte interfered and mediated a ceasefire and peace between Algerians and the French. Ottoman 
effort was successful, and the word was received that the French navy returned halfway (COA. HAT.242.13584, 23 
Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1217/21 September 1802 & COA.HAT.175.7646). It is important to state that given the Algerian 
enthusiasm to act in accordance with the Ottoman interests, Yusuf Pasha’ defiance stands even more interesting. Make 
no mistake, however, each party was acting on his own foreign policy priorities, feeding into their mostly independent 
status.  
 
37 See COA, HAT, 22537, 1231/1815-1816. This crucial document is transcribed and published by Erdem Taş as an 
appendix to his Ph.D. thesis. See Appendix 14 (Taş 2016, 493-498). 
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after Napoleon’s evacuation, he had to refuse Ottoman’s request for an Austrian 
mediation.38 Nevertheless, he promised to bring the Ottoman interests on the table 
(Sedivý, 2013, 39-41). It turned out that he actually intended to live up to his promise 
when the final decision about the concerted efforts to suppress piracy was reached. 
Metternich asked Austrian delegation in Istanbul to inquire the official Ottoman stance 
regarding the Algerians’ diplomatic status.   
At the time, the British fleet under the command of Lord Exmouth was fighting the 
Algerians. Metternich was concerned about taking a wrong decision which would strain 
Ottoman-Austrian relations. His delegation was requiring the answer for Metternich to 
put forth the Ottoman claims in the next meeting intended to take place in London. It is 
understood that the crux of the matter was Sublime Porte’s attitude if the scope of the 
European anti-piracy policy would be broadened in the upcoming meeting in London. 
Austrian delegation wanted to make sure whether Ottomans would maintain neutrality or 
allow Europeans to take necessary precautions to suppress piracy or take the matter in its 
own hands, thereby cutting European involvement altogether.  As a matter of fact, the 
Ottoman camp was divided. The minority view was seeing English aggression against the 
Algerians as a violation of Ottoman territorial integrity not only because they are worthy 
of the caliph’s backing as fellow Muslims but also because Algeria is historically an 
Ottoman territory. The dominant view, however, did not see English actions as a violation 
because in their view “that the regencies are independent in matters pertaining to 
concluding peace with and declaring war to European states except for Russian and 
Austrian states is known by everybody.” Therefore, Ottoman involvement with the matter 
would be unprecedented. Well, these conversations were behind the doors and the answer 
given to Austrian was much more diplomatic: “what would you say if you were asked to 
a similar question about your own subjects who are also your co-religionists?” (Taş 2016, 
496). 
 
38 In this context, it is crucial to add that the issue of Barbary corsairs was brought forward by the Russians during the 
deliberations. They were keen to obtain a portion of the Barbary coast to have a military commercial base of operations. 
This was adding to Metternich’s displeasure as he was determined to sustain “the status quo in the Near East against 
the threat of Russian expansion.” (Vick 2014, 222-223). This point of view is also reflected in the Ottoman 
documentation. It is understood from Mahmud II’s response to his officers that in case Europeans are only seeking to 
protect their interests in the Mediterranean, it is better to mediate between the regencies and them, however, if they 
want to totally eliminate the regencies and “if the Russians are really intended to secure some posts there, it would be 
hard to settle the matter.” (ancak merâmları bütün bütün ocakları kaldırmak ve Rusyalı ol tarafta bazı mahall zabt 
etmek ise o takdîrce ortasını bulmak müşkildir) (Taş 2016, 493) 
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As for the meaning of these Congresses for the North African’s positions, we can again 
follow their attitude in another hatt-ı hümayun of Mahmud II. Alarmed by the final 
decision taken at Aix-la-Chapelle which ruled that Europeans should apply for the 
Ottoman mediation with regards to the suppression of piracy and subsequent operations 
of the joint British-French fleet, rulers of the provinces of Algeria and Tunis sent letters 
to Sultan Mahmud II in which they requested the continuation of Sultan’s diplomatic 
backing. These were in effect written to protest the position taken by Ottoman center after 
the deliberations in the Meclis-i Vükela about the Europeans’ request for mediation 
because of the alleged infringements of valid international agreements by North African 
corsairs. It appears that after giving evasive answers to European diplomatic missions in 
Istanbul, Sublime Porte also advised the North African powers “to abstain from attacking 
the ships of these states and to pay attention to protect the frontiers of the Islamdom and 
to get along well with them” (COA.HAT.1267.49039, 1818). In return, these letters were 
positing that while each province was fully acting in accordance with the agreements they 
signed with them, Europeans were aiming at the complete annulment of these treaties, 
thereby taking down the entire customs revenue system operational in North African 
ports. Besides, Europeans were also trying to prevent North African ships of any kind to 
carry arms and ammunition. The clearly intended message is that the Sublime Porte and 
the Sultan should not be led astray by the allegations put forth by Europeans and continue 
to side with his loyal subjects. While the concerns of the Algerians and Tunisians 
demonstrate their desire to feel the support of Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II’s note on the 
matter is even more telling as to how he situates this part of his realm in his mind: “peoples 
of Algiers are of the kind that is tough and courageous, even all the Christian states join 
forces, it would not be in their power (to defeat them), may god’s help be with them 
forever” (COA.HAT.1267.49039, 1818). Significantly, neither those who drafted the 
hatt-ı hümayun nor Mahmud II makes a reference to strengthening the North African 
provinces against the rising pressure of Europeans. In a way, it signals the decreasing 
degree of cooperation between the Ottoman center and North African periphery. While 
Algerians and Tunisians wanted to get closer, the Ottoman mentality seems to alienate 
them. 
Likewise, in the case of Yusuf Pasha, the years after the Aix-la-Chapelle represented a 
dramatic change. Now, not only he abandoned the proud overtone in addressing the 
Ottoman Sultan and assumed a much humbler discourse, but also his navy became an 
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essential part of the Ottoman forces fighting the Greek rebels. Even in the most distressing 
financial situation, that is after 1825, he continued to supply Ottoman forces with ships 
and manpower (Taş 2016, 425). 
The ongoing discussion demonstrates that the Ottoman center was, in fact, sustaining the 
very principle in place from the late 16th century onwards. From their perspective, the 
ruling elites in three of the provinces, as long as they continue to cooperate with the 
Ottoman war efforts, could sustain their independence from the Sublime Porte. It is also 
Ahmet Cevdet Pasha’s impression that Mahmud II’s overestimation of the military 
prowess of the North Africans was a wide-spread phenomenon amongst the Ottoman 
ruling elite. He also reports that the Ottoman attitude during the question of Barbary 
corsairs gave possible aggressors the pretext to deny Ottoman territorial claims in the 
North African provinces (Ahmed Cevdet Paşa 1301, 229-230) and it was exactly the case 
when French diplomats played the game of “farcical diplomacy of denial”39 when French 
land forces embarked upon the conquest of Algeria.40  
The real game-changer in the Ottoman point of view is the French annexation of Algeria. 
Ercüment Kuran’s ageless study of the Ottoman Policy against the French aggression and 
the subsequent failure of the diplomacy has shown that Ottoman diplomats sustained the 
same rhetoric of Algeria being an Ottoman province in the international arena. It must 
also be added that this seemingly unexpected French success dragged Ottoman ruling 
elite into a nightmare of how to secure rest of the Ottoman North Africa from the French 
imperial aspirations. This fearful frenzy is best exemplified by a letter written by Kaptan-
ı Derya Halil Rıfat Pasha to Mahmud II (COA.HAT.364.20161-D, 25 Safer 1247/5 
August 1831). It is worth quoting at length to better demonstrate the mood of Ottoman 
decision-makers. 
 
“In view of the French ships that we come across ever since we sailed to the 
Mediterranean with the glorious imperial navy, it is apparent that French is intent 
to annex Algeria and may God forbid (ma’azallah-ı teala) if it remains in their 
hands they would never be satisfied and find excuses to move on to Tunis and 
Tripoli to invade and to subjugate…..and given that it is possible for them to be 
 
39 I borrow this term from Mustafa Minawi who used it in a similar context of inconsequential diplomatic efforts of 
Ottoman ambassadors to remind the French and the British that Tripolitan hinterland is Ottoman’s sphere of influence 
according to Final Act of Berlin Congress. In the 1890s, they were also either evaded or lied to; see (Minawi 2016, 74-
79). 
 
40 For a recent study of French colonization of Algeria see: (Sessions 2011). 
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victorious, Oh my lord, we have to never lay down on the issue of Algiers and do 
everything in our power either in the form of talking, writing or expressing (ka’len 
ve kalemen ve ifadeten) to have them evacuate.” 
 
Nevertheless, the delineation of a thorough North African policy had to wait until 
Mehmed Ali’s Syrian campaign was diplomatically worked through. Around the same 
time with the arrival of Halil Rıfat Pasha’s frenzied letter, the word reached the Sublime 
Porte that Egyptian forces are on their way to annex Syria which Mehmed Ali had asked 
as the prize of his participation in the suppression of Greek rebellion in Morean peninsula. 
In fact, the file in which Rıfat Pasha’s letter is stored in the Ottoman archives also contains 
two other documents referring to the naval preparations Mehmed Ali was making in the 
summer of 1831. In the first one, the intended purpose of these preparations is not known 
but the intelligence was alarming enough to keep a record of as Ottomans were suspicious 
of Pasha for some time (COA.HAT.20161-I). In the second document, however, Mehmed 
Ali Pasha’s plan is out in the open: the ships were destined to sail to Acre to supply the 
Egyptian army from where the forces under Ibrahim’s command would head to meet the 
army of Mehmed Pasha in Hums (COA.HAT.364.20161-D, 25 Safer 1247/5 August 
1831). After defeating Mehmed Pasha, Ibrahim went on to confront Hüseyin Pasha at the 
battle of Bilan, which was a decisive victory on the part of Egyptian forces. Another 
victory followed on the plains of Konya in 1832 from where Ibrahim’s forces proceeded 
to Kütahya (Fahmy 2002, 61-67). The consecutive defeats of the Ottoman field armies 
led Mahmud II to seek Russian help in containing the Mehmed Ali’s hazardous 
advancement in the Anatolia. This, Russians agreed and started agglomerate large 
numbers of soldiers in Istanbul, Beykoz. Such a bold move on the part of Mahmud II was 
risking the growing influence of Russians in the Istanbul and stimulated the British and 
French to put pressure on Mehmed Ali to reach an agreement with Mahmud II (Kurat 
2011, 60-61). 
Even though it was an agreement that would please none of the parties, the Sublime Porte 
could now divert full attention to dealing with North African question. It must be stated 
that the letter I cited at length above doesn’t outweigh either one of the so-called 
remaining provinces, however, when Mehmed Ali and Sultan finally concluded the 
tedious peace of Kütahya, Tripoli was torn apart by a succession struggle going on 
between Mehmed and Ali Karamanlı. The Tripolitan exposure to a possible outside 
invasion led Ottoman decision-makers to prioritize the problems of Karamanlı family. It 
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is also important to highlight that even though the stimulant for the Sublime Porte was as 
such, the final decision as to how to work out the process was not clearly delineated until 
late 1834. The matter complicated as Ottoman field agents were dragged more and more 
into the intrigues of Tripolitan and international politics, only then the final plan was 
devised to remove Karamanlı family from power. In the last analysis, growing French 
influence was only a fraction of the Ottoman motivations, as claimants to the Tripolitan 
territory were not limited only to the French Monarchy.  
 
 
3.2. Ottoman Decision Making at Work During the Tripolitan Civil War 
 
3.2.1 The Tripolitan Civil War (1832-1835) 
 
In the first chapter, I already enumerated the reasons why the rebellion against the Yusuf 
Pasha broke out. Politically paralyzed by his grandson’s opposition, Yusuf Pasha was left 
with no choice but to abdicate from the throne. However, he could have delivered it to 
his rebellious grandson. After all, Yusuf Pasha himself was a rebel once. Moreover, the 
wide-spread support Mehmed gathered around his cause was closely resembling those 
who backed up Yusuf Pasha during his succession struggle between 1791-1793. 
Nevertheless, it did not turn out that way. It is, therefore, time to account for the 
persistence of civil war conditions in the Tripoli for about three years.  
To understand why it has continued for three years despite various attempts of the 
Ottoman agents to mediate between the two parties, one must pay close attention to the 
political factions on the scene. It is imperative to highlight that this was a revolution from 
below. Instead of Mehmed having organized the entire attempt, he was announced Pasha 
by those who were extremely critical of his grandfather’s rule. Consequently, the 
challenge to Yusuf Pasha’s rule had risen on 26 July 1832. While the city was burst in 
worry and people were taking up arms to defend themselves, the leaders of the rebellion 
came together in a gathering organized in Menşiye. The social profile of those who 
showed up in the gathering reveals the nature of the opposition against Yusuf’s rule. It 
was an alliance of propertied Turkish and Jewish merchants and political outcasts which 
is militarily supported by tax-exempt Kuloğlu class. While the former group was to risk 
great financial loss if Yusuf Pasha himself or his policies would continue, the latter group 
was characterized by their alienation from Yusuf Pasha due to the factitious political life 
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of Tripoli. The principal contention of these men such as Mehmed Beytülmal and Murad 
Reis was the growing power of D’Ghies family in Karamanlı court. Especially the former 
resented twice being superseded by members of this family when Yusuf Pasha appointed 
them as his foreign ministers, a position which he desperately wanted to occupy. What 
must have aggravated the opposition of the Mehmed Beytülmal to Ali Bey was probably 
his marriage relationship with the D’Ghies family.41  Therefore, as a man of political and 
financial capital, he was determined to put all the economic power he had into good use 
against Ali’s newly forming regime. Therefore, after Ali’s unsanctioned accession to the 
throne of Tripoli, Beytülmal swiftly packed up and sailed to Malta from where he would 
supply much-needed arms, ammunition, and foodstuff for the Mehmed’s rebellious camp 
stationed in Menşiye (Folayan 1979, 143). 
The mismanagement of the country was pinned on Yusuf Pasha and leaders of the 
rebellious group had chosen not to trust Ali Bey who, they thought, will continue Yusuf 
Pasha’s policies. Mehmed, on the other hand, was considered to be easily pliable due to 
his young age. Indeed, it was a good estimation. Before the crowd swore allegiance to 
Mehmed, the leaders of the opposition had Mehmed pledge to set the precedent to act 
under certain conditions, which Folayan argues, amounts to a Constitution. While 
Beytülmal became the chief minister, Murad Reis assumed the admiralty. Mehmed’s 
alternative government took a wise step by recognizing Abdülcelil Seyfünnasır, the 
rebellious leader of Evlad-ı Süleyman who had taken control over Fezzan for about a year 
now, as the legitimate governor of the region (Folayan 1979, 144-145) 
Inside the walls of the city, another camp was also forming. It is important to remember 
that when the rebellion of Mehmed broke out, Ali Bey had yet to assume his father's 
position. given his father's old age he decided to take the initiative to provide a smooth 
transition. He had the backing of most of the members of father's regime apart from those 
people I have touched upon above. Ali’s former successes in suppressing Gharian risings 
in 1826 and 1831 was speaking loud as to indicate he would be the one to put an end to 
the ongoing upheaval. Nevertheless, it was not an easy decision to make while some 
members of the divan argued Yusuf’s abdication would not only fuel up the existing 
rebellions but also encourage another one. After two weeks of deliberations, Ali finally 
rose up to the highest position in the Tripoli, only to be further challenged by his nephew. 
 
41 Ali Bey’s marriage alliance is revealed in the correspondence of Reşid Bey (later Pasha), Ottoman ambassador to 
Paris at the time, see (COA.HAT.46419. 1250). 
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It must also be added that most of the Karamanlı family was with him. His immediate 
brother, Ibrahim, came second in command and two of his lesser brothers assumed the 
control of military forces. 
Now, the camps were ready to intensify their efforts to take full control over the Tripoli 
and the region stretching into the Sahara. Apart from the actual struggle on land and the 
sea, there were two principle and defining political challenges facing these alternative 
governments. Each party was in dire need to broaden their social basis as much as they 
required international recognition, especially that of Ottoman Sultan if either one of them 
was to subdue the other. 
Ali Bey’s party was much more agile in seeking foreign recognition. Right after he 
succeeded to the throne, he not only notified the resident consuls of the European states 
in Tripoli but also dispatched his agents across Europe to notify European states on their 
own soil. While Muhammad D’Ghies as his chief minister sailed to Malta to seek British 
recognition, his brother Hassuna was lobbying in London and Paris to win over Ottoman 
support.42  It is also important to say that Yusuf was also writing letters all over to explain 
the legality of his abdication and legitimacy of Ali Bey’s accession. Even though the 
situation was in favor of Ali Bey, resident consuls had been also divided amongst 
themselves. While consuls of Tuscany and America got aligned with Mehmed, the Dutch, 
Swede, Neapolitan, and Spanish representatives expressed their support for Ali Bey. 
Nevertheless, what mattered first and foremost was the respective positions of British and 
French governments. Officially sanctioned position of each government was to remain 
neutral as long as possible up until an official note of investiture favoring one of warring 
parties would arrive from the Sublime Porte (Folayan 1979, 145-148). 
Things on the ground, however, was utterly different. In direct contrast with what their 
governments wanted them to do, the British Consul Warrington and the French Consul 
Schwebel worked ferociously to ensure their candidate arise triumphantly. According to 
Warrington, British interests as he saw them lied with Mehmed’s accession to power. 
Accordingly, he moved the British embassy in Tripolitan city walls to Menşiye quarters 
where Mehmed’s rebellion was based. Schwebel, on the contrary, sided with Ali Bey. 
The consuls’ defiance of governmental orders was due to several reasons. First was the 
personal animosity grown out of the Warrington’s ceaseless efforts to curb French 
 
42 See for Namık Bey’s report containing information on his interviews with Hassune D’Ghies: (COA.HAT.1173. 
46423) 
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influence in the Tripoli which sometimes amounted to outrageous insults to his 
opponents. Their rivalry was also deeply rooted in the long-standing colonial rivalry 
between their respective countries. It seemed obvious to Warrington that all the 
Schwebel’s activities were intended to carve out another colony for his Metropolitan 
France. He accordingly wrote to British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies 
Frederick Goderich that “if Ali succeeds, this place will be more than a colony of France 
as the advantages would be derived without the odium of the expenses.” Suspicions were, 
on the other hand, reciprocal. The two frigates British stationed off the coast to protect 
British subjects seemed evidence enough for Schwebel and French circles to think that 
these vessels are the advance party of an imminent British occupation of the country 
(Folayan, 1979, 149). At this point, it is important to remind that Ottoman diplomatic 
missions in London and Paris were carefully taking notes of such rumors and 
speculations.  
Warrington had contributed to Mehmed’s cause in several ways. Apart from his efforts 
to propagate Mehmed as the main medium through which the British government could 
extend its influence in the region, he also futilely tried to convince his superiors to 
intervene militarily to secure Mehmed’s victory as he thought that the British ascendancy 
in Tripoli would translate as a colonial gateway to all North Africa, as taking over of the 
commerce of the interior and as a means to abolish slavery. More importantly, he assumed 
the role of an intermediary, connecting leadership of the Mehmed’s rebellion to its Arab 
allies in the hinterland, thereby making sure of regular supplies of warriors. He also 
attended the material needs of the rebellious camp by procuring arms and ammunitions. 
These were, indeed, among the reasons that Şakir Efendi accused him of being the reason 
why the chaos does not cease.43 Likewise, Ali Bey had written quite several letters to 
British authorities asking the dismissal of Warrington.44  
French Consul Schwebel, on the other hand, was not falling short of Warrington in his 
own efforts to advertise the rule of Ali Bey as the legitimate one. He got in touch with his 
connections across Europe to encourage them to publish articles condemning Mehmed’s 
rebellion and Warrington’s support. One of the biggest achievements of Schwebel’s and 
 
43 For Warrington’s mentions in Şakir Efendi’s reports, (COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 9 Receb 1250/11 November 1834). 
 
44 Ali Bey wrote a letter intended directly to the King of England. He, likewise, asked Ottoman ambassador to London 
Namık Bey to lobby for the dismissal of the Consul Warrington. For the former see (COA.HAT.788.36747 (22 
Ramazan 1250/22 January 1835). For the latter see (COA.HAT.738.34986). 
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Ali Bey’s cooperation was probably the winning over of Cebel-i Garbi Arabs, led by 
Şeyh Guma to their side. It was beyond doubt had important consequences in terms of 
military superiority, tilting the balance in favor of Ali Bey. After Arabs of Cebel-i Garbi 
and Evlad-ı Süleyman was included in the struggle, it expanded to sweep all the Tripolitan 
interior.  
The military confrontations started as early as July of 1832. Vigorous attempts on the part 
of Mehmed at taking the city through a siege came to naught before the well-armed walls 
of the Tripoli. After six months of siege and multiple open field confrontation, Mehmed 
decided to increase his numerical strength by winning more Berber and Arab allies. When 
it came to February of 1833, Mehmed’s forces were once more repulsed, suffering heavy 
losses. It would hard to estimate that it came much to their relief when Abdülcelil supplied 
the Mehmed a fresh round of reinforcements. However, the city walls were still 
unbreachable which is why the rebellious camp thought that it would be wise to use heavy 
armaments to breach the walls. As noted above Mehmed Beytülmal was tasked with 
procuring this equipment from Malta. Nevertheless, the very next confrontation had seen 
yet another defeat for the Mehmed’s party and most of the heavy war equipment passed 
on to the hands of Ali Pasha. It is safe to say that the energetic and hopeful aura 
surrounding the Mehmed’s party was slowly evaporating by the December of 1833 while 
Ali’s party was becoming bolder and bolder (Folayan 1979, 155-157). 
In April 1834, after pushing back the rebel forces, Ali took the offensive and started a 
heavy bombardment of the Menşiye that lasted about three months. It was a traumatic 
experience on the part of Mehmed’s supporters such that they lost faith in their own 
military capacity to terminate the struggle in their favor. Turning desperately to the British 
Consul who reported to his government that they promised to become a “voluntary 
Colony of England” if his majesty would intervene militarily to put an end to Ali Bey’s 
control of the city and remove him from the power (Folayan 1979, 157). The overseas 
intervention they so recklessly sought to secure, however, had come from another 
direction, in a way no one would have expected. Now, the so-called “Sick Man of Europe” 
was hesitantly rising from his bed to assert direct control over the entire Tripolitania, 
Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. 
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3.2.2 Claimants to Tripolitan Territory 
 
In the years between 1829 and 1835, the race to seize the political control of the Tripolitan 
territory had attracted quite a number of competitors. Ottoman Sultan was by no means 
the only one who had wished to integrate this lively center of Saharan trade, though 
mismanaged for some time, into his imperial domains. Without getting into detail, I 
already enumerated the attendees of this fierce competition. It is, therefore, imperative to 
situate these in the picture. Only then, it would be clear enough that for the Ottomans the 
intervention of 1835 was a way of reasserting their imperial prowess in the context of 
international competition.  
Looking from the Ottoman perspective, there were perceived and real threats. Especially 
the English threat was more perceived than real. The British government repeatedly 
reminded consul Warrington that Britain does not have a territorial interest in Tripoli 
when the consul delivered his first suggestion to invade the country. The British position 
did not change either when Mehmed’s party requested a British intervention in favor of 
their cause. However, as will be discussed further below, Warrington was giving an 
extreme distrust to Mehmed Şakir Efendi, the Ottoman investigator sent twice by Sublime 
Porte specifically to estimate the best course of action in Tripoli. On the contrary, there 
were times when the threat was very much real. Mehmed Ali of Egypt in collaboration 
with the French plotted to annex all the North Africa including Tripoli just before he 
launched his Syrian campaign, a plot which is generally known as the Drovetti plan. 
Moreover, Huseyin Bey of Tunisia also started to think that extending his power by 
annexing Tripoli would be in his best interest. The Sublime Porte counterbalanced these 
first by diplomacy and then by resorting to military force. 
When Bernardino Drovetti, a long-time servant to the French Monarchy as consul and 
consul-general in Egypt returned to Paris in retirement in mid-1829, he found an aura of 
international revisionism. The French foreign minister Polignac was just about to 
formulate his famous plan to either modify or completely nullify the post-1815 European 
territorial delineations. Given the outcome of Morean War, he was arguing that Ottoman 
Empire had come to the end of its place in the history and after its imminent fall, Russia 
and Austria would share its territories, allowing France to particularly seek Belgium 
territories up to the line of Meuse and Rhine as a compensation for the disturbance of 
balances of power. His plan was to be carried out by signing a secret agreement between 
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France and Russia which would be extended to Prussia, then Austria would have no 
chance but to get along and join the alliance. Indeed, a plan that would require a huge 
military force on the part of France. After having it approved by Charles X who was also 
eager to raise humiliated French nation on its foot in the international arena, the minister 
ordered the Russian ambassador to communicate with Tsar Alexander I. Carried off by 
the genius plan he made, Polignac was overlooking the fact that neither Prince Metternich 
nor Tsar had any interest in tipping the balance in the West or in the East. Having known 
it very well, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg did not take the chance to embarrass 
himself in front of Tsar Alexander (Šedivý 2013, 411). 
Though never put into action, what is significant about the Polignac plan in the context 
of our discussion is its presupposition of the inevitability of the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
and interestingly, he was not alone in this. In a study entitled as “Aperçu de la situation 
politique de L’Egypte en 1828 et 1829”, Baron de Coehern, attaché of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of France, was summarizing how the French aspired to see the political map of 
Levant.45  He announced that “the most real cause why the people and issues of Egypt are 
separated from the destiny of Turkish Empire is that the first has just started its future 
while the other had completed the phases of its existence.” He elaborated by stating that 
Mehmed Ali was the rising power who “started by making himself the sole master of 
Egypt, elevated by conquering, subdued the Nubia, choked the Wahhabi reform, reunited 
Arabia under his son-turned-pasha, established his regime in Cyprus and most recently in 
a part of Candia.” He continued to propound that “the current position of the Ottoman 
Empire exposes it to listen more to the cabinet of St. Petersburg and the naval forces of 
Great Britain” and if France does not want “to play a secondary role”, it must support 
“the third power that has arisen in the East and whose action is still hidden by an 
appearance of suzerainty” who would “offer resources to our policy” to form a “new 
empire.” His position was that by doing so France would “kill two birds with one 
stone:  prevent the disadvantages resulting from the dissolution of Turkish Empire by 
rallying its pieces around a new empire which offer order and stability in the region” and 
“reassert the bygone influence France exercised in the Orient.” Even though the naivety 
of such a position was proved by the eventual outcome of the Mehmed Ali’s Syrian 
 
45 This rather blunt memorandum is stored in French Archives with the catalog entry of A.E.Memoirs et documents. 
Egypt 19; and is quoted at length in (Sabryr 1930, 170-172). Translations from French to English are mine. Originals 
are to be found especially on page 170. 
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campaign, after which the so-called Turkish Empire continued to survive nearly a century 
and Russians significantly increased their influence in Istanbul, to which direction this 
new empire of Mehmed would grow into was not yet determined. This was exactly the 
moment when Drovetti came up with a brilliant plan to encourage Mehmed Ali to expand 
westwards, that is, into Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria. 
After the famous fly-whisk episode happened in April 1827 between Hüseyin Dey of 
Algeria and French Consul Pierre Deval, the French government sought redress with the 
Sublime Porte. Came out empty-handed, and arguably disgraced, they moved onto a naval 
blockade to Algerian ports, which was essentially inconsequential as well. In the eyes of 
Hüseyin Dey, it only worked to prove that France has no intention to escalate the level of 
violence. In the autumn of 1829, encouraged by unwieldy French policy, Hüseyin Dey 
made it clear that he would not yield to the French demands of reparation. The truth of 
the matter, however, was utterly different than it seemed to Hüseyin Dey. At the time, 
Polignac was not eager to send the precious French troops he hoped to use in redesigning 
the map of Europe (Šedivý 2013, 413). Therefore, when approached by Drovetti who in 
fact conducted preliminary talks on his own initiative with Mehmed Ali before his return, 
Polignac willingly agreed to follow the policy retired Consul of Egypt had suggested. In 
Drovetti’s scheme, Mehmed Ali’s army appeared not only as of the punisher of Algerian 
Dey but also as the conqueror of the Tripoli and Tunisia. If the plan was to succeed, he 
convinced Polignac that although France would not make any territorial gains, it will 
make an eternal ally of Mehmed Ali, thereby boosting its influence in the region. It was 
indeed a plan in accordance with the spirit of the time in Paris. Moreover, the avoidance 
from a possible English jealously if the French would undertake a military campaign was 
a side gain of the plan, after all a stabile north African coastline ruled from Cairo would 
be to the advantage of every European country (Dodwell, 1931, 97). For the plan, France 
was ready to transfer a loan of 10 thousand francs along with the cooperation of the 
French navy. 
French diplomats Mimaut and Huder who were tasked to approach Mehmed Ali of Egypt 
in an official capacity to negotiate the terms of an alliance arrive in Mehmed Ali’s court 
on November 1829. Ostensibly favorable to French suggestions, Mehmed Ali Pasha 
expressed that he could mobilize forty thousand men for the campaign if the French 
government would be kind enough to raise for him a loan of twenty million francs and 
donate four battleships, each equipped with eighty cannons. In fact, Mehmed Ali was not 
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as enthusiastic as Drovetti originally supposed him to be, but he still did not want to miss 
the opportunity to boost his bond of friendship with France. Moreover, if French 
proposals would materialize, it would mean a chance to rebuild his fleet which comes 
close to complete annihilation. Therefore, though not abandoned for good, the project of 
occupying Syria and Baghdad was suspended for a while. However, the fact that Mehmed 
Ali’s demands were well beyond what French diplomats were authorized to settle with 
appeared as a problem. In vain that they tried to convince Mehmed Ali to give up his 
requests to obtain four French men-of-war. The Pasha obliged them to communicate his 
counter-proposal. These requests found Polignac still hopeful to obtain Russian help to 
secure territorial gains in Rhine region. He decided to get along with Mehmed Ali’s 
demands and opened the issue for deliberations with the members of his cabinet. One can 
only guess what he acted like when opposed by the cabinet who thought the transfer of 
ships carrying French flag as a disgrace to the French nation. Polignac only induced them 
to accept extensive help of the French navy, an assignment which would include 
protecting Alexandria as well as Egyptian transport vessels from a possible attack of 
Sultan’s navy. Moreover, to persuade Mehmed Ali, the French offered to partition North 
Africa so as to share the financial burden of the campaign. Operations in Tunis and Tripoli 
would be on Mehmed Ali’s account while French would attack Algiers. 
The secrecy of these deliberations had been compromised from the start, not only because 
Drovetti was engaged in loose talk with British representatives in Cairo. Right after 
Egyptian mission hit the roads for the first round of talks, Polignac had written to 
Guillemont, the French ambassador in Istanbul, an order in which he requested the 
ambassador to obtain Sultan’s permission sanctioning Mehmed Ali’s occupation of the 
entire north African littoral. When Mehmed Ali heard this, he contemplated that this 
should be the last thing to do not only because the very effort to secure such a sanction is 
futile but also because Sultan Mahmud would seek the help of British navy to counteract 
his over empowerment (Dodwell, 1931, 9). In this estimation, he proved himself to be a 
man of foresight. The internationalization of the Drovetti plan had been received very 
badly by Ottoman Sultan and British diplomatic circles. In a rather sarcastic and ironical 
letter which pretends that the news could be nothing, but rumors taken out of context, the 
Sublime Porte urged Mehmed Ali to act in accordance with the Sultanic orders and God’s 
providence as it would be “beyond comprehension to send soldiers against a Muslim land 
in alliance with one of the favored nations” especially given that Mehmed Ali is in “ripe 
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old age.” (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, v.2, 519-521). It seems that Sublime Porte found it hard to 
believe “a man who thinks methodically the pros and cons of a matter with extreme 
precision” by virtue of his “lucid mind and righteous disposition” would embark upon 
such an outrageous act “to deploy soldiers in alliance with the tribes of the area stretching 
from the frontiers of Egypt to Moroccan borders against the north African regencies” 
(Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, v.2, 520). It seems to me that the writer of this dispatch was 
threatening Mehmed Ali by complimenting him. The frequent occurrence of the Sultanic 
authority and description of Mehmed Ali as a governor instituted by Sultan Mahmud II 
leads me to speculate that the overpass of France was perceived rightly as undermining 
Sultan’s suzerainty over Mehmed Ali and Sultan was extremely uncomfortable with such 
a thing. The dispatch also informed him that Tahir Pasha was sent to settle the matter 
without bloodshed (Ahmet Lutfı̂ 1999, 521-526).  
Even though the British also sent a diplomatic mission to push Mehmed Ali to abort the 
scheme planned with France, neither the Sultan’s intimidation nor the opposition of 
enraged British diplomats was the real cause why Mehmed Ali had chosen to give up the 
mission in the March of 1830. He had too much to risk against what he could expect to 
achieve by such a campaign. He also found French hesitancy extremely disturbing under 
the impression that they would not a good enough ally to elevate tensions with the British. 
If gains would be greater, he would have gone ahead (Dodwell, 1931, 104). The lack of 
Sultanic approval was very likely to create a legitimacy crisis which would be a source 
of weakness than strength for Mehmed Ali, far away from his actual power base in Egypt. 
Then, he turned his eyes from Tripoli, Tunis, and Algeria to his long-awaited prize, Syria. 
Even though the Drovetti scheme was abandoned in 1830, the specter of it continued to 
haunt Ottoman decision-makers. The reason was not only the recent campaign of 
Mehmed Ali ending with Kütahya agreement. The Sublime Porte had good reasons to 
believe that Mehmed Ali might have revitalized a plan to annex Tripoli. Moreover, it was 
not just on the air, it was also in writing. I have already mentioned the treaty Hassune 
D’Ghies wrote to inform Reşid Bey and the Sublime Porte about the recent situation in 
the Tripoli. In its essence, it is a reform package intended to reorganize and strengthen 
the North African regencies. Important to highlight is that the text seems to play a rather 
decisive role in formulating Sublime Porte’s Tripolitan policy in 1834-1835. Now is the 
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exact context it should be further discussed with regards to how he tries to convince 
Sublime Porte to carry out reforms in North Africa.46  
The proposals of Hassune Efendi are best to be understood as strategies concerned with 
the evacuation of the French and isolation of Mehmed Ali’s westward ambitions. To 
achieve this, he has specific and detailed instructions. In the case of kicking the French 
back, the keystone of his proposal is the diplomatic, economic and military empowerment 
of the Ahmed Bey of Constantine. On the other hand, he posits that if Sublime Porte 
would like to get rid of Mehmed Ali once and for all, the Tripolitan civil war should be 
ended by appointing Ali Bey as the governor of Tripoli. He goes on to argue that the rebel 
Mehmed is a protégé of Mehmed Ali which means that if he succeeds to the governorship, 
the province would slip through the hands of Ottomans into Mehmed Ali’s realm. When 
the situation in the Tripoli is amended, the potent warriors in the Benghazi who is sick of 
Mehmed Ali’s transgressions could be assembled in a strong army to push him back (Taş 
2016b, 100). 
What is most significant in Hassune Efendi’s succinct account, however, is the worst-
case scenario if the Ottoman center would fail to resolve the North African question by 
taking the measures he proposed. As a result, he argues, Mehmed Ali’s power and 
prowess which is diverted to Damascus only for a short time will enhance. When he has 
his enemies subdued there, he will turn his attention to North Africa. Most interestingly, 
he seems to believe that the French military activity against the Ahmed Bey of 
Constantine is only for laying the ground for Mehmed Ali’s takeover. The French position 
is that if Mehmed Ali grows stronger in the region the British hopes to obstruct French 
interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean would become obsolete. Therefore, 
Mehmed Ali and French are going to proceed as following (Taş 2016b, 102). 
As a precaution to any possible British maneuver, French will continue to transfer large 
numbers of soldiers to Algiers. In the meantime, Mehmed Ali will march into Tripoli to 
put it under the sway of his rule, taking advantage of the weakness of the Pasha of Tripoli. 
Next step will be the agglutination of Hüseyin Bey of Tunisia to Mehmed Ali’s political 
orbit by making him a vassal. Hassune Efendi seems to believe that this would be an easy 
task even though Tunis has a powerful army and solid finances because of Hüseyin Bey’s 
disproportionate fear of the French. A threatening letter addressed to Hüseyin Bey, 
 
46 The document is published by Erdem Taş, see: (Taş 2016b) 
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therefore, would be enough to make him yield to the Egyptian political supremacy. 
Hassune Efendi estimates that a wave of political propaganda will follow the subjugation 
of Tunisia before Mehmed Ali proceeds to Constantine and Algiers in which Mehmed 
Ali would be portrayed as the savior of the Muslims of Algeria who suffered heavy losses 
against the French and saw “their mosques turned into churches of the infidels, barns, 
commercial warehouses and some other unthinkable of places.” The people follow the 
suit by submitting to his authority while Mehmed Ali wages an imaginary war against 
French forces which in effect are retreating to France in accordance with the agreement 
between the French government and Mehmed Ali. Hassune Efendi goes on to argue that 
Mehmed Ali will make good use of the abandoned and disordered resources of this fertile 
land to grow strong enough to challenge all the Francs (cümle taife-i efrenc) with the help 
of his naval alliance with the French government. It seems that Hassune Efendi thinks 
even the British could not put up a fight against such a formidable alliance (Taş 2016b, 
103). 
One could not help but notice the resounding similarity of Hassune Efendi’s estimations 
with the Drovetti plan even though there is no mention of the French diplomat in the 
document. Moreover, it would be safe to argue that the Ottoman intervention was 
genuinely motivated to curb the further increase of Mehmed Ali’s political influence in 
North Africa. Nevertheless, Mehmed Ali was only one of the political contenders to grow 
more powerful in North Africa. 
Hüseyin Bey of Tunisia himself started to think about taking advantage of the Tripolitan 
upheaval to integrate the region into his realm from October 1833 (Temimi 1975, 72).47 
The mastermind of the Tunisian plan was Hüseyin Bey’s chief minister, Şakir al-Tabi. 
His scheme included overthrowing the Karamanlı dynasty to put Tripoli under the sway 
of Mustafa Bey who was Hüseyin Bey’s brother and heir apparent to Tunisian throne. 
Minister secretly hoped to do away with the heir apparent by sending him to Tripoli, 
thereby securing the succession for his own brother-in-law Prince Hamza, the eldest son 
of the reigning Hüseyin Bey. It was a golden opportunity when a call for aid came from 
the leaders of Mehmed’s rebellion in the Tripoli. Now, the Tunisian army could march 
into Tripoli and eliminate the two warring camps on this pretext. Nevertheless, Hüseyin 
Bey found it imperative to consult to the Sublime Porte and to obtain the official sanction 
 
47 Hüseyin Bey revealed his intentions to French ambassador Deval. This article is originally written in Arabic. My 
special thanks are due to my mother Fazilet Kılıçaslan who kindly translated the article from Arabic to Turkish. 
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of the Sultan Mahmud II (Temimi 1975, 72-73). However, we have evidence that he also 
ostensibly responded to rebellious camp’s call for aid by ordering his representative in 
Tripoli, Kasım b. Recep, to side with the rebels, probably to ensure the perpetuation of 
the upheaval until the Sublime Porte’s answer arrives. In the meantime, the minister was 
tasked to assemble the army of occupation. Eventually, Sublime Porte refused the 
Tunisian plan, the reasons for which I will further discuss below. However, as Mehmed 
Şakir Efendi’s reports reveal, Tunisian involvement continued to hangover like a question 
mark in the minds of Ottoman decision-makers who eventually decided to establish direct 
control over the region.  
 
 
3.2.3   Ottoman Policy during the Tripolitan Civil War and Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s 
Missions in Tripoli and Tunis. 
 
The Sublime Porte’s priority during the Tripolitan civil war was to stabilize the region to 
cut off the possibility of a foreign occupation of the country. However, the way through 
which it would be carried out was an open question and remained as such until Necip 
Pasha’s naval squadron landed the Ottoman forces it carried to the shores of Tripoli on 
the 25 May 1835. 
After Yusuf Pasha’s letter had arrived in Istanbul in January 1833, Meclis-i Vükela held 
a meeting to decide how to proceed with the appointment of Ali Bey as the legitimate 
governor of the Tripoli. The final act was to delay the fulfillment of the request as it would 
be a violation of the precedent to renew governorships in North Africa every three years. 
In fact, Sublime Porte wanted to take the measure of the situation given their on-going 
occupation with the North African problem. A wrong move would have cost dearly. 
Accordingly, it was decided to send a trusted man of Kapudan Pasha as an investigator 
(COA.HAT.366.20242). This was the moment Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s troubles started. 
He was the chief-scribe (sır katibi) of the admiral of the time, Mehmed Tahir Pasha. 
Getting on a ship destined to Tunisia, he sailed to take off in Tripoli on the way. He set 
foot on Tripoli in late August 1833. 
At the time of his arrival, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was most graciously welcomed by Ali 
Bey while the other contender was away in the interior to settle some local disputes among 
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his supporters. After Şakir Efendi demanded a complete ceasefire and called for a meeting 
in which two parties could present their cases to be heard by Sultan’s representative, both 
parties followed suit. After the contending claims were heard, Şakir Efendi was inclined 
towards the Ali Bey not only because he was the eldest son of the Yusuf Pasha but also 
because his energetic arguments were much more orderly compared to that of his rival’s 
representatives but also because, as I have already touched upon, the rebellious party was 
losing its commitment around the time Şakir Efendi arrived at Tripoli. They did not 
resemble a group extremely determined to win over its rival (Folayan 1979, 158). It seems 
that after assessing the situation Şakir Efendi departed from Tripoli in late September 
1833 due to an order coming from Tahir Pasha, asking him to travel to Tunis. 
When the Tunisian plan to annex the Tripoli and appointment of Mustafa Bey as the 
governor of that region reached the Sublime Porte, they approached it with due care 
because at first look the success of such a plan could not be taken for granted. On the 
other hand, if it would turn out to be a success story, the protracted civil war in Tripoli 
could have been terminated and a possible foreign invasion could be avoided. 
Nevertheless, the Sublime Porte evaded a formal promise to deliver what Tunisian Bey 
was asking. Mehmed Tahir Pasha, in his letter to Hüseyin Bey, enumerated Ottoman 
demands if for the argument’s sake Sultan would authorize the Tunisian 
plans. Apparently, Tahir Pasha sustains, the Sublime Porte may consider such an 
arrangement under the condition that the Bey of Tunis could indeed bring stability to 
Tripoli. Hüseyin Bey is also asked to prove the Tunisian government’s ability to repel a 
possible foreign intervention by sending the required number of soldiers, arms and 
ammunition as well as ships and naval equipment to Tripoli. Moreover, Tahir Pasha 
reminded the Bey that he must undertake the liability of the foreign debts of Karamanlı 
family if he wants his son to be recognized as the ruler of Tripoli. Tahir Pasha goes on to 
add that he is going to send his chief-scribe Mehmed Şakir Efendi to negotiate a final 
agreement. Upon departing Tripoli, therefore, Şakir Efendi’s days in Tunis started.48 It 
seems that the gravity of the situation compelled Sublime Porte to consider every single 
contingency plan.  
After his journey from Tripoli to Tunis, Şakir Efendi was obliged to wait the return of 
Hüseyin Bey’s chief minister, Şakir Sahib al-Tabi who was dealing with minor rebellions 
 
48 Mehmet Tahir Pasha’s letter is included in (Temimi 1975, 73). It is in Arabic translation and it is dated to 1 February 
1834. 
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in the south of Tunisian territories for some time. When he finally made the acquaintance 
of the chief minister in October 1833, it was revealed in this meeting that the Sublime 
Porte was inclined to dictate harsh conditions if it was to authorize the unification of 
Tripoli and Tunis under Huseynid family. In the case that Hüseyin Bey’s son, Mustafa, is 
instituted as the Pasha of Tripoli, Şakir Efendi conditioned a huge lumpsum payment of 
Tunisian currency as well as a yearly tribute to Ottoman Sultan. It goes without saying 
that Şakir Efendi restated the obligation of Mustafa to take over Karamanlı debts. In 
return, the Tunisian chief minister propounded that, under such financial terms, the 
Tunisian government can't bring stability to Tripoli by sending its troops and navy. The 
deliberations were stuck and Mehmed Şakir Efendi left the Tunis for Istanbul at the end 
of the same month (Temimi 1975, 74). 
The unfruitful meetings with Tahir Pasha’s representative did not discourage Tunisian 
Chief Minister to get in touch directly with the Tahir Pasha who he thinks has the power 
to convince the Sultan to obtain the necessary orders instituting Mustafa as the Pasha of 
Tripoli if the feasibility of Tunisian plan was to be clearly explained. They argued that 
given the internal financial problems of the Tunis, it would be hard to assume the foreign 
debts of the Yusuf Pasha as well as assembling an army and a navy powerful enough to 
pacify the upheaval in Tripoli. Nonetheless, Tunis would be willing to pay the half of the 
Karamanlı debts upfront and to restructure the remaining half by issuing new promissory 
papers. It seemed a fair deal to them because they would rebuild the war-torn Tripolitan 
city as well as bring stability to the entire region whose people are in a state of constant 
misery and poverty. Moreover, given the call of Mehmed’s party, the transition from 
Karamanlı rule to Huseynid rule would be a bloodless one (Temimi 1975, 74).  
Though it was indeed a good line of thought, in August 1834, Grand Vizier Rauf Pasha 
and Mehmed Tahir Pasha had written two separate letters rejecting the Tunisian plan 
because the distance between Tripoli and Tunis is too great to employ it with efficiency. 
On the other hand, they argued that the greatness of the prize Sublime Porte would be 
bestowing to his person requires a swift proceeding rather than extensive bargaining. 
Strictly speaking, these were more like excuses than real arguments. In fact, by the time 
Tunisian counterproposal arrived at Istanbul, the Ottomans were considering the ultimate 
plan to establish direct Ottoman rule in Tripoli. It would also be unwise to voluntarily 
carve out a new Mehmed Ali of Egypt out of Huseynids of Tunisia. Therefore, Rauf Pasha 
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added the Sublime Porte’s request for military help in Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s efforts to 
subdue the Mehmed’s rebellion (Temimi 1975, 74-75).  
For the time being, however, let us come back to the last months of the year 1833 and 
early 1834. Upon the arrival of the Mehmed Şakir Efendi, the Sublime Porte took its time 
to grant Ali Bey with the Sultanic order of investiture to watch the course of events and 
gather more intelligence. It is understood from the Ottoman ambassador to London, 
Namık Bey’s reports that British diplomats started to ask pressuring questions about who 
would be the next ruler of Tripoli, a fact which led Sublime Porte to speed up the process 
(COA.HAT.454.22450). Again, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was seen fit for the duty. This time 
his task was to deliver the order of investiture recognizing Ali Bey as the Pasha of Tripoli 
and help him to appease the rebellious leaders around Mehmed. In other words, for the 
time being, the Ottoman official position was to stabilize the region by empowering Ali 
Bey Karamanlı. 
On his second mission, Mehmed Şakir Efendi arrived at Tripoli on 18 September 1834. 
After the declaration of Sultan’s recognition of Ali Bey as the legitimate governor of the 
Tripoli, stiff protests on the part of Menşiye rebellion ensued. They resisted the public 
inauguration of the Ali Pasha. The Sultan’s representative gave the protestors six days to 
come to terms with Sultanic decision (Folayan 1979, 158). However, it was in vain to talk 
through the matter. Instead, he delayed his departure and worked to suppress the rebellion 
by using coercive methods for three months.  
From the report where Mehmed Şakir Efendi summarizes his activities to undermine the 
rebellious party and the reports of British and French consuls, it is understood that he had 
opted for three strategies. First was the naval blockade of Menşiye. However, the blockade 
that he ordered was constantly sabotaged by the activities of the Warrington. Secondly, 
he made numerous efforts to rally the Arabs in the interior around the Ali Pasha to 
increase the numerical strength of the Tripolitan defensive against the rebels 
(COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 06 Receb 1250/8 November 1834). When he understood that 
these measures would not be sufficient to put an end to the civil war, he tried to broker 
peace between the two parties. After a series of meetings with both parties, he came up 
with the following proposals. Firstly, after the establishment of a final ceasefire, the city 
gates would remain open. Secondly, the fighting forces of the contending parties in the 
interior should leave their arms and withdraw. To appease the followers of Mehmed, he 
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said that if they agree to these terms, thereafter the order of investiture would be nullified. 
Until the final decision as to how to proceed will be re-discussed in Istanbul, they would 
remain equals and a joint council made up of ten members from each side will be 
assembled to act as a provisionary government. However, neither the Ali Pasha nor 
Mehmed’ rebellious party was content with the proposals. The situation again dragged 
into a painful stalemate before he finally set sails to Istanbul on 31 December 1834 
(Folayan 1979, 160). 
In accounting for his failure to resolve the situation, Mehmed Şakir enumerated the 
following. He pinned the Consul Warrington as the primary reason for the continued 
resistance of the Mehmed’s party. He says that the Consul did not respond to his call for 
forty days and unceasingly acted to undermine the measures taken by him. Moreover, he 
is a great source of moral support and political advisor to Mehmed who is also clearly 
connected with Mehmed Ali of Egypt. It also seems clear to Sultan’s representative that 
the English desires to further aggravate the situation to lay the ground of an impending 
occupation, using their naval base in Malta as the center of the operations 
(COA.HAT.456.22487-A, 9 Receb 1250/11 November 1834). He repeatedly calls for 
action to have the English government dismiss the Consul because of his hostile and 
inappropriate behavior. 
Even though Ottoman effort to have him removed from the Tripoli had started earlier, 
Şakir Efendi’s report moved the Sublime Porte to open a new line of correspondence with 
its diplomatic missions in Europe. Upon the kind request of Ali Pasha, Namık Bey worked 
hard to procure a congratulatory letter from the British crown intended for Ali Pasha 
(COA.HAT.738.34986-E). This came in handy to partly curb Warrington’s acrimonious 
activities. After Sublime Porte’s renewed request Namık Bey also approached to British 
Colonial Office to persuade them to recall Warrington. In a private conversation with 
Duke Wellington, Ottoman Ambassador, judging from his evasive tone, understood that 
the task he was given would not be an easy one (COA.HAT.831.37520-A, 30 Zilkade 
1250/30 March 1835). Nevertheless, he continued to push for it, and eventually obtained 
an affirmative answer from the British authorities, only a few days left to the Ottoman 
intervention (COA.HAT. 46430-Ç, 05 Muharrem 1251/3 May 1835) 
The Sublime Porte’s support for Ali Pasha is not confined to Mehmed Şakir Efendi’s 
activities on the ground and diplomatic efforts of Ottoman missions in Europe.  In a letter 
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addressed to Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha, Ali Pasha requested a substantive material help 
from the Sublime Porte against the Mehmed Karamanlı, saying that ammunitions in the 
Tripoli were nearly exhausted. The decision was taken to provide Ali Pasha with a 
sizeable amount of gunpowder in view of his loyalty to Ottoman Sultan together with the 
fact that the rebellion keeps going. Moreover, Ali Pasha is also authorized to enroll 
fighters from western Anatolia (COA.HAT.1403.56719). In other words, Ali Pasha had 
the complete operational, moral, diplomatic and material support of the Ottoman center. 
Interestingly enough, the Sublime Porte was otherwise intended to sustain all these if 
some petitions from the supporters of Mehmed Karamanlı would not arrive just before 
new orders were issued to ensure people’s support for Ali Karamanlı. Upon the arrival of 
these multiple complaint letters which served as a quick indication of the relentlessly non-
conciliatory attitudes of the rebels, the Ottoman decision-makers thought that keeping Ali 
Pasha in power would only make things worse. Accordingly, a new meeting in which 
Serasker Hüsrev Paşa, Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha and Damad Halil Rıfat Pasha would 
be present was summoned in Istanbul (COA.HAT.1267.49043). Those who sent these 
petitions would have never guessed the historical significance of their action, that is 
setting the fire of Ottoman Intervention in Tripoli. 
These attendants seem to be utterly frustrated by the fact that the rebels could not be 
appeased no matter what the Sublime Porte has done so far. After the petitions of the 
Tripolitans, they completely lost trust in Ali Pasha. Yet, they reckoned that Mehmed 
Karamanlı was no better than the former one. As in the case of Samos, the only feasible 
solution was to send a governor from Istanbul who can handle the situation. In their view, 
the governor must be accompanied by a naval squadron as a precaution against 
insurrection. In the meantime, it is imperative to continue the efforts to suppress the 
rebellion until the naval campaign season will arrive. For this reason, each party should 
be informed to carry out business as usual. As for the petitioners, the council decided to 
dispatch a mitigating message. For the time being, it is argued that the naval preparations 
should be carried out in complete secrecy of the real intention of the Sublime Porte to 
avoid the protests of the Europeans (COA.HAT.457.22542).  
The council’s foresight was proved when it was heard that the British navy is on its way 
to Istanbul to take the measure of the Ottoman intentions. Such news led to a new meeting 
in which two impending issues are discussed. The first concern was the answer to be 
given to those inquiring the intentions of the navy. It seems that the council was worried 
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about an interception of the British navy if the real intentions of the Sublime Porte would 
be revealed. The official mission statement is therefore set as an aid to Ali Pasha 
Karamanlı who had been unsuccessful to put an end to the protracted civil war which has 
devastating effects for the general populace. The following concern to picking the high-
ranking personnel of the expedition had also been addressed under the shadow of the 
British navy. The council propounds that anyone above the rank of Ferik (lieutenant 
general) would raise the suspicions of foreign powers. After a period of uncertainty, Necip 
Paşa was appointed as the commander of the squadron and he is also given the secret 
mission statement. The Sublime Porte ordered him to swiftly sneak into the Tripolitan 
fortress to arrest Yusuf and Ali Karamanlı, then to proceed to disaggregate the rebellious 
group rallied around Mehmed Karamanlı (COA.HAT.455.22484). 
Now, Ottoman intervention was slowly taking shape, however, it was still one meeting 
away from reaching perfection. The final plan anticipated an advance dispatch of official 
correspondence written by high-ranking officials of the Sublime Porte assuring Ali Pasha 
of the continuation of his rule. These would also inform Ali Pasha about the ostensible 
motivation of Sublime Porte to send Necip Pasha with a naval force. Nonetheless, it had 
been decided that Necip Pasha must act on the capacity of a deputy governor (kaymakam) 
because the masterminds of the plan hoped to lure rebellious Mehmed into the castle with 
the promise of appointing him as the new governor after Ottoman force arrests and 
dispatches Ali Karamanlı to Istanbul. Here is when the things get more interesting 
because it is also provisioned that against any possible obligatory diversion from the 
original plan, Necip Pasha was to be provided with contingency Sultanic orders. The 
alternative scenarios included the ill-reception of the new governor sent from Istanbul. In 
that case, Ali Pasha must remain in Ottoman custody until Necip Pasha could trick 
Mehmed to come to the castle. Then send word to obtain orders for the renewal of the Ali 
Pasha Karamanlı. Otherwise, Necip Pasha was ordered to present himself as the deputy 
of Sultan who is sent to save the people from the oppression of the Karamanlı family 
(COA.HAT.457.22538 in Taş 2019, 505-509). In any case, the protracted civil war which 
made Tripoli vulnerable to occupation would be finally halted for good. In the eyes of the 
Sultan and his close circle in the Sublime Porte, the matter carried weight such that Necip 
Pasha is granted a budget increase of around thirty percent for his preparatory 
expenditures. 
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It should not come as a surprise that Mehmed Şakir Efendi was the Ottoman agent at the 
head of the advance party. The entire force of twenty-two ships departed from Adriatic 
on 28 March 1835. However, the warship carrying Mehmed Şakir Efendi took the lead to 
arrive at Tripoli exactly five days before the rest of the Necip Pasha’s naval force. Given 
that North Africa and Europe was filled with curiosity and uncertainty about the rumors 
of Ottoman motivations to fit a naval squadron, such a move was extremely needed to 
avoid further disturbances in the Tripoli.  Upon landing, Şakir Efendi presented Ali Pasha 
with the papers written by Grand Vizier Rauf Pasha, Serasker Hüsrev Pasha, Kaptan-ı 
Derya Tahir Pasha and commander-in-chief Necip Pasha, resting him assured that 
Ottoman Sultan had sent the much-rumored naval force to help him and his governorship 
is renewed. For now, everything was on the clock and Ali Pasha was pleased by the 
Ottoman generosity to help him overthrow his rival (Taş 2016, 418-419 and 
COA.HAT.1186.46759).   
 
 
3.2.4   Necip Pasha’s Takeover 
 
The long wait had come to an end on 25 May 1835 when Ottoman Naval squadron 
appeared on Tripolitan shores. No one of Ali Pasha’s intimate circle suspected that Necip 
Pasha would be the commander who will put an end to the dynasty of Karamanlı Pashas. 
Things were to turn out very differently. 
The same day he arrived at Tripolitan coast, Necip Pasha dispatched an invitation to Ali 
Pasha who unsuspiciously returned to the call of his supposed savior to come aboard to 
his vessel. Necip Pasha was extremely careful not to raise any doubt whatsoever of Ali 
Pasha while he listed some of his demands. An immediate agreement on the disarmament 
of the general populace who fought as defenders of the city was reached. Then, Ottoman 
forces proceeded to disembark on Tripoli. In a matter of a couple of hours, all the citadel 
was taken over by Necip Pasha’s soldiers who stationed heavy guns on the walls 
protecting the city. For the time being, however, Necip Pasha hiding Sublime Porte’s real 
intentions behind his friendly face, excused Ali Pasha to retreat to his quarters, notifying 
him that he would set foot on Tripoli three days later. When the occasion came, the city 
was blossoming with all the preparations Ali Pasha ordered his protégés to carry out. 
Necip Pasha asked him again to come on board with his close circle to accompany his 
entry into the port. This time, Ali Pasha and his immediate circle of forty men were 
67 
 
detained in the ship. Necip Pasha proceeded into the city to declare the Sultanic orders 
notifying that he is sent to take control of the Tripoli in the name of Sultan Mahmud II, 
thereby cutting the succession line of Karamanlı family (Taş 2016, 418-420).  
Next day, the Menşiye rebellion dispersed quickly and residents of the quarter pledged 
loyalty to Necip Pasha whereas the leadership of the rebellion sought protection either 
with the British or in the interior of Tripoli. It was also on the same day that entire Menşiye 
was disarmed. Foreign representatives were also notified that Sultan Mahmud II brought 
the region under his direct control in the 1 June 1835.  
In the scope of one week, the entire problem of bringing stability into the Tripoli was 
resolved. It was a result of a thoroughly thought, timely plan. The Sublime Porte could 
not have risked another case of Algiers which would mean a definitive end for the 
Ottoman presence in North Africa. It seemed that from an abundance of claimants to the 
Tripolitan territory, Ottoman Center had risen triumphantly. Nonetheless, creation of a 
united Tripoli stretching from Tripolitania to Fezzan and into Cyrenaica like in the prime 
days of Yusuf Karamanlı proved to be a serious challenge which could not be surmounted 
permanently until 1858. Even after that, a completely centralized province did not come 
about thanks to the rise of Sanusiyya order. However, the early episode of the Ottoman 
direct rule itself which is quite frequently disturbed by outbreaks of tribal rebellions 
allows a historian to think about the imperial characteristics of Ottoman polity and the 
conflicting political mentalities of Ottoman agents. 
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4. A CASE STUDY OF OTTOMAN IMPERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY 
 
 
 
What is an empire? In a recent and most cherished book, Frederick Cooper and Jane 
Burbank posed the very same question. They conceptualized empires as “large political 
units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain 
distinctions and hierarchy as they incorporate new people.” (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 
8) As they aptly put it “the empire was a remarkably durable form of state.” How to 
approach different empires then, how to pinpoint varying historical experiences of their 
subjects? They suggest that rather than categorizing unfruitfully the empires as “modern”, 
“premodern”, or “ancient”, it is better to concentrate on the different repertoires of power 
which are defined as “ruling strategies that were imaginable and feasible in specific 
historical situations” (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 3). As they also clearly demonstrate 
there are some historiographical consequences of such chronologically freezing 
designations. Under their dictate, for example, in “the western moment of imperial 
domination”, which is conventionally understood as the “modern empire” as well, “the 
empires of China, Russia, the Ottomans, and the Habsburgs are formulated as “imperial 
has-beens” who are incapable of taking initiatives to counter economic and cultural 
challenges” and “playing crucial roles in the conflicts and connections that animated 
world politics even though they existed simultaneously” (Burbank and Cooper 2010, 9). 
In other words, they are excluded from the very history they have participated in.  
I find the concept “repertoires of power” as a useful analytical tool because of its 
applicability to empires not only across time and space but also to simultaneously existing 
empires of different political strength, thereby making feasible a comparative history. 
Although it cannot claim to be exhaustive by any means, this chapter aims at exploring 
the strategies of rule Ottoman agents resorted to in pacifying the Tripoli which I believe 
gives a unique opportunity to critically approach to the growing literature of Ottoman 
colonialism/imperialism in the 19th century.  
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This body of literature purports the idea that Ottoman colonialism and its discursive 
counterpart Ottoman orientalism are products of the second half of the 19th century. 
Adhering to their archenemies, Ottoman ruling class then produced a political mentality 
that is markedly different from the way politics of difference is carried out in the earlier 
centuries. The members of Ottoman central bureaucracy who had seen in themselves the 
image of the civilized men developed a metropolitan arrogance through which they saw 
the peoples of the outlying, mainly Arab, provinces of the empire as the exact opposite of 
what they stood for and used it in legitimizing the top-down centralist reform programs 
Ottoman government had imagined, which in fact amounted to what the modern literature 
and contemporaries alike refer to as Ottoman civilizing mission (vazife-i temdin). It was 
therefore closely connected with the development of modern state structures in the 
Ottoman realm.  
In the literature, the reign of Abdülhamit II appears as a crucial turning point with regards 
to the reinforcement of the idea of Ottoman colonialism. After all, it was in the Final Act 
of Berlin Conference in 1885 that for the first time, the word colony (müstemleke) was 
used to define the Ottoman Africa provinces, especially Tripoli. By using the 
internationally recognized terminology of imperialism, especially the principle of the 
hinterland, Ottomans were hoping to lay claim to the area stretching from the southern 
tip of Fezzan to Lake Chad region (Minawi 2016, 46-47). The increased circulation of the 
word must have encouraged the Abdulhamid II to commission the translation of a 
travelogue written by the infamous British traveler, Henry Morton Stanley. In the 
introduction, the translator, Mehmed İzzet feels the need to clarify what the colonialism 
means: “a civilized state sends its settlers out to lands where people still live in a state of 
nomadism and savagery, developing these areas, and causing them to become a market 
for its goods.” (Quoted in Deringil, 2003, 312).  
It seems that the early 20th century saw only further entrenchment of it in the minds of 
Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucrats. Indeed, famous Turkish nationalist and writer, 
Ömer Seyfettin appears to have so much internalized the idea of Ottoman Turkish 
colonialism that after enlisting a sizeable body of French, British, Portuguese and Belgian 
colonial misconduct, he refers to Ottoman-Italian war in 1911 as a joint European effort 
to expel the Ottoman Turks from their colonies (müstemlekat) in Africa, that is Tripoli 
(Seyfeddin 2012, 234-237 and 251). In other words, he was perfectly fine with the 
Ottoman polity being a colonial empire, but at the same time disgusted by the type of 
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colonialism that is European. As a matter of fact, conceiving the Ottoman Empire as a 
colonial power extends beyond the literary allusions made by Ömer Seyfeddin in his 
rather short story. One of the most influential Ottoman statesmen of the 20th century, 
Cemal Paşa also conceptualized the territories which are situated outside of the Rumelia 
and Anatolia as Ottoman colonies. Rather interestingly, in his memoirs, he goes on to 
refer to Anatolia as his motherland while lamenting on the weak infrastructure that 
connects Syria and his motherland (Erdem 2016).    
The examples in which Ottoman military or bureaucratic elite refers to its periphery as 
colonies can be multiplied and are abundantly available in the secondary literature. 
Moreover, even in cases where Ottoman elites do not directly use the word itself, they 
one way or another resort to the political vocabulary of cultural superiority I described 
above in legitimizing their provincial reforms. Therefore, it is beyond doubt that Ottoman 
colonialism and orientalism did exist on an ideological level. In this respect, the 
framework delineated by Ottoman colonialism literature has grown out to be a way of 
understanding center-periphery relations in the late Ottoman empire, by giving the 
Ottoman provincial reforms a markedly different meaning. As Makdisi puts it, 
(comparing with European desire to reshape and discipline non-European places) “so too 
can Ottoman modernization be thought of as an Ottoman desire to reshape and discipline 
not-yet Ottoman places and peoples” (Makdisi 2002a, 46). However, does all this really 
mean that the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century become a colonial empire? I believe 
not. 
For one thing, the peripheral territories of Ottoman Empire had never been officially 
organized in colonial terms even though the word “colony” was used in international 
agreements and Ottomans were invited to meetings that are by definition exclusive to 
imperial powers such as Berlin (1884) and Brussels Conferences (1889). Moreover, all 
Ottoman citizens, regardless of their birthplace or ethnicity, could enjoy the very same 
rights and privileges, including parliamentary representation and being a public servant. 
(Erdem 2016).  
Along the same lines, a rather sound criticism was recently put forward against the 
conceiving of the new relationship between the peripheral provinces of the empire and 
center as a type of colonialism by Özgür Türesay. After all, he argues, modern colonialism 
that is decorated with the themes of bringing civilization to wilderness was primarily a 
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European phenomenon that had started to take roots in the early 16th century and only 
after three centuries of historical development that it culminated in the great age of 
imperial expansion in the second half of the 19th century. To be able to talk about a 
modern colonialism, he sustains, one need to observe the coexistence of a racially defined 
social Darwinism attached to imperial expansion, i.e. the civilizing mission of the white 
man, a specific phase of capitalist development which squeezed the European economies 
so much that they needed to accommodate the surplus workforce and capital outside 
Europe, extensive missionary activity and lastly a group of stakeholders who would 
encourage their governments’ colonial pursuits in extra-European territories. In the 
Ottoman example, similarities end with the Ottoman civilizing mission. Even in that, 
further qualification is needed as it was so much softer than European orientalist discourse 
with regards to the racist element. As he rightly points out, in the absence of underlying 
dynamics, it would be stretching too far to talk about an Ottoman colonial enterprise, 
relying on a couple of observations based on narrative sources (Türesay 2013, 143-145). 
Drawing inspiration from this criticism, I would say, perhaps, it is time to think about the 
social otherness created by the modernizing Ottoman center in a more indigenously 
developed way than associating it directly with the European conceptualizations. Perhaps, 
as I will discuss further below, it is even proper to ask how modern was the social 
otherness the people of the peripheries subjected to?  
Why have I taken pains at delving into the literature on Ottoman orientalism? It is because 
some elements of the social otherness created by the members of the Ottoman 
bureaucratic elite later in the century was evident in the perceptions of the Ottoman agents 
operational in the Tripoli right after the intervention. By now, it must have been well-
understood that I will refrain from calling their attitude a colonial one, however, the task 
of making sense of the Ottoman imperial presence in Tripoli still awaits. The fact that the 
Ottoman intervention in Tripoli is nearly contemporary with one of the most momentous 
points of French colonial history makes it even more compelling. As I discussed 
thoroughly in Chapter 2, it was even conducted in competition with France. Moreover, 
the European officials and the public perceived it no different than what France was doing 
in Algeria. In addressing this problem, I believe that the concept of “imperial repertoires 
of power” comes in really handy not only because of the opportunity it gives to refrain 
from discussing the problem with regards to a sort of imagined colonialism but also 
because it allows tracing the historicity of some aspects of imperial politics in Tripoli. 
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After all, it involved various strategies of rule ranging from resorting to extreme violence 
to the accommodation of intermediaries, and conversion of the local population in the 
most resilient region, Cebel-i Garbi, to Sunni Islam. 
 
 
4.1 What Have We Done, What Will We Do? Meclis-I Şura Meeting Regarding the 
Upcoming Policies in Tripoli. 
 
After Necip Pasha successfully established the Ottoman forces in Tripolitan citadel, his 
mission was complete, after all, he was only appointed as a deputy governor, not to draw 
any unwanted attention from the foreign powers to Ottoman intervention in May 1835 
(COA.HAT.457.22538 in Taş 2019, 505-509). At first, Osman Pasha was thought to be 
appointed with the full authority of a governor, but his medical condition did not allow 
him to assume the assignment (Atabaş 2017, 63). In his stead, Mehmed Raif Pasha was 
sent to Tripoli to govern the newly acquired province. It seems that after making his 
assessment of the situation, he has written a couple of letters to the Sublime Porte, 
explaining the situation and making certain demands with regards to his plans. It was in 
the Meclis-i Şura meeting which discussed Mehmed Raif Pasha’s demands that the 
Sublime Porte decided how to proceed with Tripoli. These letters and the outcome of the 
meeting provide insights as to how center-periphery relations played out in Tripoli as well 
as how the Ottoman center conceived of Necip Pasha’s takeover. 
The one thing the Sublime Porte understood from the short term of Necip Pasha and 
Mehmed Raif Pasha’s dispatches was that the entire undertaking was about to put heavy 
pressure on the shoulders of central treasury, not only because of Yusuf Pasha’s debts but 
also because the hardships the Ottoman state apparatus was to endure in Tripoli. As Raif 
Pasha narrates, Necip Pasha was approached by the local tribal chieftains who manifested 
that they are inclined towards pledging loyalty to Sultan. In return, however, they 
requested that Ottoman Pasha would please them with the generosity of Ottoman Sultan. 
This, as the political precedent goes, was granted by Necip Pasha. Nonetheless, it was 
beyond the limited financial means he held in his possession which obliged him to pay 
for these gifts from the money intended originally for the stipends of Ottoman soldiers. 
Raif Pasha recognized the inevitability of using gifts and bribes in making the tribes of 
the interior yield to Ottoman authority. Accordingly, he requested at least four thousand 
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money bags of akçe from Istanbul. From this point onwards, things get even more 
insightful. He thinks that if Tripoli would be relieved financially from the shoulders of 
Istanbul, such expenditures must be taken back from the communities these leaders 
presided over. Nonetheless, it can only be feasible if these leaders were to be escorted 
back to their quarters by a company of three or four hundred soldiers. Then these soldiers 
were to collect money from the locals in the presence of their leaders. It seems only then 
a sustainable cycle of financing government expenditure would become possible 
(COA.HAT.456.22505-D, 27 Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1251/20 September 1835). It seems to 
me that Mehmed Raif Pasha’s plan of ensuring a steady flow of income is really 
illuminating in terms of the limits of Ottoman centralization, the State apparatus 
paradoxically had to accommodate intermediaries in an effort to establish a direct rule.49  
It is understood from hatt-ı hümayun record of the Meclis-i Şura meeting that when 
presented with a summary of Mehmed Raif Pasha’s requests, Sultan Mahmud II called 
for deliberation to decide the best course of action. Meclis-i Şura sought the opinion of 
Necip Pasha with the mediation of Serasker Hüsrev Paşa and a final decision in which 
the transfer of the requested cavalry force is authorized together with the provisions and 
stipends of the soldiers already stationed in Tripoli was reached because it is deemed 
necessary to “get proper hold of the region and the people”50 The document goes on to 
reveal the motivation of the Ottoman decision-makers in taking up such a financial 
burden. It is worth quoting at length: 
 
“…the final subjugation of the province by the shadow of your most powerful 
Majesty is regarded as a new conquest; and it has brought to the Sublime State 
of yours the glory and fame it required both in your realm and, especially in 
Europe; if it is necessary to make some expenditures at the start, it is hoped 
that those will not be in vain; that in the future its administrative and strategic 
value will be observed is attested by the God’s grace  …51” 
 
49 Even though I excluded them as they are not relevant in making sense of the Ottomans’ imperial repertoire of power, 
it is necessary to state that Mehmed Raif Pasha’s requests do not end with the financial and military reinforcements. In 
his letters, he also states that a couple of well-conditioned ships are urgently needed to run administrative duties. He 
also says that a kadı of the strong blend is needed to address the problem of people seeking foreign protection by 
changing nationality. It was a problem because most of these were either family or former members of Yusuf Pasha’s 
government which Ottoman authorities thought makes them accountable for the debts of Karamanlı family. 
(COA.HAT.453.22420) and (COA.HAT.456.22505-A, 27 Cemâziye’l-Evvel 1251/20 September 1835)  
 
50 ….. havali ve ahalisinin layıkıyla ele alınması zımnında bin nefer süvari asker isali…. (COA.HAT.827.37459; first 
used in Atabaş 2017, 69-70) 
51 …vakıa eyalet-i merkumenın bu def’a saye-i şevketvaye-i hazret-i şahanelerinde zabt-ı rabtı feth-i cedid ve sani 
hükmünde olarak mülk ü saltanat ve bahusus avrupaca taraf-ı devlet-i alilerine bir kat dahi mucib-i şan ve şöhret olmuş 
olduğu derkar ve bidayet-i maslahatta eğer ki biraz mesarif vuku bulursa da inşallah-ı teala zayi olmayarak ilerde 
menafi’ mülkiyye ve mevkiyyesi müşahede olunacağı eltaf-ı ilahi delaletiyle aşikâr olup…. (COA.HAT.827.37459) 
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Nonetheless, the rest of the document demonstrates such a bold statement was not easy 
to utter. The fact that the financial burden of penetrating further into the interior would 
be incredibly heavy had led these statesmen to even consider reinstating the Ali 
Karamanlı or handing over the province to Hüseyin Bey of Tunis who had long desired 
to unite it with Tripoli. However, as the document goes, there are two possible dangers if 
the Sublime Porte would withdraw so hastily; firstly, it is thought that it would bring 
“contempt and defect” on the Exalted State. Secondly, the Ottoman diplomats were 
communicating some rumors that ever since the French have invaded Algeria, the British 
intended to prey on Tripoli by playing into the closeness they have established with the 
people of the region. Therefore, the region would not pass on to who Ottoman center 
aspires to deliver. The gist of the meeting, it seems, was that Ottoman statesmen had 
perceived their intervention in the Tripoli as a matter of international prestige and took 
pride in it. The roadmap, therefore, was to stay and to consolidate Ottoman presence in 
Tripoli no matter what the financial consequences were. Mehmed Raif Pasha then was 
granted full support. 
It seems to me that economic prospects of the Tripolitan port appeared promising to 
Ottoman decision-makers even though it was not as tempting as the international 
recognition that the intervention had provided for the Empire. The first reference in the 
documents is already cited in the form of “its administrative and strategic value.” What 
exactly was its administrative and strategic value? Well, as demonstrated by Erdem in his 
book on Ottoman slavery, Tripoli was an entrepot for the slave trade and its reconquest 
had a reinvigorating effect to slave trade across Empire which, along with other factors, 
ultimately amounted to “the recovery of Ottoman slave system” (Erdem 1996, 57). Even 
though there is no direct reference to the economic prospects of the slave trade running 
through Tripoli in the documents, it is worth reminding that when Necip Pasha was asked 
of his opinion regarding the ships Raif Pasha had requested from the Sublime Porte, he 
gave an affirmative answer citing the potential the ports along the Tripolitan coastline had 
in creating a substantive customs revenue for the central treasury if the coastline is 
properly inspected by the Ottoman ships (Atabaş 2017, 68-69). In the actual document, 
Necip Pasha takes note of revenues that could be generated by customs on alcoholic 
beverages and other products as well as port fees (gümrük ve zecriye rüsümatı ve sair 
mahsulattan senevi on bin kese mikdarı menafi’ hasıl olacağına binaen). Given the fact 
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that one of the most sizeable merchandise running through the Tripolitan ports was the 
black slaves (Dyer 1982, 78-79), it would be a safe speculation that Necip Pasha might 
also have thought of revenues that could be generated through imposing customs on the 
slave trade when he referred to a profit of ten thousand money bags 
(COA.HAT.827.37459-B). It must be stated that this is not the only reference with 
regards to the economic expectations that leads Ottoman agents to argue for the 
sustainment of Ottoman rule in Tripoli. It will reappear below. 
On the other side of the Mediterranean, though, Mehmed Raif Pasha was soon to realize 
that his plan to impose taxation in return for giving out gifts is at best a dream. He saw 
that the negotiation ground was extremely slippery and to make these tribal chieftains live 
up to their political promise is harder than he could ever imagine.52 In his words; 
 
“…the Bedouins and tribes are not the kinds that understand negotiation and 
friendly manners; it is very well understood that these would be drawn under 
the hold of government only by brute force, pressure, and threats; as it is clear, 
they would not come to terms if the crushing force of your Majesty is not to 
be shown to these at least once; even those chieftains who seem to approach 
to pledge loyalty are not true to their word and God, inclined to corrupt; and 
it is beyond any doubt whatsoever that they tend to try extorting money with 
some schemes and political cunning from me as they did with the Necip 
Pasha…” 
 
The policy of accommodation seems to be abandoned after the frustration of Mehmed 
Raif Pasha after his encounters with the tribal chieftains. A period of violent clashes 
between the forces of the central government and tribal warriors was about to ensue. With 
some intervals, these clashes continued until the rebellion of Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i Garbi 
was eliminated in 1858. 
  
4.2 Local Resistance and Ottoman Pashas Justifying their Use of Violence 
 
The relatively easy subjugation of the Tripolitan citadel and its close surroundings by 
Necip Pasha should not misguide a student of the history of Ottoman presence in Tripoli. 
 
52 “….urbân ve kabâili te’lîf ve güler yüz irâesiyle insâf eder ve taht-ı raiyyete girer makūleler olmayup bunlar darb-ı 
şedîd ve tazyîk ve tehdîd ile kabûl-i raiyyet eyleyecekleri güzelce anlaşılarak âşikâr olduğu halde ne vecihle olur ise 
olsun kahr-ı satvet-i şâhâne bunlara bir kere irâe olunmadıkça emâna gelmeyecekleri ve gûyâ itaat sûretiyle gelmiş olan 
şeyhler dahî hudâ bilir hakîkî olmayub meyl-i fesâda ve Necîb Paşa hazretlerinden plan ve politika ile bir takım kuruş 
aldıkları gibi şimdi bu çâkerlerinizden dahî akçe isticlâbına mâil oldukları şüpheden müberrâ olub…” Quoted in 
(Atabaş 2017, 76). See for the complete document; (COA.HAT.456.22505-E.3, 27 Cemaziye’l-Evvel 1251/20 
September 1835). 
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Indeed, the military force Necip Pasha brought with him was not to pull the trigger even 
once. Nonetheless, the picture we see during the Ottoman penetration further into the 
country is starkly different than the initial phase of the Ottoman takeover. If Ottomans 
were to successfully unite Tripoli, they had to either come to terms with tribal chieftains 
or to militarily defeat them. Or at best used them in conjunction with each other. It seems 
that the Ottoman Pashas had used their choice in favor of the use of violence when they 
felt strong enough to face the tribal chieftains in the battlefield. The path they had chosen, 
however, was an expensive one. Given the distance between the Ottoman center and 
Tripoli, maintenance of regular troops was incredibly hard, and Ottoman governors were 
to constantly ask for reinforcements, foodstuff, and stipends for the soldiers in their 
retinue. The constant warfare between the agents of the central government and tribal 
chieftains was seriously constraining the possibility of local generation of the income that 
is needed to provision the central government facilities in Tripoli. It was, therefore, 
heavily dependent on Istanbul. For the complete pacification of the region, Ottoman 
forces had to reckon with leaders such as Osman el-Edgam of Misurata, Ahmed el-Meriz 
of Tarhuna, Abdülcelil of Fezzan and Şeyh Guma of Cebel-i Garbi (Atabaş 2017, 433). 
It is also important to note that Tahir Pasha and Ali Aşkar Pasha were particularly known 
for their brutality and relentlessness in dealing with the tribal insurgencies. 
I do not intend to give a general survey of the violence born out of the clash between the 
Ottoman forces and tribal chieftains. What I will stress out is the way Ottoman governors 
justified their use of military force in Tripoli. Let us have a look of the report Mehmed 
Tahir Pasha had written in which he asked to be recalled to Istanbul in 1837. As would 
be recalled, Mehmed Tahir Pasha was one of the masterminds behind the Ottoman 
intervention. Afterward, he was sent to Tripoli as the commander-in-chief of Tripoli when 
Mehmed Raif Pasha was the governor of the province. He then replaced him as the 
governor of Tripoli. His task was to permanently stabilize the region. After dealing 
successfully with the insurgent forces in Misurata in August 1836, his forces suffered a 
crushing defeat at the hands of Şeyh Guma in March 1837.53  
After stating that he is tasked by Sublime Porte with ensuring the perfect loyalty (rabıta-
i hüsnisi) of the Tripolitan notables, he starts to talk about his impression of the people 
and why a military operation would not be feasible. He says that “the complete reordering 
 
53 Atabaş provides a detailed chronology of Tripolitan political history after the intervention. I used it extensively in 
this chapter see: (Atabaş 2016, Appendix 1) 
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of Arab tribes of this province by bringing them into the hold of government is only 
possible via a protracted use of force and provisions which the Exalted State cannot afford 
amongst all the business it had to attend to.” Therefore “even though it would be 
delightful to carry out a new wave of conquest to subjugate the various clans and savage 
tribes” (aşair-i muhtelife ve kabail-i vahşiyye), given the financial situation, a policy of 
appeasement (istimalet) should be assumed. Before launching an offensive, he thinks, 
when the time is right, the clans and tribes must be treated with due care, and the existing 
force can be used to punish and educate (tedip ve terbiyelerine) them if seen necessary 
(COA.C.DH.107.5342, 25 Şevval 1252/2 February 1837) 
A similar attitude is observable in the official correspondence of Mehmed Raif Pasha. 
After he lists a couple of reasons why he is not worthy of the Sultan Mahmud’s 
graciousness in appointing him as the governor of the Tripoli, he jumps into the question 
of the use of military force. One gets the impression that Mahmud II did encourage a 
more conciliatory policy, but Mehmed Raif seems to disagree. Addressing the Sultan, he 
claims:  
 
“as it is also known to you, my Gracious, the province consists only of tribes 
and clans who are of the kind that is the worst of the bandits …. and in 
accordance with your esteemed request, it is clear that I will not fail to work 
to ensure their submission by showing benignity and presenting various gifts 
but if they dare to demonstrate a sign of animosity as necessitated by the way 
they are made, it would be necessary to deploy militias against them and as 
there are some mines located around their quarters, it may also be necessary 
to deploy soldiers….54” 
 
According to Raif Pasha, then, the use of military force and violence against the tribal 
population in Tripoli is a precaution against their god-given quality of being inclined 
towards demonstrating animosity. However, he does not adhere to the usage of “savage” 
as in the case of Tahir Pasha. Instead, he uses a much more commonly used terminology 
at least from the 17th century Celali rebellions onwards, that is “tagi”, meaning bandit.55 
Nonetheless, there is also a major difference between the two. Tagi is also a legal category 
 
54 …. malum-ı veliniamileri buyurulduğu veçhile eyalet-i merkume aşair ve kabailden ibaret olarak tagi makulesinden 
olduklarından bunların…. matlub-ı ali veçhiyle taht-ı rabıtaya idhallerine suret-i mülayimet ve enva’i taltifat ile sa’yda 
kusur olunmayacağı ber-bidar ise de ber-muktezay-ı halkıyyet izhar-ı habasete cüret ettikleri halde üzerlerine urban 
askeri sevk olunmak lazım geldiği ve bazı maden olan mahaller dahi ol makule aşair taraflarında bulunduğundan bunda 
dahi kezalik asker irsali icap ettiği halde… (COA.HAT.1110.44695) 
55 See for the commonly used terminology with regards to outlaws, social outcasts and outright rebels: (Sariyannis 
2005) 
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that is mostly used synonymously with sai b’il-fesad. (Aykan 2019, 253) It was not a 
coincidence that for example, Şeyh Abdülcelil of Fezzan was called menba’ul-fesad, 
(Atabaş 2016, 171) and then assassinated by Ali Aşkar Pasha because the legitimate 
punishment of a person who is found guilty of being tagi or sa’i b’il-fesad is death (Aykan 
2019, 255).  
Not to forget, the document also contains the second and crucial reference to the economic 
expectations of the Ottoman agents operational in Tripoli, namely “the mines around their 
quarters.” Comparing to Necip Pasha’s reasoning which anticipates the violence-free 
Ottoman takeover of the Tripolitan customs regime, it appears as a justification for the 
use of violence against the local population. It is possible that, these mines were salt 
reserves, usufruct of which Karamanlı Pashas sold to Venetians throughout the second 
half of the 18th century (Dyer 1982, 179) or the copper, steel and the Sulphur reserves 
located around Gulf of Sirte, a location which houses Arab and Berber tribes (Atabaş 
2017, 161). In either case, better exploitation of the natural resources of the country was 
certainly on the agenda of early Ottoman Pashas in Tripoli. 
All in all, it can be argued that while the discourse of early Ottoman Pashas in Tripoli 
justifying the use of violence in the service of the consolidation of central authority is not 
unidimensional and unison, they seem to share a common ground with regards to their 
economic expectations from the region. The former ranged from a perceived cultural 
superiority, as implied by the use of savagery as a derogatory term, to a legalistic 
discourse criminalizing those who are perceived as a threat to public order. These also go 
to show that a social distance between the Ottoman agents and the locals was evident as 
early as the late 1830s. However, an even more striking case of acting on a discourse of 
superiority is evident in the Ottoman religious policy after the remainders of Şeyh Guma’s 
rebellion in Cebel-i Garbi was pacified by Ahmed Pasha in 1843.  
 
 
4.3      Pacification of Cebel-i Garbi and Ottoman Missionaries 
 
When Necip Pasha had arrived in Tripoli, Şeyh Guma was amongst the first party of tribal 
chieftains who visited him. He was the leader of the Mehamid Tribe and paradoxically 
led the most enduring armed opposition against the Ottomans in Tripoli. From 1835 to 
1842, he had a fluctuating relationship with the Ottoman authorities. Mehmed Emin Pasha 
79 
 
had him come to Tripoli to settle the disputes between Ottoman State and Mehamid Tribe. 
For some time, he had been given an official post. Nonetheless, he was arrested and sent 
to exile by the order of Mehmed Emin Pasha in December 1842. It was a major blow to 
his armed opposition, however, the Mehamid tribe continued to resist for about four 
months until Ahmed Pasha had inflicted a crushing defeat to the armed forces of a tribal 
alliance based in the Cebel region. Ahmed Pasha has written extensive reports on how he 
managed to defeat his opponents (COA.İ.MSM.72.2085, 28 Rabîu’l-Evvel 1259). I will 
not discuss the details of the military operation here, luckily, however, these reports are 
also rich in terms of how Ahmed Pasha and his other colleagues in Tripoli look down 
upon the people of Cebel;56  
 
“The nature of the people of Cebel is not a matter that can be described and 
articulated; not only because for years and centuries they haven’t known state 
control and each one of them has transformed into savages but also because, 
they follow a false path they call the fifth sect which is popularized, May God 
forbid, by the Wahhabis to the exclusion of the four great mezhebs…” 
 
Here the culturally disdainful attitude of the Ahmed Pasha blends the religious affiliation 
of the people of Cebel with their so-called savagery. Nonetheless, he was determined to 
change the way they were and ordered them to follow one of the paths delineated by the 
great Imams of Sunni tradition.57 However, as reflected from the documents relating to 
the issue of the conversion, the real bone of contention was the fact that these people were 
handling their dispute amongst themselves, which is strongly against the government’s 
desire to shy away from legal pluralism. Ahmed Pasha had written to Governor Mehmed 
Emin Pasha to appoint deputy judges to oversee legal matters, muftis that would attend 
to local population’s need for religious opinion, imams to oversee compulsory prayers. 
What is most striking, however, is that a group of people, specifically asked to be Hanefis 
who would “teach the basics of the religion of Islam, and to practice them the conditions 
 
56 “Cebel takımının ahvâli ta’rîf ve beyân kabûl eder mevâddan olmayub ez-cümle bunlar bunca sinîn ve a'sârdan berü 
zabt u rabt ne olduğunu görmemiş ve her biri vahşî sûretine girmiş olduğundan mâadâ hâric-i ez-mezâhib-i celîle-i 
erbaa neûzubillah Vehhâbî'nin iştihârı olan beşinci mezhep diyerek bir tarîk-i bâtıleye zâhib olduklarından bu 
makūlelere bu cihetle i’timâd câiz olmayacağı…” (Quoted in Atabaş 2017, 176-177). In Atabaş the word “iştihar” is 
understandably misread as “iştihâd.” However, this reading does not correspond to an Ottoman dictionary entry 
whereas the “iştihâr” means “to popularize.”  
 
57 For a subaltern account of what Ahmed Pasha asked the local population see the letter they have written to the seat 
of government in Tripoli, see: (COA.İ.MSM.73.2091.4, 28 Rabîu’l-Ahir 1260/17 May 1844). 
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of esteemed mezheb of ehl-i sünnet” (COA. İ.MSM.72.2086.3, 25 Cemâziye’l-Evvel 
1259/23 June 1843) is also sent to the Cebel region so that 
 
“…. those hordes of Bedouins who are associated with various bandits…... 
those ignoramuses who have not taken their share of the truths of religion and 
the nuances of Islam; a group of mutezile which is led astray by a false 
mezhep…. have now taken the initiative to walk on the straight path.58.” 
 
They are now “honored by the glory of Islam”59 and they started to attend the compulsory 
Friday and Eid prayers. It is understood from the documents that even though most of 
them had become Hanefites, some happened to choose to be Maliki. What is most 
interesting however, in every step of the way, through which the “Sunnitizing mission” 
is communicated with the Sublime Porte, those converted to mezhep of Imam Malik has 
been erased. In the documents addressed to Sultan by officials located in Istanbul, the 
only mention is the hanefization of the residents of the Cebel. While extremely 
ornamented designations were used to address the mezhep of Numan b. Sabit in all these 
documents, it was merely “Maliki mezhebi” which was used to address the latter. I don’t 
mean to extrapolate any generalizations from here, but it would not be totally wrong to 
speculate about the relative high esteem the Hanefism enjoyed in the eyes of Ottomans. 
After the military pacification, therefore, the region was incorporated into the legal 
framework of the empire. The Muftis were directly authorized to give legal opinions by 
the Şeyhülislam in Istanbul (COA.İ.MSM.72.2086-4). Along the way, a discourse of 
religious-cultural superiority is clearly discernible in the documents. 
 
 
4.4 Perception of Center-Periphery Dichotomy in Perspective 
 
I am very well aware of the fact that the ongoing discussion is quite similar to the late 
19th century perceptions of the Ottoman military-bureaucratic elite who self-admittedly 
assumed its “civilizing mission” in the outlying provinces and aimed at correcting the 
 
58 …. Güruh-ı urban bunca sinin ve a’sardan beri me’luf-i enve-i bagi ve şakiden olduklarından başka ekserisi mezheb-
i seniyye-i erba’adan hariç hamisi namıyla bir mezheb-i batılaya süluk ile hakaik-i diniyyeden ve dekaik-i islamiyyetten 
cahil ve bi-behre bir taife-i mutezile…. Min-külli-vücuh tarik-i müstakimi ihtiyar ve iltizam ve bir takımı mezheb-i 
celile-i hanefiyye ve birazı mezheb-i malikiye temessük ve itisam etmeleri… (COA.İ.MSM.73.2091.4, 28 Rabîu’l-Ahir 
1260/17 May 1844) 
 
59 “Şeref-i islam ile müşerref olup” (COA.İ.MSM.72.2086-4) 
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believes of the local populations and elevating them to the rank of civilization (Deringil 
2012, 242). The only missing component is the ideological classification of Tripoli within 
the ranks of African colonies, as with the case of Cemal Pasha. Yet, my objection is to 
the discussion of this behavior, namely the posture of socio-cultural superiority of 
Ottoman officials, as if it is unique to modernizing elites who got inspired by European 
colonialist discourses throughout the second half of 19th century. To better illustrate the 
point, let me turn to the writings of the famous intellectual of the 16th century, Mustafa 
Ali on Cairo and its inhabitants. In describing the black Arabs of Cairo, he writes: 
 
“It is noteworthy that the multitude of black Arabs, like hordes of studhorse, 
are all naked, men and women. The women cover their pudenda with a piece 
of cloth plaited of rope, the size of a palm of the hand, or with certain leaves; 
the men cover themselves in the same way, hiding only the organ of 
reproduction and the testicles, but leaving everything else uncovered. 
Moreover, when they wander along like a herd of animals, naked from head 
to foot, they would pass by a fountain spring and would, like bears, fill their 
palms and cupped their hands with water and drink (Âli and Tietze 1975, 43 
& for the original Ottoman Turkish, 117).” 
 
Let alone a lens of social otherness, in modern standards, such a description of the people 
of any locality would directly be termed racist, lucky for him that he had lived and died 
in the 16th century. Things get even more interesting in the poem he added to his normally 
prosed text. It is as if he talks about civilizing through enslaving, expectedly without 
referring to a civilizing mission. According to Âli, the black Arabs of above qualities 
through the enslavement and castration processes suddenly find the opportunity of 
entering Ottoman Palace harem quarters, thereby enjoying true happiness and starting to 
wear golden robes. By making careers out of not being able to reproduce, he says, “those 
vile Arabs that in Egypt run around naked from head to toe/ Had now become men of 
high respect.” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 44 & for the original Ottoman Turkish, 118). Even 
though the rest of the poem reads as the familiar criticizing tone of Mustafa Âli of the 
promotion of the unworthy in Ottoman career paths, the way he puts his disgust of the 
eunuchs in the service of the Ottoman dynasty is remarkably illuminating in terms of how 
a member of 16th century Ottoman bureaucracy saw the peripheral peoples of the empire. 
How different it is from the perceptions of 19th century modernizing elites is an open-
ended question.  
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In fact, the mental barrier Mustafa Âli has built lies between the people of the land of 
Rum and the people beyond, both in cultural and religious terms. In his monumental 
Essence of History (Künh’ül-Ahbar), he goes on to describe them as following: 
 
“Those varied peoples and different types of Rumis living in the glorious days 
of the Ottoman dynasty, who are not [generically] separate from those tribes 
of Turks and Tatars dealt with in the third Pillar, are a select community and 
pure, pleasing people who, just as they are distinguished in the origins of their 
state, are singled out for their piety (diyanet), cleanliness (nazafet), and faith 
(akidet).” (Quoted in Fleischer 1986, 256) 
 
Where does the land of the Rum Âli refer to correspond geographically in the 16th 
century? As discussed brilliantly by Fleischer (Fleischer 1986, 256) and later by Kafadar 
(Kafadar 2007), Rum refers to the core territories, or heartlands to be true to Fleischer’s 
terminology, of the Ottoman State from where the early Ottomans started their nearly 
unstoppable march in all directions. Perhaps, one should not be too hasty in asserting that 
a sense of motherland embedded in the Ottoman mentality is the product of modern 
sensibilities of the Ottoman ruling elite. Then perhaps, we should read Cemal Pasha’s 
allusions to his motherland as a crystallization of a mental construct that is readily 
available in the Ottoman literary tradition. It is also important to emphasize that Âli’s 
emphasis is on more humane qualities such as being pious, clean and faithful rather than 
the military prowess of the imperial army.  
For a brief discussion of why this is important let me return to the Description of Cairo 
for the moment as Âli’s misrepresentation of the people in and around Cairo extend 
beyond the black Arabs to include both the nomadic Bedouins and settled city-folk. As 
far as Mustafa Âli concerned, it is impossible to distinguish between the mischief-making 
(bais’ül fesad) or badly suspected (bed-güman) Bedouins and the good ones because they 
wear the very same costumes in the cities and behave humbly but when they get out of 
the limits of settled areas on their horsebacks, they both immediately “throw off their 
obedience and rebel as soon as they come across a victim” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 56). I 
believe that this reference is not much different from that of Mehmed Raif Pasha who 
thought that the Bedouins would “demonstrate a sign of animosity as necessitated by the 
way they are made” (COA.HAT.1110.44695). In the following lines, Âli develops his 
argument into an outright discourse of power projection. He cherishes the divided 
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loyalties and enmity driven nature of the Bedouins who constantly fight each other. He 
sustains, if not for their internal clashes necessitated by their true nature, Ottoman Sultan 
would not have been able to rule over these vast territories with such small garrisons 
situated in the region when Âli was in there. By making them as the way they are, Âli 
thinks, God bestowed upon the Sultan a great blessing (Âli and Tietze 1975, 57). 
As will be demonstrated clearly by the following quote none could have escaped Âli’s 
disdainful looking down upon the people of the seemingly distant Arab province. Âli 
describes the settled city-folk in Cairo:  
 
“Since the people of Cairo and the opportunists that have come from the 
desert and settled here suffer from an excess of envy and rancor and duplicity 
and since people of asinine obstinacy tend toward mischief and intrigue, the 
population is agreed on (living in) disharmony as one never finds it in any 
other country.” (Âli and Tietze 1975, 48-49) 
 
When compared with the piety (diyanet), cleanliness (nazafet), and faith (akidet) of the 
inhabitants of the land of Rum, the description of the innate qualities and inclinations of 
the people of the Cairo is a good example of the imagined separateness of the center and 
the periphery in the mind of Mustafa Âli. Even though he does not try to argue for a 
religious policy as in the case of the conversion of the inhabitants of Cebel-i Garbi, Âli 
could not abstain from criticizing the local imams as well as the Sufi Sheikhs of Egpyt. 
As he relates “in our times the religious orders followed by the pious, the so-called sheiks 
of Egypt, are not in harmony with the approved ways of the Sheikhs of the Khalvetiye 
and Zeyniye orders and of the heads of Naqshbendiyye order of the land of Rum” (Âli 
and Tietze 1975, 47). It is remarkable that in every chance Âli gets, he could not resist 
the temptation of articulating the religious-cultural superiority of the people of the land 
of Rum. 
In light of the present discussion in which I tried to trace back the intellectual precedent 
of the social otherness created by the Ottoman agents in Tripoli, I would like to raise the 
question of how modern was the cultural logic of 19th-century Ottoman reform? How 
much it has drawn inspiration from the colonizing logic of the European imperialism? 
Perhaps, one should stress the continuities more than the changes in the minds of the 
members of the Ottoman military-bureaucratic elites. All in all, this chapter argues that 
in no way disregarding the fruitful discussions born out of the Ottoman colonialism 
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literature, Ottoman ruling elite’s perceptions of the peripheral provinces of their empire 
must be discussed in its own terms.  
In the case of Tripoli, Ottomans certainly had concrete imperial designs motivated by the 
administrative and strategic value of the region and its economic prospects. Nonetheless, 
such a reality does not automatically mean that they had become a colonial power or 
developed a colonialist/orientalist discourse per se. I tend to see this as a continuation of 
Ottoman imperial practice and for the attitude of the Ottoman agents in their justification 
of the use of violence and Ottoman presence in Tripoli, I would say, it may be best 
conceptualized as the reproduction and perpetuation of a long-standing feeling of 
religious-cultural superiority in a slightly different terminology in the context of 19th 
century. 
  
85 
 
 
 
 
 
5.CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The early 19th century had witnessed a transformation of unknown scale in the Ottoman 
Empire ever before. The center-periphery relation was to be renegotiated, redefined even 
reinvented. The ever-greater security concerns pouring from each side of the imperial 
borders obliged Ottoman ruling elite to resort such dramatic measures in order to ensure 
the survival of the Ottoman state. However, it was never a linear process, it played out 
differently in every single case. Depending on the relative strength of the local 
powerholders and on the international balance of power, the possible strategies were 
constrained or released.  
In Ottoman North Africa, central government’s options had traditionally been limited due 
to a variety of reason ranging from maritime technology, geography to political 
impossibilities. However, as the European military domination of the Mediterranean had 
become the impending reality of the day in the early 19th century, the regencies in North 
Africa felt the need to come closer with the Sublime Porte, joining its war efforts and 
aligning international interests more closely. Nonetheless, the French aggression in the 
western Mediterranean urged the Ottoman decision-makers to reconsider their position in 
the region. With hastily made plans, they tried to make France evacuate the Algiers, 
efforts which came to naught at the end. However, once the bell started ringing, they had 
found themselves in an inter-imperial power competition in the region.  
In the early 18th century, Tripoli started to be ruled by a local dynasty, Karamanlıs. They 
saw the best of the days and the worst of the days under the reign of Yusuf Karamanlı. In 
his early years, he established Tripoli as a maritime power to be reckoned with to ensure 
safe passage in the Mediterranean Sea. The income generated by the corsair activities had 
been channeled to finance to consolidate Karamanlı control in the interior. By the time it 
had come to 1817 the process was nearly complete in terms of pacifying the country. 
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However, overdependency on the financial fruits of the piratical raids in the 
Mediterranean, intrusion of Maltese traders into Tripolitan markets by the encouragement 
of British consuls in Tripoli shrank the Tripolitan treasury, dragging Yusuf Pasha into a 
vicious cycle of unpaid debts. Several outbreaks of rebellions in the interior blew further 
to his authority. At last, he lost the last bit of legitimacy when he asked a traditionally 
tax-exempt privileged military class to finance the liquidation of his debts to the French 
traders and the Kuloğlu stroke the banner of rebellion, rallying around his grandson 
Mehmed. Eventually, two rival parties emerged in Tripoli to fill the power vacuum 
created by Yusuf Pasha’s mismanagement and resultant abdication in favor of his son Ali 
Bey. The struggle was to endure until the Ottoman naval squadron sent by the Sultan 
arrived in Tripoli on 25 May 1835. It was the moment which gave this thesis its title. 
The received wisdom in which Tripoli is portrayed as an integral part of the Ottoman 
Empire from the 16th century until 1912 Treaty of Ouchy may mislead us to think 
Ottoman intervention as the natural course of action but the naval squadron was the last 
card Ottomans had chosen to put forward. All along, the Ottoman decision-makers’ 
priority was to stabilize the region. To this end, Mehmed Şakir Efendi was sent to Tripoli 
to investigate the situation. The first course of action was to wait, probably, for the civil 
war to be sorted out by local contenders themselves. Prolongation of the conditions of 
civil war, though, had transformed Ottoman policy into a policy of full support behind 
Ali Bey in his fight against his nephew. Each party had its own local and international 
allies, which was resulting in an impasse in which either side would not surmount the 
other. On the other hand, the stalemate was rendering Tripolitan territory an easy target 
laying out in the open for potential claimants, which include France, the British and 
Hüseynids of Tunisia and Mehmed Ali of Egypt. Being aware of the escalating 
vulnerability of the region, as reflected in the reports of Mehmed Şakir Efendi, Ottoman 
high command ordered a naval squadron to be fit for duty. However, even days before its 
departure, its real ambition was disguised behind the excuse of helping Ali Pasha to 
dismantle his rival’s camp. An elaborate plan with a couple of contingency scenarios was 
laid out and Ottoman direct rule became the new reality of political life in Tripoli. 
Ottomans’ involvement in this inter-imperial competition had also its distinctive imperial 
aspects. For one thing, it was conceptualized as a new conquest by the highest council in 
the Empire. They decided to do more than to pacify the region for the benefit of the other 
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parties, seeking administrative, strategic and economic benefit for the Ottoman center 
itself. And ultimately, they had achieved what they aspired for. 
I believe that the very attempt at taking over the Tripoli and the plan’s eventual success 
goes against the paradigms in which the 19th century Ottoman Empire is portrayed as 
crumbling, disintegrating or diplomatically speaking as a passive object of the Eastern 
Question. In the 1820s and 1830s, a period when contemporary rivals of Ottoman Empire 
such as Russia and France see its destruction as imminent and impending, Ottoman center 
started to decisively re-expand southwards through eliminating powerful local dynastic 
structures around the empire, Karamanlı family being one of them. It doesn’t matter if 
they singlehandedly orchestrated a southern policy or seized the opportunities when they 
presented themselves, they were able enough not to be captioned as the “Sick Man of 
Europe.” Therefore, as far as political and diplomatic history concerned it is imperative 
to refrain from being blindfolded by what had happened at the end of the Great War. Such 
a point of view would give us the opportunity of thoroughly assessing the political 
choices, successes, and failures of the late Ottoman political elite.  
I believe, therefore, that it is due here to take a detour to talk about those who involved 
with the planning and execution of the Ottoman intervention and with the formulation of 
a loosely defined North African policy which basically aims at containing French 
expansion.  Most important among them, those who sit at the table when the decisions 
were being made and those who were operational in the field, were Hüsrev Mehmed 
Pasha, Necip Pasha, Damad Halil Rıfat Pasha, and Kaptan-ı Derya Tahir Pasha.  
First, it must be stated that each had become affiliated with the imperial navy, three of 
them at its highest office. Unfortunately, the main executioner of the plan is the most 
obscure one. Mustafa Necip Pasha was a graduate of palace school and after a career in 
Ottoman military, details of which are unknown, he became a general in 1832 and tasked 
with the elimination of Karamanlı dynasty in 1835. After he served as the guardian of 
Varna, he died in the early years of Abdülmecid’s reign (Çaycı 1995, 5). Hüsrev Mehmed 
Pasha is perhaps the most famous one. He was a Caucasian slave who had been also 
educated in the palace school and became a protégé of Silahtar Yahya and Süfyan Aghas. 
After his early years in the palace, he was attached to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and when his 
master was appointed as the Kaptan-ı Derya of the imperial navy, Hüsrev followed him 
as his kethüda, commencing his career out of the palace (Çelik 2013, 6-9). Mehmed Tahir 
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Pasha, also known as Çengeloğlu, had started his career in the North African corsair fleets 
and rose up in the imperial navy. After avoiding the annihilation of his ship Mecray-ı 
Zafer and his crew in the battle of Navarino (COA.HAT.402.21123, n.d), his career 
blossomed, becoming a ferik, Kaptan-ı Derya and Governor of Tripoli, respectively in 
1830, 1832 and 1837. After his second term as Kaptan-ı Derya between 1841 and 1843, 
he served as governor in several provinces and died in 1847 (Çaycı 1995, 6). Damad Halil 
Rıfat Pasha was also a Georgian slave. Interestingly enough, his master was Hüsrev 
Mehmed Pasha. He was first tasked with being his master’s treasurer, become Kaptan-ı 
Derya in 1830, and royal groom in 1834. He succeeded his master as the Serasker in 1836, 
continued to hold prominent positions until he died in 1856 and buried next to his master, 
Hüsrev Pasha (Çelik 2013, 421).  
Apart from being involved with the naval affairs of the Empire, these men have one other 
thing in common, that is, they are coming from traditional backgrounds. They were either 
slaves or free-born graduates of palace school who are deeply entrenched in factional 
politics. In the case of Tahir Pasha, he had entered the system through north Africa. 
Wouldn’t it be logical to ask how different a cadre is this from let’s say the 17th century? 
On the other hand, these so-called traditionally oriented people were smoothly 
orchestrating a political scheme that could even be considered as overseas expansion. Not 
only that, but they also started to lay the first bricks of Ottoman modernization in Tripoli. 
I believe that their success calls for a better evaluation of their legacy, by that I mean the 
legacy of their tradition to better understand the dynamics of the development of Ottoman 
modernity in the 19th century. 
Looking from such a perspective, the social distancing, even disdain, clearly discernible 
from the official correspondence of these Ottoman agents is all the more interesting. After 
all, apart from Mustafa Ali’s discussions of the people of the Cairo, Süleyman Penah 
Efendi as well in his Esbab-ı Tebdir-i Nizam-i Ekâlim had seen the “noble savages” in 
the persons of Albanians of Avlonya and Delvine in the late 18th century (Erdem 2017).60 
Therefore, perhaps it is possible to follow the tracks of a nuanced understanding of how 
the Ottoman center perceived and conceptualized its provinces and the people living in it 
with a better historicization. In our case, apart from the usual discourse of tribal “savage”, 
it turned out to be deeply intertwined with concerns of the legal jurisdiction of Ottoman 
 
60 See for the text of Esbab-ı Tebdir-i Nizam-i Ekâlim: (Süleyman Penah & Zararsız, 2017). 
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central government which is also blended with a belief in the religious superiority of the 
mezheb-i Numan b. Sabit. 
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